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Fady A. Qaddoura 
 
PHILANTHROPY, POLICY, AND POLITICS: 
POWER AND INFLUENCE OF HEALTH CARE NONPROFIT INTEREST 
GROUPS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH CARE POLICY 
 
Nonprofit organizations that “speak for, act for, and look after the interests of their 
constituents when they interact with government are, by any definition of political 
science, interest groups.” Indiana’s recent implementation of the Healthy Indiana 
Plan 2.0 (HIP 2.0) under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) opened a window of 
opportunity to closely examine the role of nonprofits in shaping the 
implementation of health care policy. Existing literature on health and human 
service nonprofit organizations did not examine in depth the role and influence of 
nonprofits as interest groups in the implementation of public policy. This study 
examines a deeper research question that was not given adequate attention 
under existing studies with a special focus on the health care policy field: whose 
interest do nonprofit organizations advance when they attempt to influence the 
implementation of public policy? To answer this question, it is critical to 
understand why nonprofits engage in the public policy process (motivation and 
values), the policy actions that nonprofits make during the implementation of the 
policy (how?), and the method by which nonprofits address or mitigate conflicts 
and contradictions between organizational interest and constituents’ interest 
(whose interest do they advance?).  
  
The main contribution of this study is that it sheds light on the implementation of 
the largest extension of domestic social welfare policy since the “War on Poverty” 
using Robert Alford’s theory of interest groups to examine the role of nonprofit 
organizations during the implementation of HIP 2.0 in Indiana. Given the 
complexity of the policy process, this study utilizes a qualitative methods 
approach to complement existing quantitative findings. Finally, this study 
provides a deeper examination of the relationships between nonprofits as actors 
vi 
within a policy field, accounts for the complexity of the policy and political 
environment, analyzes whether or not dominant interest groups truly advance the 
interest of their constituents, and provides additional insights into how nonprofits 
mitigate and prioritize competing interests. 
 
 
 
Dwight Burlingame, Ph.D., Chair 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Nonprofits deliver services on behalf of government and operate in sophisticated 
political and policy environments that affect their budgets, structure, mission, and 
constituents. In order for them to survive, nonprofits engage in the public policy 
process to protect their interest and produce favorable policy outcomes (Almog-
Bar & Schmid, 2014; Berry & Arons, 2003). In light of the critical role nonprofits 
play in serving the needs of millions of Americans, it is important for nonprofit 
scholars to examine the political behavior of health care nonprofits and develop a 
deeper understanding of whose interest they advance (Berry & Arons, 2003). A 
closer examination of the values, motives, and methods will help us better 
understand the political behavior of nonprofits as interest groups during the 
implementation of public policy. 
 
The question of whose interest must nonprofits advance is clear from a 
theoretical perspective: the interest of their constituents. From a legal 
perspective, and according to federal law and IRS Regulations, nonprofits are 
established to advance the best interest of their constituents or those who they 
serve.  However, given the complex political and policy environments that 
nonprofits operate within, the answer becomes less clear (Hudson, 2004). In 
addition, nonprofit organizations are value driven and not profit driven. This is 
evident in the health care field via IRS rules and regulations under the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) that mandate health care providers such as hospitals to 
complete a community health needs assessment once every three years, which 
is an indication that nonprofit hospitals have a social responsibility to address the 
needs of their constituents and communities. According to federal law and IRS 
rules, nonprofits are prohibited from advancing private interests and must exist to 
achieve "exempt purposes" including the relief of the poor, the distressed, or the 
underprivileged; advancement of education or science; erecting or maintaining 
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; 
lessening neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; 
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defending human and civil rights secured by law; and combating community 
deterioration and juvenile delinquency (IRS, 2017). 
 
To successfully analyze why and how nonprofits engage in the implementation of 
health care policy, this study will utilize a micro-level analysis of internal decision 
making processes within a given organization and meso-level analysis that 
focuses on the relationship between interest, power, and health care policy. For 
the purposes of this study, power is defined as the ability or capacity of an 
organization to dominate a policy field and influence decisions made by other 
actors to impact policy outcomes. When these two levels of qualitative analysis 
converge they produce a more comprehensive understanding of the policy field, 
organizational actors, organizational conflicts based on values and interests, and 
the distribution of power between nonprofit interest groups. This analysis can be 
best framed using Robert R. Alford’s theory of structural interests, which 
distinguishes between dominant, challenging, and repressed interest groups 
(Alford, 1975; Barker, 1996). According to Alford, institutions with dominant 
interest aim to maintain the status quo of a certain policy system to maximize 
their influence and benefits; challenging interest groups are less content with the 
status quo and envision the advancement of their interests through a structural 
and transactional change of a policy system; and repressed interest groups are 
the most impacted by the changes but are not well represented (Alford, 1975).  
 
In his 1970 case study examination of embedded structural interest within the 
New York health care system and policy field, Alford described dominant interest 
groups as professional monopolizers, challenging interest groups as corporate 
rationalizers, and repressed interest groups as organizations representing the 
poor working class. For the purposes of his study, Alford further explained 
professional monopoly as an interest group category that encompasses medical 
researchers, physicians in private or group practice, salaried physicians, and 
professionals in other health care occupations.  
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Alford also explained corporate rationalizers as an interest group category that 
encompasses medical schools, public health agencies, insurance companies, 
hospitals, and health planning agencies. Nevertheless, Alford was not 
prescriptive about the type of institutions that occupy each category of structural 
interest; rather, he concluded that different types of groups could occupy different 
categories of structural interest at different times (Alford, 1975). 
 
Due to the complex nature of the public policy process, nonprofits’ engagement 
in and influence over the implementation of public policy can be better 
understood using a qualitative method to extract meaning from nonprofit leaders 
regarding their organizational interest and ability to influence the implementation 
of health care policy. In addition, the qualitative analysis aims to uncover how 
nonprofits prioritize and mitigate competing or contradictory interests between 
the organization’s financial stability and the interest of constituents they serve. 
For example, the Indiana Hospital Association, which is a nonprofit organization 
that represents over one hundred seventy hospitals in Indiana, declares that one 
of their main policy goals is to increase reimbursement and financial stability for 
hospitals that they represent (Indiana Hospital Association, 2017). Other 
nonprofit organizations such as the United Way of Central Indiana advocate for 
the provision of affordable health care for working families. Therefore, different 
types of nonprofits may advance different types of interests based on their 
missions and motives.  
 
While different types of nonprofits behave differently, this study is focused on 
examining the behaviors of Indiana’s health and human service nonprofits as one 
system of organizations that is composed of multiple interest structures. This 
approach is more focused on the collective behavior rather than the individual 
behavior of nonprofits and is aligned with Robert Alford’s methodological 
assumptions of his New York City Health Agencies study, which was concerned 
with “how a complex system of organizations handle a problem” rather than how 
individual nonprofits behave within a policy field (Alford, 1975, p. 19).   
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Similar to Alford’s approach, the selection of nonprofits for this study was based 
on the researcher’s professional judgement and knowledge of the role of 
Indiana’s nonprofits in the health care policy field and delivery system. The 
selection criteria focused on nonprofits that interact with funding, regulating, and 
planning agencies (Alford, 1975). 
 
The empirical materials of this study are derived from only few 
organizations judged to be key ones in the process of decision 
making. The angel of vision is thus influenced to some extent by 
the choice of organizations, since the specific documents available 
will inevitably represent the interests of the organizations which 
provide the point of entry or access into the system.  
 
It is important to state that the political behavior and advocacy methods of 501-C-
3, 501-C-4, and 501-C-6 nonprofits depend on many variables such as an 
organization’s mission, role, scope of services offered, budgets, the impact of 
proposed policies, and the political calculus of benefits vs. harms resulting from 
taking a certain policy position on controversial policy proposals (Andrews & 
Edwards, 2004; Child, 2007; Donaldson & Shields, 2009; Kimberlin, 2010; 
Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Yoshioka, 2012). According to Andrew and Edwards, 
501-C-3s tend to be the least engaged in formal lobbying activities due to federal 
regulations that cap spending limits on lobbying activities (Andrews & Edwards, 
2004). 501-C-4 and 501-C-6 nonprofits are legally permitted to engage in 
different types of advocacy strategies to influence public policy such as agency 
advocacy, legislative advocacy, legal advocacy, and community advocacy (Ezell, 
2001; Mosley, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Wallack & Dorfman, 1996). 
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Policy Context: Indiana’s Medicaid Expansion 
 
The Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 (HIP 2.0) is Indiana’s Medicaid expansion program 
under the ACA (CMS, 2017). HIP 2.0 was modeled after HIP 1.0, which was 
designed by former Governor Mitch Daniels’ administration in 2007 and formally 
legislated in state law by the Indiana General Assembly with bi-partisan support 
(FSSA, 2016). The initial plan was designed based on a consumer-driven 
Medicaid model that was managed by Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) 
such as Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield, MDwise, and Managed Health Services 
(FSSA, 2016).  
 
The original design of HIP 1.0 included a high deductible health plan paired with 
Personal Wellness and Responsibility (POWER) account, which operated 
similarly to a Health Savings Account (HSA). The idea of personal monetary 
contribution towards one’s own healthcare was meant to encourage participants 
in the HIP insurance plan to make better decisions regarding their physical and 
behavioral health; utilize healthcare services appropriately without over utilizing 
or underutilizing available services; and demand cost-conscious quality 
healthcare services. Officials from the state of Indiana cite the success of HIP 1.0 
as the motive to design a new HIP plan that meets federal mandates to expand 
Medicaid without compromising the POWER account and consumer driven 
model (FSSA, 2016). 
 
HIP 2.0 sought replacing traditional Medicaid, or what is also known as the Fee-
For-Service model, for all non-disabled adults ages between 19 to 64 and 
expand HIP to those who fall below 138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). 
HIP 2.0 augments the existing HIP 1.0 program by offering HIP 2.0 to individuals 
previously excluded from the program due to eligibility restrictions and enrollment 
caps that were designed to maintain budget neutrality. This expansion of HIP 1.0 
targets an estimated 559,000 uninsured non-disabled adults ages 19 to 64 who 
earn an  income under 138% FPL (FSSA, 2016). Consistent with the State’s 
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original enabling legislation, HIP 2.0 promotes private employer based coverage 
over public assistance in several ways. First, the State implemented a new 
optional defined contribution premium assistance program, HIP Employer Benefit 
Link (HIP Link), designed to support individuals wishing to purchase their 
employer’s sponsored health insurance.  
 
Second, to promote private market family coverage, the State proposed an 
optional premium assistance program for children currently receiving benefits 
through the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), whereby the State 
provided premium assistance to allow the children to be covered under their 
parents’ employer-sponsored or Marketplace plan. Third, under HIP 2.0, 
members who consistently made required contributions to their POWER account 
maintained access to a new “HIP Plus” plan that included enhanced benefits 
such as dental and vision coverage. Members under 100% FPL who did not 
make monthly POWER account contributions were placed in the “HIP Basic” 
plan, a more limited benefit plan. The HIP Basic plan maintained essential 
benefits, but incorporated reduced benefit coverage and a more limited 
pharmacy benefit. The HIP Basic plan, unlike HIP Plus, required co-payments for 
all services. Fourth, recognizing the strong tie between work and health, HIP 2.0 
further promoted private market coverage and employment by introducing the 
HIP’s Gateway to Work program. This program required HIP 2.0 participants be 
referred to the State’s workforce training programs and work search resources to 
create opportunities for HIP members to connect with potential employers 
(FSSA, 2016).  
 
Given the unique opportunity to closely examine the implementation of HIP 2.0, 
this study will examine whose interest did Indiana’s nonprofit organizations 
advance when they attempted to influence the implementation of HIP 2.0?  
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To answer this question, a qualitative research methods was used to examine 
why nonprofits engage in the public policy process (motivation and values), the 
policy actions that nonprofits make during the implementation of the policy 
(how?), and the method by which nonprofits address or mitigate conflicts and 
contradictions between organizational interest and constituents’ interest (whose 
interest do they advance?). Chapter one reviews existing literature on nonprofits 
political behavior as public interest groups, their engagement in the policy 
process, and their advocacy to influence health care policies. Chapter two 
explains the research method. Chapters three and four provide the data analysis 
and findings. The conclusion offers closing thoughts on the importance of this 
research and raises additional research questions that are more suitable for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Three main bodies of literature inform the main research question of this study: 
interest groups theory, public policy implementation, and advocacy by health and 
human service nonprofits. Interest groups literature provides the historical 
development of interest group theory, summarizes existing research on 
nonprofits as interest groups, and highlights research areas that either received 
significant attention or were not deeply examined. The public policy literature 
summarizes the different stages of the public policy process, the role of 
nonprofits in the implementation phase of the public policy process, the impact of 
nonprofit advocacy on policy outcomes, and the impact of the policy and political 
environment on nonprofits. Literature on advocacy by health and human service 
nonprofits summarizes research that focused on advocacy by health and human 
nonprofit organizations, definitions and theories of advocacy, tactics and 
strategies, funding, and effectiveness of advocacy. The three bodies of literature 
illustrate that existing research provides a rich theoretical and empirical 
understanding of nonprofit advocacy, the policy process, and the impact of 
nonprofit advocacy on policy outcomes and the political environment. It is worth 
noting that existing literature does not offer a deep examination of conflicts 
between nonprofits’ organizational interest and the interest of those who they 
serve. This study examines the organizational values and motives, policy actions 
of nonprofits, and conflict of interest between organizational values and actions 
on one hand and the interests of those who they serve on the other.  
 
While understanding the interests of patients or clients from their own 
perspective is critical, this study focused on examining the organizational 
perspective of nonprofits’ interest vs. clients’ interest rather than clients’ 
perspective of whether or not they think their interest was advanced by nonprofits 
that serve them. Future research could examine the main research question of 
this study by interviewing clients and patients in addition to leaders of health and 
human service nonprofits.     
9 
Interest Groups Theory in Political Science 
 
American political scientists tend to agree that interest group theory originated 
from Madison’s contributions to the federalist papers and was initially referred to 
as “countervailing power” or “balance of interests” theory (Maisel & Berry, 2010, 
p. 37).  Madison was concerned that radical advocacy by one or several 
politically powerful groups to pursue selfish interests at the expense of the public 
good could create an authoritarian political system. Madison thought that 
extending the political system to allow greater participation by more groups would 
offset extreme shifts in governing and would mitigate risks associated with 
minority or majority tyranny (Berry & Wilcox, 2007). American political scientists 
tend also to agree that interest group theory was revived around 1908 and 
evolved over a period of few decades by going through four stages of theoretical 
development: group theory, pluralism, multiple elitist theory, and neo-pluralism. 
Arthur F. Bentley is recognized in the political science field as the pioneer scholar 
who helped advance James Madison’s group theory (Bentley, 1908) and David 
Truman as the reviver of Bentley’s work (Truman, 1951). Bentley’s work 
emphasized that the governmental process is an interaction “between power and 
economic interest while the state and the law were reducible to representation of 
interest” (Maisel & Berry, 2010, p. 39); Truman on the other hand focused on 
social and political interest rather than economic interest as the main motive for 
political activity by interest groups (Maisel & Berry, 2010, p. 39).  
 
Truman’s group theory was prominent in the 1950s but was displaced in the 
1960s by Robert A. Dahl’s Pluralism Theory (Dahl, 1967; Dahl & Lindblom, 
1953), which is a theory of power that focuses mainly on political parties and 
elections rather than public interest groups. Dahl’s theory incorporated some 
components of sociologist C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite Theory (Elwell, 2006) and 
emphasized that public policy is determined by interactions between interest 
groups, politicians, government officials, and political parties (Maisel & Berry, 
2010). However, Dahl’s argument was undermined by Mancur Olson Jr.’s 
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Collective Action Theory of Groups (Olson, 1965) and Theodor Lowi, Jr.’s 
Multiple Elite Theory (Lowi, 1965, 1968, 1969, 1974, 1976; Lowi & Ripley, 1973). 
Both Oslon and Lowi theorized that powerful elite interest groups dominate 
different policy areas (McFarland, 1969, 1976, 2004).  
 
Multiple elite theory dominated the field of political science as the prominent 
interest group theory until the end of the 1970s but was replaced by neo-pluralist 
theory during the 1980s and early 1990s (Berry, 2007). The theoretical 
foundation of neo-pluralist theory revolves around the idea that “countervailing 
power results from issue networks, advocacy coalitions, social movements, 
political patrons, and group entrepreneurs” (Maisel & Berry, 2010, p. 44; 
McFarland, 2004). Since the 1990s, interest group theory did not go through 
significant theoretical development; however, in the last decade, interest group 
theory received a renewed attention as a result of the scholarly work of B. Jones 
and Baumgartner on “politics of attention,” which is a theoretical framework in the 
political science field that is concerned with how the American political process 
works.  
 
The politics of attention is mainly concerned with the way politicians process 
streams of information flowing from different entities within the American political 
system, prioritize which issues to focus on or ignore, and allocate attention to 
certain policy issues. Entities with ideological and self-interest motivations such 
as interest groups, media outlets, government agencies, and politicians process 
facts and information differently and allocate attention to certain policy issues in 
ways that serve their interests. This builds on the theory of “complex political 
systems” and overlaps with theoretical notions of public policy changes, political 
agenda setting, and issue framing (Maisel & Berry, 2010, p. 47).  
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Nonprofits as Interest Groups 
 
Jeffery Berry’s book A Voice for Nonprofits is considered one of the most 
prominent scholarly works on nonprofits as interests groups. In his book, Berry 
presents evidence from an empirical study that he conducted to measure the 
impact of tax laws on nonprofits’ political participation. Berry argues in his book 
that tax deductibility and tax exemption laws deter 501-C-3 nonprofits from 
participating in the public policy making process, which in turn, “harms the most 
vulnerable populations, who are denied effective representation in the political 
system”(Berry & Arons, 2003, p. 4).  In addition, Berry argues that the rapid 
growth of the nonprofit sector, the domination of health and human service 
nonprofits within the sector, the expansion of the welfare state while concurrently 
downsizing federal and state governments, and the increase in government-
nonprofit subcontracting have transformed nonprofits from private charities to an 
arm of government, which complicates the public policy making process and 
creates a reciprocal impact on both sectors (Berry & Arons, 2003).  
 
The core idea of Berry’s book is that nonprofits are public interest groups and 
their engagement in political advocacy varies depending on their human and 
financial resources, level of interest in the political process, and level of risk 
associated with losing their tax exemption status if significant resources were 
spent on lobbying (Berry & Arons, 2003, p. 25). Berry argues that scholarly work 
on nonprofits’ engagement in the public policy process is scarce (Berry, 1977; 
Berry & Arons, 2003), so he aspires to use his book to “push scholarship towards 
boarder understanding of nonprofit’s role in public policymaking” by emphasizing 
how lack of engagement by nonprofits as lobbies “works against the interests of 
those people who have no one else to represent them” (Berry & Arons, 2003, p. 
25).  
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Berry presents several critical ideas in his book that include the following: the 
study of interest groups is the study of how various constituencies are 
represented in the political process; government regulations affect entry of 501-
C-3 nonprofits to the policy making process; nonprofits are considered interest 
groups because they represent constituencies with a variety of needs; and 
existing political science theories, such as elite theory and political opportunity 
theory, do not adequately explain the participation of nonprofits in policy making 
(Berry & Arons, 2003, pp. 29-34). In addition, Berry explains that government 
intentionally regulates the interest group market to control the influence of 
interest groups over the policies that govern them; to ensure government integrity 
and accountability; to preserve order among competing interests and interest 
groups; and to subsidize and promote unrepresented groups in the policy making 
process (Berry & Arons, 2003, pp. 35-36).    
 
In addition to A Voice for Nonprofits, Berry published two valuable books, The 
Interest Group Society and Lobbying for the People. Both books aim to further 
advance understanding of interest groups. In Lobbying for the People Berry 
focuses on the structure, operations, and advocacy decision making process of 
public interest groups and he examines the conversion process by which public 
interest groups convert constituent preferences into political and policy agendas 
(Berry, 1977). Berry distinguishes between private and public interest groups in 
the following ways: (1) private interest groups are special interest groups that 
interact with the government to influence public policy outcomes to benefit their 
members only. Private interest groups can represent for-profit corporations or 
closed membership non-profit organizations (Berry, 1977, 1989). (2) Public 
interest groups are organizations that attempt to influence public policy outcomes 
so that the benefits may be enjoined by the general population (Berry, 1977, 
1989).  
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According to Berry’s definition, the terms “private” and “public” are not used in the 
legal sense to differentiate between non-profit and for-profit organization based 
on their registration with the IRS; rather, the terms are used to distinguish 
between different constituency types that are represented by interest groups. In 
order to complete his study, Berry conducted 83 structured interviews, two case 
studies, and participant observations methods. Findings from Berry’s study 
highlight the following: (1) Public interest groups contribute to the American 
political system by bringing new issues to the forefront of the political agenda; (2) 
through litigation, administrative intervention, and other tactics public interest 
groups perform a law enforcement function in obtaining new rulings or exacting 
compliance with old ones; (3) public interest groups educate the public, facilitate 
citizenship participation, and represent the policy preferences of their 
constituents; and that (4) government should not circumscribe the participation of 
public interest groups in the political process, especially public interest nonprofits 
that are registered with the IRS as 501-C-3  tax exempt organizations (Berry, 
1977). 
 
Berry’s third book The Interest Group Society used a framework of traditional 
democratic theory to address macro level questions relating to the origins, 
proliferation, and impact of interest groups, both private and public, on American 
political parties and elections. Although Berry’s book did not focus on nonprofits, 
his arguments provide a good framework for researchers in the philanthropic 
studies field to understand the political process in which nonprofits participate. 
Berry makes several important arguments in this book that revolve around the 
following ideas: (1) Interests and interest groups are not the same and should be 
distinguished from each other;(2) interest groups facilitate citizens’ participation 
in the political process, help cultivate social capital, and improve the functioning 
of government by monitoring government programs and policies;  
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(3) interest groups are not political parties or social movements, although social 
movements are composed of many interest groups; (4) the public distrusts 
interest groups in general but still value organizations that represent them; (5) 
since the 1990s, politicians and lobbyists created and protected a revolving door 
between government, private sector, academia, and other institutions to influence 
public policies; and (6) interest groups intensified their involvement in elections 
since the 1990s with the hope of influencing election outcomes that are more 
favorable towards certain policy arenas (Berry & Wilcox, 2007).  
 
Berry concludes his book with a call to reform campaign finance and lobbying 
laws to encourage and empower unrepresented groups to gain access to the 
political process and make their voices heard during critical phases of the policy 
decision making process. Similar to Berry, several academics and scholars 
published in recent years several books calling for reforming laws to curtail the 
corrupting role of money in politics and to address ethical issues arising from the 
revolving door between government and private interest groups (Lessig, 2011; 
Sachs, 2012).  
 
Jeffery Berry’s books A Voice for Nonprofits and Lobbying for the People are 
highly cited and respected publications; however, over the past two decades, a 
new generation of social scientists became more interested in understanding the 
role and impact of public interest groups on the American political and policy 
processes (Boris & Steuerle, 2006; Bryce, 2012; Grossmann, 2012; Hessenius, 
2007). Grossman’s book The Not-So-Special Interests: Interest Groups, Public 
Representation, And American Governance focuses on two main research 
questions: who is represented? And whose voice is heard? Grossman uses 
“Behavioral Pluralism” theory to explain the relative representation of public 
groups, and “Institutionalized Pluralism” to explain why some organizations 
representing these groups are more successful than others.  
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Behavioral Pluralism “suggests that advocacy organizations represent the distinct 
interests and ideas of public groups in proportion to the civic and political 
capacity of those groups” (Grossmann, 2012, p. 8); and institutionalized pluralism 
“suggests that certain organizations become the presumed representatives of 
public groups in all types of media and all branches of government … their 
structural attributes enable them to play these legitimized roles in public 
representation and policy deliberation” (Grossmann, 2012, p. 9). Grossman 
conducted an empirical study that covered 1600 advocacy organizations that are 
active in the Washington D.C. area and concluded that their legitimacy and 
effectiveness of representation depended on the civic and political capacity and 
characteristics of their organizations and constituencies (Grossmann, 2012).  
 
Similar to Grossman, Anthony J. Nownes’ book Interest Groups in American 
Politics: Pressure and Power explains the paradox of interest groups, what 
interest groups are, what they do, and what role they play in American politics. 
Although nonprofits are referenced extensively throughout his book, the author 
did not dedicate enough focus on the role of nonprofits as public interest groups 
in the political and policy process. Bryce’s book Players in the Public Policy 
Process: Nonprofits as Social Capital Agents did a better job in examining 
nonprofit organizations as social capital assets and agents of public policy within 
a principal-agent framework. Bryce’s interdisciplinary approach draws on 
economics, sociology, political science, and public choice theories to 
systematically develop the main argument of the book, which is that nonprofits 
are institutional forms of social capital (Bryce, 2012). 
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Nonprofits and the Public Policy Process 
 
Scholarly work tends to examine advocacy in a context that is framed by the 
political and policy environments that nonprofits operate within (Berger, 2011; 
Berry, 1977; Berry & Arons, 2003; Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Frumkin, 2002; 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2007, 2011; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012; Stone & 
Sandfort, 2009). This context portrays nonprofits as agents of public policy that 
“foster, formulate, perform, and evaluate society’s policies that are in the 
furtherance of the public good” (Bryce, 2012, p. 10). Therefore, nonprofits as 
agents of public policy are public interest groups entrusted by those who they 
represent to carry critical functions that preserve democracy and address the 
needs of citizens. Although many nonprofits view the term “interest group” 
negatively, nonprofits as public interest groups play a critical role in a democratic 
political system by representing constituents, facilitating political participation for 
vulnerable citizens, educating the public and government representatives about 
important social and economic issues, shaping local and national political 
agendas, and monitoring efficiency and effectiveness of government programs 
(Avner, 2001; Berry, 1977; Berry & Arons, 2003; Bryce, 2012; Janda, Berry, 
Goldman, & Hula, 2001; Jenkins, 2006; Pekkanen, Smith, & Tsujinaka, 2014; 
Salamon, 2003). In order to understand how nonprofits as public interest groups 
participate to influence local, state, and national political and policy agendas, it 
becomes critical to examine the policy setting agenda process.  
 
John Kingdon’s agenda setting framework occupies a prominent place in the 
public policy literature and is relevant to the implementation of HIP 2.0 because 
HIP 2.0 was designed at the state level, approved by CMS as “Section 1115 
Demonstration” waiver, and funded by state and ACA dollars. “Section 1115 
Demonstration” is a federal waiver process that gives states great flexibility to 
develop and implement their own policies as pilot programs with the goal of 
testing new and innovative ideas that could further advance the federal policy 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017).  
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Indiana’s architects of HIP 2.0 designed the policy in a way that complied with 
the ACA but added additional components that are unique to Indiana. Therefore, 
I argue that HIP 2.0 policy decisions were made at the state level during the 
implementation of the ACA in Indiana and that makes Kingdon’s framework 
relevant to HIP 2.0 (Lipsky, 1980).  
 
In his book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies Kingdon examines three 
main questions: how are political and policy agendas are set? How the 
alternatives for policy choices are specified? And why do these processes work 
the way they do?  To answer these questions, Kingdon considers the pre-
decision aspects of the policy process (Xinsheng Liu, 2010) and expands the 
“garbage can model of organizational choice” (Michael D. Cohen, 1972), which is 
a theoretical framework that explains policy making as a combination of 
problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. According to 
Kingdon, political and policy agenda setting is enabled through the interaction of 
three streams: the problem stream, the political stream, and the policy options 
stream (Kingdon, 2011).  
 
The problem stream addresses how problems capture the attention of politicians 
and government officials; the policy stream addresses how policy proposals 
evolve as a result of proposals and ideas that originate within policy networks 
such as universities, think tanks, public policy institutes, and private entities; and 
the political stream focuses on public mood, pressure groups campaigns, 
election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of 
administration (Kingdon, 2011). Nonprofits play a critical role in the pre-decision 
aspects of the policy process by educating the public and government 
representatives, mobilizing grassroots resources, engaging in public campaigns, 
organizing public awareness events, and building coalitions to participate in 
administrative and legislative lobbying (Hessenius, 2007; Mintrom, 1996; Reid, 
2000).  
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Kingdon argues that policy changes only occur if the three streams converge. 
Therefore, to influence public policy outcomes, participants in the policy making 
process, including nonprofit public interest groups, must align their collective 
efforts to help the three streams converge to create the right conditions that lead 
to a “policy window of opportunity” (Bryce, 2012; Kingdon, 2011).  
 
Similar to Berry and Kingdon, Di Gioacchino, Ginebri, and Sabani studied how 
interest groups influence policy outcomes. In their book The Role of Organized 
Interest Groups in Policy Making, Di Gioacchino et al utilized empirical 
approaches to explain the various types of lobbying activities carried by interest 
groups to buy access to policy makers, strategically gain and transmit 
asymmetric information, and influence pre-election politics or electoral 
competition (Bryce, 2012; Di Gioacchino, Ginebri, & Sabani, 2004; Hessenius, 
2007). Their contribution is significant to the overall scholarly understanding of 
the role and impact of lobbying on policy outcomes; however, the theoretical and 
empirical frameworks that they used were not tested on nonprofit public interest 
groups.  
 
Thus, their findings can neither be generalized to an existing theory on nonprofit 
advocacy nor could they be generalized to advocacy organizations in the 
nonprofit sector. The lack of focus on nonprofits in the political science field 
creates a window of opportunity for nonprofit researchers to expand and test 
existing interest groups theoretical frameworks to the nonprofit sector to 
understand why nonprofits advocate and who do they represent.    
 
In addition to research work presented above, several researchers attempted in 
recent years to use different theoretical frameworks to explain nonprofits 
participation in advocacy. Joanne Sobeck conducted a single case study 
research to examine healthcare nonprofits participation in the early development 
phase of a substance abuse policy in a local community context.  
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Sobeck used the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), bureaucratic politics 
framework, and institutional analysis and development framework (IADF) to 
examine group membership and participation (Sobeck, 2003). Sobeck’s research 
results showed that ACF and IADF best explained group membership and 
participation. The theories presented above are helpful in providing a linear 
explanation of a complex political and policy process but fail to explain why 
different types of nonprofits engage in the process and whose interest they 
advance.   
 
Nonprofits and Public Policy Implementation 
 
This research examines the role played by Indiana’s health and human 
nonprofits in influencing decisions made by state actors such as the Indiana 
Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) during the process of 
implementing the Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0. FSSA led the efforts to design and 
implement Indiana’s Medicaid expansion program as mandated by the ACA. The 
ACA provided states with the general policy framework that defined minimum 
eligibility and benefits coverage requirements and gave states some flexibility to 
experiment with innovative design and implementation programs to reduce cost 
of services and improve quality of care. Indiana’s human and health nonprofits 
engaged in the implementation process to influence certain program design and 
implementation decisions such as eligibility requirements, benefits coverage, and 
financial reimbursements. 
 
Implementation of public policy is the “carrying out or execution of a program that 
has been adopted by legislation or by executive or judicial order” and involves 
three activities: organization, interpretation, and application (Knill & Tosun, 2012; 
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Rushefsky, 2008, p. 17).  
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Organization refers to entities that provide resources, funding, facilities, 
technology, etc.; interpretation refers to the translation of the law into programs 
or policies at the local or state level, which tends to be complex; application 
relates to the implementation of changes to a program or funding as prescribed 
by legislation. The implementation of public policy is “deliberate, institutionally 
sanctioned change motivated by a policy or program oriented toward creating 
public value results on purpose. When successful, policy and program 
implementation creates public value by enabling collective impact beyond the 
narrow self-interest of any particular actor or institution” (Gerston, 2010; Sandfort 
& Moulton, 2014, p. 11).  
 
Implementing new public policies and programs that are large in scope and scale 
require the support of the public through formal democratic processes such as 
election referenda, federal rule making, or electing candidates who champion 
shared values and policy proposals. Therefore, it is critical that the 
implementation of the policy or the program meet the expectations of the public 
in order for it to be viewed as effective (Conlan, Posner, & Regan, 2017; 
Sandfort, 2017). Given that there are multiple invested constituencies in the 
health care policy field, delivery of services by front line workers and the overall 
programmatic operations of the system influence the perception of the target 
population (Benjamin, 2012; Benjamin & Campbell, 2015; Sandfort & Moulton, 
2014). If the policy is viewed favorably by the public due to the quality of program 
delivery, then the target group will be more satisfied and engaged with the new 
program. Effective policy implementation results in systematic changes at the 
policy field, organization, and frontline levels and promotes firmer integration 
between ideas and practices in the delivery system and daily operating 
procedures (Sandfort & Moulton, 2014).  
 
 
 
21 
The quality of services offered and the surrounding environment under a new 
policy or program influence clients’ satisfaction; therefore, the means (policy 
implementation) and the ends (policy outcomes) are equally important.   
 
While policy fields differ, the implementation of public policy across different 
fields share common concepts.  First, policy and program implementation occurs 
at different levels within a system. Second, “people in the policy or program area 
share a common understanding about the task at hand, the relationships they 
have with each other, and the taken for granted assumptions of that setting;” 
power structures, and the spoken and unspoken rules (Sandfort & Moulton, 
2014, p. 17). Third, informal influences shape action and understanding of what 
is possible and considered legitimate. Fourth, collective action is required from all 
levels of the implementation system to ensure effective changes (Sandfort & 
Moulton, 2014). Entities that aim to influence policy implementation using their 
expertise and resources are mainly interested in dominating the policy field 
structure and its processes. Therefore, it is critical to consider the resources and 
processes that exist within key organizations to understand why and whose 
interest do they aim to advance.  
 
It is worth noting that there is no reasonable distinction between policy 
formulation and implementation except at the theoretical or conceptual level 
(Majone & Wildavsky, 1978; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983).  On a conceptual 
level, earlier studies divided policy implementation into stages: policy outputs of 
implementing agencies, compliance with policy outputs by target groups, actual 
impacts of policy outputs, perceived impacts of policy outputs, and major 
revisions in statute (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). These stages are often 
referred to as the feedback loop (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). With the 
evolution of policy implementation research and after reviewing more than one 
hundred studies over three hundred implementation variables, many scholars 
concluded that policy implementation literature does not need more variables; 
rather, it needs more structure (Matland, 1995; O'Toole, 1986).     
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Contemporary policy implementation literature divides policy implementation into 
two main schools of thought: top-down and bottom-up (Knill & Tosun, 2012; 
Matland, 1995). Top down theorists consider policy designers as the central 
actors with the ability to influence the implementation of public policy while 
bottom up theorists consider target groups and service deliverers as influential 
actors who shape public policy implementation at the local level (Matland, 1995).  
 
Existing studies identify four policy implementation paradigms that help explain 
the influence of ambiguity and conflict levels within a policy field on the 
implementation process: (1) low conflict- low ambiguity (administrative 
implementation); (2) high conflict – low ambiguity (political implementation); (3) 
high conflict-high ambiguity (symbolic implementation); and (4) low conflict – high 
ambiguity (experimental implementation)  (Matland, 1995).  Policy conflicts 
during implementation occur as a result of interdependence of actors, an 
incompatibility of objectives and interests, and perceived zero-sum element to 
the interactions (Matland, 1995). Policy ambiguity during implementation occurs 
as a result of ambiguous goals and implementation means (Matland, 1995). 
Figure 1 below summarizes the four policy implementation paradigms. 
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Figure 1: Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix: Policy Implementation Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Administrative implementation, or low policy ambiguity- low conflict 
implementation paradigm, provide the pre-requisite for a rational decision-making 
process by which goals are given and a technology or means for solving the 
existing problem is known (Matland, 1995). Under this paradigm, outcomes are 
determined by resources and problems that arise are primarily technical. Actors 
under the political implementation, or low ambiguity-high conflict implementation 
paradigm, have clearly defined goals but dissension occurs because the clearly 
defined goals are incompatible (Matland, 1995). Under this paradigm, 
implementation outcomes are decided by power and actors or coalition of actors 
have sufficient power to force their will on other participants or resort to 
bargaining to reach an agreement (Matland, 1995). To achieve successful 
implementation, policy designers and state actors must secure the compliance of 
actors whose resources are vital to policy success to ensure that the process is 
not thwarted by opponents of the policy.  
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Many actors have independent bases of power and can refuse to participate 
without having their missions threatened (Matland, 1995).  Under the 
experimental implementation, or high policy ambiguity and low policy conflict, 
outcomes will depend on which actors are active and involved and contextual 
conditions will dominate the process.  Finally, under the symbolic 
implementation, or high policy ambiguity and high policy conflict, the policy aims 
to confirm new goals, reaffirm a commitment to old goals, or emphasize the 
importance of certain values and principles (Matland, 1995). The policy course is 
determined by the coalition of actors at the local level who control available 
resources.  
 
The Policy Implementation Environment 
 
Public policy formulation and implementation does not exist in a vacuum 
(Edwards, 1984; Matland, 1995; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Nakamura, 1980). 
Policy implementation can be influenced by actors and arenas, organizational 
structures and bureaucratic norms, and communication networks and compliance 
mechanisms (Nakamura, 1980). Actors include nonprofits, public and private 
interest groups, formal implementers, policy makers, intermediaries, 
administrative lobbies, powerful individuals, policy recipients or consumers, the 
mass media, and other interested parties have a critical role to play in shaping 
policy and influencing the implementation process (Nakamura, 1980). 
Institutional structures and bureaucratic norms can be explained by one of the 
following four institutional models: (1) The systems management model, which 
views implementation as an ordered, goal oriented activity; (2) the bureaucratic 
process model, which views implementation as a more routine process of 
continually controlling discretion; (3) the organizational development model, 
which views the implementation as a participatory process in which implementers 
shape policies and claim them as their own; and (4) the conflict and bargaining 
model, which views implementation as a conflict and bargaining process 
(Nakamura, 1980).  
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A variety of organizational factors can influence an institution’s implementation 
efforts, including internal procedures, allocation of resources, and psychological 
motivations and bureaucratic norms (Nakamura, 1980). Finally, given the 
complexity of the implementation environment and diversity of actors and 
interests, it is necessary for policy implementers to create linkages with policy 
makers and evaluators via communication networks and compliance 
mechanisms for actors to comply (Nakamura, 1980). 
 
Few nonprofit researchers, such as Honeycutt and Strong, examined the impact 
of the external environment on nonprofits’ internal decision making process to 
engage in advocacy. Honeycutt and Strong used social network analysis to 
predict early collaboration within health advocacy coalitions (Honeycutt & Strong, 
2012); Frumkin and Andre-Clark researched the impact of welfare reform politics 
on social welfare nonprofits’ strategy (Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000); Salamon 
and Twomblt researched nonprofits adaptation under social welfare reform 
legislation (Salamon, 1987; Twombly, 2003); and Schmid et al researched the 
relationship between political activity and advocacy of health and human health 
service nonprofits outside of the USA (Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008a).  
 
Nicholson Crotty’s research re-affirms that political and policy environments do 
influence nonprofits’ decision to engage in the political and policy process. Her 
research focused on reproductive health providers to examine the likelihood of 
these nonprofits advocating to change public policy restricting the delivery of 
reproductive health services. The author expected an increased likelihood of 
nonprofits advocacy as the political liberalism of the state increases.  The 
findings reveal that there is a connection or correlation between policy and 
politics on one hand and the political activity of nonprofit service providers on the 
other. Nicholson Crotty asserted that nonprofit organizations advocate when the 
threat from government institutions to their ability to deliver core services is 
sufficient to justify engaging in political activity and when they perceive the 
highest probability of success (Nicholson-Crotty, 2007, 2009, 2011).  
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Finally, the author declared that her research findings indicate that measures of 
institutionalization and resource dependence prove to be inconsistent predictors 
of political activity and nonprofits’ motive to engage in advocacy (Herrnson, 2000; 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2007). 
 
Advocacy by Health and Human Service Nonprofits 
 
Health and human service nonprofit organizations occupy a prominent space in 
the American health and social service sector and play a critical role in 
representing vulnerable populations (Donaldson, 2007; Grogan & Gusmano, 
2007; Metcalfe, 2002; Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008b). In order to preserve their 
mission, serve their constituents, and improve the environmental conditions for 
vulnerable citizens, nonprofits engage in different forms of direct and indirect 
advocacy. Research relevant to nonprofit policy advocacy that has been 
published over the past two decades covered several areas of advocacy by 
nonprofit human service organizations. The following sections provide an 
overview of existing research.  
 
Definition and Theories of Advocacy 
 
The term advocacy is  used differently in nonprofit studies (Reid, 2000). Several 
researchers examined the various definitions of advocacy, origins of the term, 
and its current uses in studies related to nonprofits (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014; 
Berger, 2011; Ezell, 2001; Kimberlin, 2010; Pekkanen et al., 2014; Reid, 2000). 
Reid defines advocacy as a “wide range of individual and collective expression or 
action on a cause, idea, or policy” (Reid, 2000, p. 1) to educate the public, shape 
public opinion, propose policy solutions, mobilize resources, influence political 
and policy agenda setting, influence design and implementation of a policy, gain 
access to policy makers, or influence the outcomes of elections. These activities 
illustrate the critical role nonprofits play in representing their constituents and 
facilitating citizens’ participation in the political process.  
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Both Reid and Berger distinguish between advocacy as a form of civic 
engagement, citizens’ collective action, social protest, and other forms of 
advocacy such as professional lobbying, whether administrative, legislative, or 
judicial. Berger argues that advocacy is one form of civic engagement, which is a 
broad definition that includes several types of advocacy such as political activity, 
lobbying, and community organizing(Berger, 2011). Pekkanen et al define 
advocacy as “the attempt to influence public policy, either directly or indirectly” 
(Pekkanen et al., 2014). Definitions of advocacy used by Reid, Jenkins, Boris, 
Andrews and Edwards, Donaldson, Salamon, and Donaldson overlap and 
complement each other (Kimberlin, 2010).  
  
Nonprofit scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and economists use different 
theoretical frameworks to explain nonprofit advocacy. During the last two 
decades, nonprofit scholars expanded their use of theoretical frameworks to 
examine why nonprofits advocate (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014; Clerkin, 2006; 
Gray, Lowery, & Benz, 2013; Grogan & Gusmano, 2007; Hasenfeld & Garrow, 
2012; Jenkins, 2006; Kimberlin, 2010; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007). Jenkins used the 
following five reasons to explain the formation of nonprofit advocacy 
organizations: 1) disturbance or strain ideas, 2) resource mobilization, 3) political 
opportunities, 4) organizational ecology theory, and 5) social constructionist 
arguments about the framing of collective grievance and organizational 
repertoires.  Jenkins suggested that all these explanations could be considered 
critical to the formation of new advocacy organizations with one or more of these 
theories more relevant depending on other factors present (Jenkins, 2006).  
Schmid and Bar used a framework that combined neo-institutional theory and 
resource dependence theory to analyze political activities of nonprofits (Schmid 
et al., 2008b). Clerkin also used neo-institutionalism to test whether the 
isomorphic pressures of organizational fields inhibits or facilitates an 
organization’s engagement in advocacy (Clerkin, 2006).  
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Findings by Schmid, Bar, and Clerkin indicate that institutional, organizational, 
and environmental features have an impact on level of nonprofit advocacy and 
that more formal organizations with greater number of volunteers are more likely 
to engage in advocacy.  Neo-institutional theory emphasizes the rules and 
procedures emanating from the institutional environment while resource 
dependence asserts that organizations often become dependent on their 
environments for resources that are critical for their survival (Schmid et al., 
2008b).  
 
Salamon, Gronberg, and Child used resource mobilization, bureaucratization of 
nonprofits, and theories of conflict and partnership between nonprofits and the 
state to examine whether or not government funding affects how nonprofits 
advocate (Kimberlin, 2010). Research findings by the three scholars indicate that 
larger, more professionalized, and government funded nonprofits tend to engage 
in advocacy more frequently and more aggressively than smaller nonprofits 
(Donaldson, 2007; Kimberlin, 2010). Garrow and Hasenfeld used institutional 
logic to study the difference between advocacy for social benefits versus 
advocacy for organizational benefits (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014). Their findings 
indicate that organizations that place the cause of the problem on the individual 
tend to advocate less than organizations that blame the external environment. 
Similar to Garrow and Hasenfeld, Gray et al examined advocacy by healthcare 
interest groups to influence the 2010 healthcare reform proposal in the United 
States. Gary et al conducted empirical studies and used innovation theory and 
population ecology theory to answer the above question and they concluded that 
interest groups in the field of healthcare are multi-level structured interest group 
systems that innovatively engage effectively on state level to influence the design 
and implementation of several policy areas (Gray et al., 2013). In her book, Gray 
focuses on the configuration of interest groups under the healthcare subsector 
and she pays close attention to advocacy by managed care entities, 
pharmaceutical drug enterprises, healthcare finance organizations, healthcare 
advocacy groups, health professional associations, and direct patient care 
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providers. She also traces legislative and media activities relating to healthcare 
reform from the early 1980s to 2010 at the state level and concludes that the 
intensity of these activities and lack of reform initiatives on the national level led 
states to innovatively design state solutions to address healthcare issues. 
However, her book does not focus on the role of nonprofits as interest groups in 
influencing state level policy implementation.  
 
Role, Scope, Types, and Funding of Nonprofit Advocacy 
 
Advocacy by nonprofits differ from one organization to another depending on the 
organization’s mission, role, scope, and services offered (Andrews & Edwards, 
2004; Child, 2007; Donaldson & Shields, 2009; Kimberlin, 2010; Leroux & 
Goerdel, 2009; Yoshioka, 2012). Yoshioka focused on the representational roles 
of nonprofits (Yoshioka, 2012); Caira focused on the role of health experts and 
policy entrepreneurs in advocacy and policy (Caira et al., 2003); Kerlin and Reid 
focused on the relationship between funding sources of advocacy and ability to 
influence policy (Kerlin & Reid, 2010); and Andrew and Edwards focused on the 
growth and characteristics of advocacy organizations along the key dimensions 
of organizational structures, membership and participation, resources and inter 
organizational networks.  
 
The research conducted by Andrew and Edwards examined the role and 
influence of advocacy organizations in politics in five categories of the policy 
process: 1) agenda setting, 2) access to decision-making arenas, 3) achieving 
favorable policies, 4) monitoring and shaping implementation and 5) shifting the 
long term priorities and resources of political institutions. Andrew and Edwards 
concluded with a recommendation to reorient scholarship towards the 
interactions between advocacy organizations and political institutions to 
understand the patterns of influence and answer core questions about 
democracy and government responsiveness (Andrews & Edwards, 2004).  
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Balassiano and Chandler examined the emerging development of state 
associations of nonprofit organizations and a national federation of state 
associations to determine if these associations increase the role of nonprofits in 
advocacy and participation in community decision making and to what degree 
they help the sector exert influence in the public policy arena?  Balassiano and 
Chandler contend that the recent trend to devolve power from the federal 
government to the state and local levels has resulted in the transfer of a large 
amount of decision making authority to individual state legislatures.  States are 
contracting out to nonprofits and exerting new authority to define how nonprofits 
function.  A study of the National Council of Nonprofit Associations (NCNA) and 
seven high performing member state nonprofits indicated that among the proven 
strategies for organizational survival and sustainability are networking and 
collaboration for resource mobilization, service delivery and policy advocacy.  
The NCNA and state associations are helping nonprofits grow, adapt and do the 
work of impacting public policy (Balassiano & Chandler, 2010) 
 
Strategies, Tactics, and Effectiveness of Nonprofits Advocacy 
 
Several nonprofit researchers examined the topic of strategies, tactics, and 
effectiveness of nonprofits policy advocacy over the past three decades (Ezell, 
2001; Mosley, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Wallack & Dorfman, 1996). Ezell 
focused on four broad nonprofit strategies: agency advocacy, legislative 
advocacy, legal advocacy, and community advocacy. He argued that in order for 
nonprofits to engage in effective advocacy, nonprofits must use appropriate 
tactics under each strategy. The following are examples of such tactics under 
each strategy: (1) Agency advocacy strategy – watch dog tactic: monitoring 
agency activities, planning and decision making processes, budgets, programs, 
and outcomes; meeting with agency officials; working with insider advocates; 
accessing information using administrative procedures such as the Access to 
Public Records Act; and joining task forces.  
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(2) legislative advocacy: legislative monitoring, lobbying and testifying, publishing 
position papers, testifying in committee meetings, alerting constituents and 
advocates, working with legislative staff, seeking executive veto or signing, and 
engaging in non-session activities such as organizing networks and coalitions, 
training advocates, and participating in political campaigns. (3) Legal advocacy: 
litigation and non-litigation tactics to change court rules, challenge agency rules, 
and stop detrimental practices. (4) Community advocacy – using media, direct 
community education. In addition to Ezell, other scholars attempted to develop a 
framework for measuring the effectiveness of advocacy, especially in the 
healthcare field (Fagen, Reed, Kaye, & Jack, 2009). However, the majority of 
nonprofit researchers recognize the challenges associated with measuring the 
effectiveness of advocacy due to the limitations of current theoretical frameworks 
that explain nonprofit advocacy (Berry & Arons, 2003; Kimberlin, 2010; Lowi, 
1976; Pekkanen et al., 2014; Schmid & Almog-Bar, 2013). 
 
In summary, existing research on health and human service nonprofit 
organizations did not examine in depth the question of whose interest do 
nonprofit organizations advance when they attempt to influence the 
implementation of public policy? To answer this question, an in depth research is 
needed to understand the role and influence of health and human service 
nonprofits as interest groups in the implementation of public policy (Almog-Bar & 
Schmid, 2014; Berry & Arons, 2003; Browne, 1990; Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014; 
Gray & Lowery, 1996; Kimberlin, 2010; Nicholson-Crotty, 2011; Schmid & Almog-
Bar, 2013). Alford’ theory provides a suitable framework to examine the role of 
Indiana’s health and human nonprofits in the implementation of the largest 
extension of domestic social welfare policy in Indiana since the “War on Poverty.” 
In addition, Alford’s theoretical framework of structural interests is capable of 
modeling: the complexity of relationships between nonprofits as actors within a 
policy field, the complexity of the policy and political environment, and the 
competing interests between dominant, challenging, and pressed interests. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Qualitative, Document Analysis, and Visual Trending 
 
In terms of a theoretical analysis, this study uses Robert Alford’s interest group 
theory to help us understand why and how Indiana’s nonprofits engaged in the 
implementation of the ACA on a statewide level. Due to the complex nature of 
the public policy process and the ways by which nonprofits engage to influence 
the implementation of public policy, this study uses three research methods: (1) 
A qualitative method to extract meaning from nonprofit leaders regarding their 
organizational interest and ability to influence the implementation of health care 
policy; (2) Review of state published HIP 2.0 documents; (3) Visual Trend 
Analysis to validate whether or not patients’ interest, measured by level of 
satisfaction of the quality of services they received, was advanced through the 
expansion of Medicaid. Indiana’s health care advocacy and service providing 
nonprofit leaders argued that any expansion would improve services to their 
patients. While an increase in patients’ satisfaction rates cannot be fully be 
attributable to the ACA expansion, the trend analysis is used to validate whether 
or not Indiana’s patients perception confirms the claims made by Indiana’s 
nonprofits health care organizations. To test for a correlation between the ACA 
expansion and customer satisfaction an advanced statistical analysis is needed, 
which is outside the scope of this study.     
 
The qualitative analysis aims to explore and uncover how nonprofits prioritize 
and mitigate competing or contradictory interests between organizations’ 
financial stability and the interest of constituents they serve. For example, the 
Indiana Hospital Association, which is a nonprofit organization that represents 
over one hundred and fifty hospitals in Indiana, declares that one of their main 
policy goals is to increase reimbursement and financial stability for hospitals that 
they represent (Indiana Hospital Association, 2017).  
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Other nonprofit organizations such as the United Way of Central Indiana 
advocate for affordable health care coverage for working families. Therefore, 
different types of nonprofits may advance different types of interests based on 
their missions and motives.  
 
Furthermore, the findings from the qualitative analysis will confirm whether or not 
dominant interest groups truly advance the interest of their constituents and will 
provide additional insights into how nonprofits mitigate and prioritize competing 
interests. 
 
In addition to interviewing leaders of nonprofits, an examination of select HIP 2.0 
state published documents informed the findings of this study. Three main 
questions researchers must consider when using a document analysis method: 
(1) what constitutes a document? (2) What is the context of the document? (3) 
How does a researcher approach analysis of the document content?  Documents 
should not be treated as stable, static and pre-defined artifacts; rather, they 
should be considered in terms of fields (involving creators, users and settings), 
frames (context) and networks of action (Prior, 2011). Documents may be texts, 
printed and electronic documents, sculptures, paintings, architectural 
organization of space and different forms of written texts; are “social facts” which 
are produced, shared and used in socially organized ways (Bowen, 2009); and 
are produced in a context of socially organized projects that include certain social 
rules, structures and production interactions that occur between the author 
“function”, consumers and producers. Authenticity is an issue when the use has 
significant social or political consequences, as consumers shape the form and 
content of the document.   The strategy for content analysis depends on whether 
the researcher wishes to move beyond the surface content of the document and 
more into its functioning, in which case schemes of referencing and social 
activities offer insights into analysis of document content and function.  
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Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating 
documents that requires data to be examined and interpreted in order to elicit 
meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge.  Document 
analysis is also used as one strategy in triangulation, which combines 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon: drawing on multiple 
sources of evidence and methods, the researcher seeks convergence and 
corroboration.  Documents serve five specific functions: (1) they provide 
background and context; (2) prompt additional questions to be asked; (3) are a 
source of supplementary data; (4) a means of tracking change and development; 
and (5) a way to verify findings form other data sources (Bowen, 2009).  
 
The document analysis process involved the following steps: 
1. Searched for, downloaded, and examined tens of documents from 
FSSA’s HIP 2.0 website to evaluate their relevance to the research 
project. 
2. Conducted additional research to understand the context that the 
documents were created within, such as the time period, the author, 
publication site, target audience, political events that occurred during 
the time of drafting and publishing the documents, etc. 
3. Analyzed the documents to construct and interpret meaning and craft 
answers to the main questions that this project is concerned with. 
Literature on document analysis cautions researchers from two types of bias 
when using documents are: (1) selection bias, which events are covered; and (2) 
description bias: how, and how well, the events are covered (Bowen, 2009; Earl, 
Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004; Prior, 2011).  Selection bias may be loosely 
considered a function of how “newsworthy” a given story is , whether 
“newsworthiness” is considered an event characteristic or a social construct, and 
is thus context-specific, as well as variable among types of publications (Bowen, 
2009; Earl et al., 2004; Prior, 2011).  
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Similarly, description bias takes into account not only any active framing or 
representation choices made by the publisher or an author, which may reveal 
readership preferences as well as editorial preferences; it also includes omission 
of information. Researchers must assess potential biases, and considering 
options for reducing their effect on the research such as triangulation by use of 
multiple resources (including electronic databases), and methodologically sound 
imputation of missing information.  The use of documents should be considered 
with respect to how well the source fits the research question, and with an 
understanding of the strengths and limitations of the source. 
 
The third method used is Visual trending analysis, which illustrates the change in 
patient satisfaction levels for services they received within a local hospital in 
Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. The visual trending analysis 
utilized the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems Survey (HCAHPS), attached in Appendix E, which is a national 
standardized survey instrument that is administered by the Centers on Medicare 
and Medicaid (CMS). CMS is the authorized federal agency that is entrusted with 
overseeing the design of the collection methodology for measuring patients' 
perspectives on hospital care. 
 
The HCAHPS survey is administered to a random sample of adult patients 
across medical conditions between 48 hours and six weeks after discharge; the 
survey is not restricted to Medicare beneficiaries (The Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, 2017). Hospitals may either use an approved survey vendor, 
or collect their own HCAHPS data (if approved by CMS to do so). HCAHPS can 
be implemented in four different survey modes: mail, telephone, mail with 
telephone follow-up, or active interactive voice recognition (IVR). Hospitals can 
use the HCAHPS survey alone, or include additional questions after the core 
HCAHPS items.  
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Hospitals must survey patients throughout each month of the year. The survey is 
available in official English, Spanish, Chinese, Russian and Vietnamese 
versions. CMS cleans, adjusts and analyzes the data, then publicly reports the 
results. The HCAHPS survey contains 21 patient perspectives on care and 
patient rating items that encompass nine key topics: communication with doctors, 
communication with nurses, responsiveness of hospital staff, pain management, 
communication about medicines, discharge information, cleanliness of the 
hospital environment, quietness of the hospital environment, and transition of 
care. The survey also includes four screener questions and seven demographic 
items, which are used for adjusting the mix of patients across hospitals and for 
analytical purposes. The survey is 32 questions in length. For purposes of this 
study, the visual trending analysis relied on data collected for questions 10 and 
11 of the survey: questions 10 (H_HSP_RATING_9_10) and 11 
(H_RECMND_DY) of the survey (The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
2017).  
 
To ensure that HCAHPS scores allow fair and accurate comparisons among 
hospitals, it is necessary to adjust for factors that are not directly related to 
hospital performance but which affect how patients answer survey items. CMS 
and the HCAHPS Project Team (HPT) apply adjustments that are intended to 
eliminate any advantage or disadvantage attributable to the mode of survey 
administration or characteristics of patients that are beyond a hospital’s control. 
In addition, the HPT undertakes a series of quality oversight activities, which 
include site visits of HCAHPS survey vendors to inspect survey administration 
procedures and trace records, and statistical analyses of submitted data, to 
assure that the HCAHPS Survey is being administered properly and consistently 
(The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2017). 
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As shown in Figure 2 below, states that expanded Medicaid by January 1, 2014 
were AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, IA, KY, MD, MA, MN, NJ, NY, ND, 
NM, NV, OH, OR, RI, VT, WA, WI, and WV; and states that did not expand 
Medicaid or expanded later than January 1, 2014 were AK, AL, FL, GA, ID, KS, 
LA, ME, MI, MS, MO, MT, NE, NC, NH, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, and 
WY. The Medicaid expansion became effective in January 2014 for all expansion 
states except for the following: AK (September 2015), IN (February 2015), LA 
(July 2016), MI (April 2014), MT (January 2016), NH (August 2014), and PA 
(January 2015). Since data go through 2015, we identified those states that 
expanded after January 2014 but before January 2016 as expansion states only 
in the quarters after the expansion was implemented. 
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Figure 2: Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions 
 
Coverage under the Medicaid expansion became effective January 1, 2014 in all 
states that have adopted the Medicaid expansion except for the following: 
Michigan (4/1/2014), New Hampshire (8/15/2014), Pennsylvania (1/1/2015), 
Indiana (2/1/2015), Alaska (9/1/2015), Montana (1/1/2016), and Louisiana 
(7/1/2016). 
 
Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, and New Hampshire have 
approved Section 1115 waivers for the Medicaid expansion. Arizona received 
CMS approval on September 30, 2016 to transition expansion coverage to 1115 
waiver authority; implementation of the waiver provisions related to the 
expansion population are pending CMS approval of the state's Operational 
Protocol. Wisconsin covers adults up to 100% FPL in Medicaid but did not adopt 
the ACA expansion. 
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Research Hypothesis 
 
This research hypothesizes the following: 
 
1- Due to the high cost of providing quality health care, there is an inherent 
conflict between nonprofit financial interest and the interest of their 
Medicaid patients. Patients desire to receive the highest quality of care at 
the lowest cost possible while hospitals desire to maximize revenues by 
providing services at the lowest cost. Therefore, dominant health care 
organizations prioritize their interest as a top priority and engage in the 
policy process to protect their interest.  
 
2- Challenging and suppressed interest groups engage to protect the interest 
of the most vulnerable in their communities.  
 
3- The more benefits nonprofit health care organizations receive from 
government, the more these nonprofits will attempt to dominate the policy 
field.  
 
4- Unlike challenging and suppressed interest groups, dominant health care 
nonprofits tend to be very influential, connected to the political elite, have 
abundance of resources, and are focused on protecting long term goals. 
Challenging and suppressed interest groups tend to collaborate with each 
other to counter public power and private interest via networks of 
coalitions.  
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Sample Group 
 
To comply with the federal requirements, FSSA conducted public hearings prior 
to the implementation of HIP 2.0 to collect public feedback on the implementation 
of HIP 2.0. The public hearing events were conducted at the Indiana Government 
Conference Center and the State House while the public conversations events 
were sponsored and organized by several health provider organizations across 
the state. Among those who testified during the public hearing events are the 
following: Sherri Jawett CEO of Valle Vista Health, a mental health hospital and 
mental health organization in Greenwood, Indiana; CEO of Wellstone Regional 
Hospital; Michiana Behavioral Health Center;  Ambre Marr, state legislative 
director for AARP; Rylin Rodgers Family Voices – Indiana; Tanya Shelburne, 
Vice President at Little Red Door Cancer Agency; Brian Tabor, Indiana Hospital 
Association – representing 160 hospitals in Indiana; Jocelyn Forehand, CEO of 
SouthSide OBGYN and legislative liaison for Medical Group Management 
Association - Indiana Chapter; Bob Holda, citizen (advocating on behalf of the 
Medicaid-Employed-Disabled population); Michael Schwing – homeless citizen 
and serves on several committees of the CoC; Mark Monson President of 
Fairbanks, Alcohol and Drug Treatment Center; Kristen Metzger President of 
Blue Cross Blue Shield Medicaid Division; Paul Chase, deputy director of policy 
and administration for Covering Kids and Families Indiana; Jean Scallon CEO of 
Bloomington Meadows Hospital; Katherine Wentworth – Chief Operating Officer 
of MDwise; and Rev. Dan Gangler Director of Communications Indiana 
Conference of the United Other organization Church, 1020 congregations across 
Indiana. The Public Conversations on the Future of Healthcare in Indiana took 
place at Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center Education Centers; Indiana 
University Northwest/IU School of Medicine-Northwest; Southwest Indiana 
Chamber luncheon; Hendricks Regional Health YMCA; Ivy Tech Community 
College Northeast; St. Elizabeth Hospital; Memorial Lodge; and Community East 
Hospital. 
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Selection Criteria 
 
Eight nonprofit organizations were selected from the pool of organizations that 
testified publically during the implementation of HIP 2.0 and engaged with FSSA 
during the implementation phase. Leaders of eight organizations were 
interviewed and interview data was analyzed to evaluate the role played by the 
eight organizations using Alford’s framework of dominant, challenging, or 
repressed interest groups. The following organizations were selected: (1) two 
health care providers and two trade associations that represents health care 
institutions in Indiana. Given that health care institutions are major providers of 
health care services, this group tends to be a dominant group that enjoys large 
influence over state actors and the health care policy field in Indiana. (2) Two 
challenging interest organizations such as advocacy nonprofits. These groups 
tend to challenge the proposed design and implementation of the program to 
achieve better outcomes for those who they serve. (3) Two repressed interest 
groups that represent the working class. This group tends to represent the voices 
of repressed individuals and communities.  
 
Similar to Alford’s approach, the selection of nonprofits for this study was based 
on professional judgement and knowledge of the role of Indiana’s nonprofits in 
the health care policy field and delivery system. More specifically, the selection 
criteria focused on nonprofits that interact with funding, regulating, and planning 
agencies. 
 
The empirical materials of this study are derived from only few 
organizations judged to be key ones in the process of decision 
making. The angel of vision is thus influenced to some extent by 
the choice of organizations, since the specific documents available 
will inevitably represent the interests of the organizations which 
provide the point of entry or access into the system (Alford, 1975).  
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It is also critical to note that interviewees from the selected nonprofits were high 
level executives who had the authority to represent and speak on behalf of their 
organizations regarding their values and policy positions. Emulating Alford’s 
framing of this issue, this study considered interviewees as social actors within 
diverse organizational and professional context. Alford’s study was “concerned 
with the ways in which ideologies are constructed to defend structural interests 
composed of social roles and positions attached to only parts of the individuals” 
(Alford, 1975, pp. 18-19). For the purposes of this study, and given that all 
interviewees were senior executives within their organizations, the researcher 
treated statements made by interviewees as formal representation of their 
organizational positions.  
 
Following Alford’s approach proved useful in shedding light on roles played by 
the system of different types of nonprofits during the implementation of the ACA 
in Indiana and whose interest they advance. This study emulates Robert Alford’s 
methodological approach, which was concerned with how a complex system of 
organizations handles a problem rather than the behavior or history of one 
organization or analyzing organizational variables such as dependence, 
resources, strength, or persistence (Alford, 1975).  
 
Interview Instrument 
 
This qualitative research is focused on exploring, describing, and understanding 
nonprofits that participated in Indiana’s Medicaid expansion as public interest 
groups. Data was collected from interviews with leaders of Indiana based health 
care nonprofit organizations with primary focus on health care service delivery or 
health care advocacy using questions in the interview tool in Appendix A to 
collect data that is relevant to answering the following questions: Do these 
organizations advocate for their interest or the interest of their patients? Do these 
nonprofits have similar level of influence on the policy outcome and if not then 
why?  
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Do these nonprofits focus on macro policy issues or do they focus on micro level 
niche areas that are more transactional in nature? How do these nonprofits 
resolve conflict among themselves and with public power (state) and other 
private interest? What internal and external organizational factors strengthen an 
organization’s ability to influence outcomes of health care policy in Indiana? 
 
Data Analysis Procedures 
 
Interview data analysis procedures included line by line coding, categorization, 
conceptualization, and text analysis. The data analysis process involved multiple 
steps as outlined below:  
1. Focused coding of interviews  
 
2. Raised the most important codes to categories.   
 
3. Selected main themes that relate to the main question of this project, and 
drafted analytical memos.  
 
4. At the end of the research project, all memos were further developed and 
the findings are included in the next section. 
 
The document analysis process involved the following steps: 
 
1. Searched for, downloaded, and examined over 50 documents from 
FSSA’s HIP 2.0 website to evaluate their relevance to the research 
project. 
 
2. Conducted additional research to understand the context that the 
documents were created within, such as the time period, the author, 
publication site, target audience, political events that occurred during the 
time of drafting and publishing the documents, etc. 
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3. Analyzed the documents to construct and interpret meaning and crafted 
answers to the main questions of this research study. 
 
Strategies for Validating Findings 
 
The strategy to validate findings includes member checks, peer review, providing 
thick description and evidence, and clarifying the researcher’s role and biases. 
All interviewees were offered to receive a copy of the final transcript to review for 
accuracy of statements.  
 
Anticipated Ethical Issues 
 
Participants of this study did not belong to any marginalized or vulnerable 
population and no emotional or physical stress was expected as a result of 
participating in this study. In addition, I addressed the necessary research 
concerns about privacy issues relating to protecting the identity of participants 
and their organizations and protecting data in my approved IRB protocol.    
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
This study has several limitations: 
 
1- The study solicited empirical data from executives of Indiana’s health and 
human service nonprofits only. Due to limited time and resources, the 
study did not solicit empirical data from interviewing patients. 
 
2- Over twenty organizations received interview requests but only eight 
organizations accepted to participate.  
 
3- A quantitative study using an advanced statistical design is needed to 
confirm any correlation between patients’ level of satisfaction with services 
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they received before and after Medicaid expansion. If Medicaid expansion 
directly correlates to an improved patient satisfaction, then the policy 
actions of health and human service nonprofits in support expanding 
Medicaid confirm that nonprofits acted to advance the best interest of their 
patients.  
 
4- Certain findings that were generated from this study cannot be 
generalized to nonprofits on a national level because Indiana’s Medicaid 
expansion customized certain components of the expansion that are 
different from traditional Medicaid expansion.  
 
5- While statements made by senior executives were treated as formal 
statements representing their organizational positions on public policy, 
there is a potential that certain statements were more of a personal 
opinion rather than formal representation of organizational positions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The interview analysis process led to the discovery of seven main themes that 
emerged from the categories that evolved out of the initial coding phase and from 
my Interviews. The main themes that emerged out of my interviews are 
presented and briefly discussed below. 
 
Interview Data 
 
Theme 1: Experienced in Politics and Policy 
 
Question 1: Describe your professional background? 
 
All interviewees are highly educated nonprofit leaders who hold prominent 
leadership roles within their organizations. They all have extensive experience in 
the fields of law, politics, lobbying, and health care policy and administration. Five 
of the eight interviewees are registered lobbyists.  
 
Participant A  
 
Participant is highly educated, served in advanced leadership roles, worked for 
both nonprofits and state government, worked directly with clients (service 
provision) and indirectly (formulating and implementing new state programs and 
policies), has a deep level of understanding of the role of public policy, and 
engaged in educational initiatives.  
 
Participant B  
 
Participant B decided to join the health care advocacy field after experiencing 
health care complications within the participant’s family.  
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This participant is highly educated, served in advanced leadership roles, worked 
primarily for nonprofits and a health care system, worked extensively on policy 
issues and connecting clients with resources, has a deep level of understanding 
of the role of public policy, and engaged in educational initiatives on a local and 
national level. 
 
Participant C  
 
Participant C worked is highly educated, served in advanced leadership roles, 
worked in state and local politics for over two decades, is a registered lobbyist, 
mainly focused on policy issues, has a deep understanding of the role of public 
policy, and engages in formal lobbying and educational initiatives on a local and 
statewide level. 
 
Participant D  
 
Participant D is highly educated, served in advanced leadership roles, connected 
with elected officials and state politicians on a personal and professional levels 
for over four decades, has a deep understanding of the role of public policy, and 
extensively engaged in educational initiatives on a local, state, and national 
levels. 
 
Participant E  
 
Participant E is highly educated, served in an advanced role in a local faith-based 
nonprofit, a registered lobbyist, mainly focused on policy issues, has a deep 
understanding of the role of public policy, and is engaged in initiatives to educate 
elected officials and membership organizations.  
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Participant F  
 
Participant F is highly educated, served in an advanced role in a statewide 
nonprofit, a registered lobbyist, mainly focused on policy issues, has a deep 
understanding of the role of public policy, and is engaged in initiatives to educate 
elected officials and membership organizations.  
 
Participant G  
 
Participant G is highly educated, served in an advanced role in a statewide 501-
C-3 nonprofit, a registered lobbyist, worked in politics for over two decades, 
mainly focused on policy issues, has a deep understanding of the role of public 
policy, and is engaged in initiatives to lobby elected officials and educate 
membership organizations.  
 
Participant H  
 
Participant H is highly educated, served in advanced leadership roles, has a deep 
understanding of the role of public policy, and spent close to two decades in 
health care administration. 
 
Theme 2: Their Membership, Patients, and the Larger Community 
 
Question 2: Organization’s Constituents: Who is your main constituency? 
 
The primary constituency for four organizations are their board members and 
CEOs of member organizations [two 501-C-6 Trade Association, the 501-C-3 
faith-based organization, and the statewide mutual benefits organization]. By 
extension, these four organizations view the larger community as their target 
constituency.  The other four organizations view the patient and the larger 
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community as their primary constituency [two 501-C-3 health care providers and 
the two 501-C-3 hospital systems].    
 
Participant A  
 
Participant A indicated that the organization’s primary constituents are low 
income, chronically ill patients, with income below 225% of the Federal Poverty 
Line (FPL). Donors, staff, and volunteers are considered secondary.  
 
Participant B  
 
Participant B indicated that the organization’s primary constituents are families 
who are navigating systems and services while caring for family members with 
disabilities and complex health care needs. Families that may have connected 
with the organization in the past tend to become volunteers and donors. 
Therefore, the organization is led by individuals who are passionately connected 
to the mission of serving families who care for disabled individuals.  
 
Participant C 
  
Participant C indicated that the organization’s primary constituents are state-wide 
for-profit and nonprofit health systems and their CEOs and board members.  
 
Participant D  
 
Participant D indicated that the organization’s primary constituents are patients 
and their families and the larger community in which the health institution operate 
within as the secondary constituency. 
 
We have a duty of responsible grace. We have to discharge that 
duty and the only way to discharge that duty is to hold it at the 
center of our work, [which is to serve] the patient and their families. 
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Participant E  
 
Participant E indicated that the organization’s primary constituents are board 
members who represent local houses of worship.  
 
Participant F  
 
Participant F indicated that the organization’s primary constituents are member 
organizations from across the state. These state-wide organizations are 
comprised of all of their donors, volunteers, and all funded partners, and local 
community. By extension, Participant F considers communities as the targeted 
constituency, which is much broader than the board membership. 
 
Participant G  
 
Participant G indicated that the organization’s primary constituents are member 
organizations from across the state. However, Participant G believes that the 
public benefits greatly from good health policies that are advanced by this 
organization. 
 
Participant H  
 
Participant H indicated that the organization’s primary constituency includes 
patients, their families and the larger community. 
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If you look at it truly down to the granular side of it, [our 
constituents] are those people who are struggling…. those who are 
poor and vulnerable. So when you truly look at the granular nature 
of it, we are all poor and vulnerable at some point in our lifetime… 
so for us that’s everybody. We look at that and say those are our 
patients, our consumers, our constituents…. Maybe we would say 
the communities, it so much broader than that [more than patients]. 
It is the broader community. We believe everybody at some point in 
their life will have an issue, we want to be able to help them solve it.  
So when we understand that side of the community, our role [is] to 
help make communities thrive. [We ask ourselves] how do we 
improve [the] health status [and] health outcomes in the 
communities in which we are present, which is every county in the 
state of Indiana. 
 
Theme 3: Different Levels of Organizational Maturity 
 
Q3: Organization’s Background: Describe the organization’s service model, 
funding, staffing, and relationship with local or state government? 
 
The two Hospital systems are very unique because they are among the largest 
employers in the state with tens of thousands of employees statewide, highly 
structured, operate almost in every county of the state, maintain budgets with 
billions of dollars, serve millions of people, very well connected to policy makers 
and the corporate community, engage in direct and indirect lobbying and 
advocacy activities, highly regulated and operate in a very volatile market place, 
and very focused on long term strategies and goals. The two trade associations 
are very different in their size, scope, budgets, and level of influence. The more 
influential trade association is the one that represents primary and acute health 
care services. The other trade association represents a stigmatized community 
that suffered from lack of societal investments for centuries. The mutual benefits 
association and the faith-based nonprofit share similar characteristics: small 
budgets, small teams, boards are composed of executives of locally affiliated 
chapters or branches, self- preservation is important to both organizations given 
the diversity of their membership, advocacy and policy stances are evaluated 
based on political calculus, religious values, and internal consensus.  
52 
The two health care providers are very committed to their patients, they are 
focused on their mission, operate with small budgets, employ few staff members, 
have a very limited influence over policy, they serve a very specific segment of 
the population, and do not receive state funding.      
    
Participant A  
 
Participant A indicated that the board is composed of diverse group of members 
who work mainly in the private sector. The organization employs a small team of 
staff that serves disadvantage, poor, undocumented, and uninsured individuals. 
The organization operates in a locally limited geographical area and provides 
limited health care services that are philanthropically funded. The organization 
does not rely on local or state government funding.  
 
Participant B  
 
Participant B indicated that the board consists mainly of individuals who 
experienced living with a disabled family member. The organization was founded 
to focus on policy, advocacy is carried by volunteer parents, operates statewide, 
employs a small team of staff, serves families with disabled family members, 
funded by a federal grant and does not rely on state government funding, and 
provides research and information to families, physicians, teachers, elected 
officials, and state agencies. 
 
Participant C  
 
Participant C indicated that this trade association is a state-wide organization that 
represents 179 member organizations (includes for-profit and nonprofit health 
institutions, behavioral health facilities with inpatient beds and emergency rooms, 
community mental health centers, free standing psychiatric hospitals). The 
organization employs 30 staff members, funded by membership dues, 
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occasionally receives federal grants for statewide health care initiatives, and not 
affiliated with national organizations but occasionally coordinates fundraising 
activities with national organizations who share similar missions and goals.  
The core mission of the organization is to advocate and lobby state and federal 
entities to enhance reimbursement rates and protect member organizations from 
disadvantageous regulatory issues. 
 
Participant D  
 
Participant D indicated that the organization is one of the largest health care 
organizations in the state of Indiana, controlled by members with deep religious 
values who are commitment to high standards of ethics and are very well 
connected to policy makers, legal experts, and the corporate community. Few 
board members are appointed by the church. The board has a formal values 
committee chaired by an expert on law and ethics and the organization has a 
values fund and a values officer who reports directly to the CEO and the board. 
The organization employs over 40,000 individuals, holds billions in fixed assets, 
and operates state-wide in urban, suburban, and rural areas. The organization 
receives state and federal funding for participating in state and federal health 
care programs. The organization requires large budgets to mitigate operational 
and budgetary risks associated with the complexities of the federal health care 
system, constant changes in federal and state laws, shifts in populations, and 
socio-economic swings that resulted in a highly volatile health care market or 
industry. The organization employs registered lobbyists and also contracts 
directly with lobbyists.  
 
Participant E  
 
Participant E indicated that the board represents liberal and conservative local 
houses of worship and organizations that belong to that specific faith. The 
organization employs a very small team of staff that includes one registered 
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lobbyist, focused on advocacy and public policy, funded from membership dues, 
does not contract with any governmental entity, and formulates policy based on 
religious principles.  
 
Participant F  
 
Participant F indicated that board members are CEOs of statewide affiliates who 
represent different communities (liberal and conservative; rural, urban, and 
suburban; affluent and disadvantaged; etc.), the organization employs a small 
team of advocacy staff with one registered lobbyist, funded from membership 
dues, does not receive state dollars, focused on multiple policy areas that include 
health care, and enjoys a decent working relationship with state agencies and 
elected officials. The organization tends to be politically neutral and does not take 
formal positions on controversial issues to avoid internal conflicts within the 
membership.   
 
Participant G  
 
Participant G indicated that the organization is a state-wide trade association, the 
board consists of CEOs of locally affiliated chapters or institutions, has a very 
limited budget, employs a small team of staff with one registered lobbyist, does 
not receive state or federal dollars or participate in government programs, 
focused on promoting good policies that relate to a specialized area of health 
care that benefits a specific segment of the population. 
 
Participant H  
 
Participant H indicated that the organization operates statewide in almost every 
county, is a subsidiary of a national organization with a budget of over $23 billion 
dollar dedicated to health ministry, heavily driven by religious values, 
organization receives federal and state funding, employs professional advocacy 
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staff, contracts directly with lobbying firms, and formulates policy based on 
religious principles.  
 
Theme 4: Different Methods (Formal, Informal, Direct, Indirect) 
 
Q4: Organization’s Advocacy decision making process, type and purpose: 
During the implementation of HIP 2.0 in Indiana, what was the decision 
making process to formulate your organization’s policy position? 
 
The eight organizations fully supported HIP 2.0 because the policy expands 
coverage to the uninsured population and allows organizations to improve their 
finances, which in return allows them to serve more people. HIP 2.0 was viewed 
favorably by most organizations thus minimizing internal conflicts. All 
organizations have a formal process to finalize policy and advocacy positions, 
some are more complicated than others. With the exception of the two health 
care providers, the remaining six organizations engaged in formal and informal 
lobbying activities. The two Hospital systems were focused on long term strategic 
goals, business model stability, and securing favorable regulations. The two 
trade associations have similar process to formulate policy, policy positions 
represent the best interest of their membership, and by extension they think they 
benefit the population they serve. The mutual benefits association, the faith-
based nonprofit, and the two health care providers formulated advocacy and 
policy decisions based on political environment, a calculus of cost-benefits to 
their organizations and constituents, religious values and guiding missions and 
principles, and aimed to mitigate internal conflicts through consensus building.  
 
Participant A  
 
Participant A indicated that organizational conflicts do exist at different levels 
within the organization: board, volunteers, donors, and clients. When the ACA 
became law, board members who were mainly Republican business leaders 
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objected to certain aspects of Medicaid expansion. However, when HIP 2.0 was 
introduced as the state model for expanding Medicaid, board conflicts were 
mitigated by the board’s commitment to formulate their policy positions based on 
the organization’s mission, values, and commitment to serve their clients.  
This allowed the board to support HP 2.0 even-though the position contradicted 
personal or political ideology of certain board members. Among the examples of 
controversial issues that the board had to decide on are two examples: the 
smoke ban law and serving undocumented women who needed treatment. The 
organization did not solicit client input to formulate the organization’s policy 
stance. Clients did not always understand their own interest due to the 
complexity of HIP 2.0. According to Participant A, the organization did not consult 
with patients but strongly felt that the organization must represent their interests. 
Clients were not always engaged in the process except on rare occasions when 
they were asked to testify.  
 
Most constituents did not engage in the [policy decision making] 
process. They were not fully educated about the impact of the 
proposed policy. We felt strongly about being their voice. 
 
Participant B  
 
Participant B indicated that the board makes policy and advocacy decisions 
based on data, research and best practices. Clients did not always understand 
the details of the policy and how it may help or hurt their own interest. Therefore, 
the organization played a role in educating clients about the policy and how it 
impacts their interest. Given that clients were not always engaged in the process, 
the organization tried to engage constituents using surveys and social media. 
During the implementation of HIP 2.0, organizational conflict was minimal given 
that HIP 2.0 did not directly impact the organization or their population.  
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Participant C  
 
Participant C indicated that the association’s advocacy agenda is formulated 
based on feedback from districts and executives of member organizations. 
Proposals are presented to sub committees called councils.  
Council on government relations is the most prominent and plays significant role 
in developing policy. The Council recommends policies to the board. In the past, 
the association outsourced all lobbying activities. Most recently, the organization 
decided to insource, or bring back in house, most of the lobbying activities. The 
association has full time staff in senior positions dedicated to governmental 
affairs and legislative relations. The association supported HIP 1.0 and HIP 2.0 
for many reasons including: higher reimbursement rates, expanded coverage to 
help the uninsured, and the ability to influence health outcomes.  
 
Participant D  
 
Participant D indicated that the organization engaged in formal lobbying activities 
by staff, coordinated external lobbying activities with the trade association, and 
worked directly with governors and executives of state agencies. Top executives 
spent a great deal of time educating the public, employees, and peers. The CEO 
gave over a 1000 speeches in 5 years, engaged with mayors and governors for 
over 5 decades, had direct access to governors to discuss HIP 1.0 and HIP 2.0., 
and firmly believed that health care was not just an employee benefit but also the 
social issue of our time.  
 
We [employ] 40,000 employees, if you add [their] dependents, that 
[is a] six figure workforce. So a lot of times we were educating 
ourselves. [We engaged in educational initiatives during] the HIP 
1.0 [in collaboration with] Governor Daniels and HIP 2.0 with 
Governor Pence. [Our educational initiatives focused on motivating] 
people about [HIP 2.0 especially] in the for-profit world because 
most of the insurance payers are for-profit. 
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There was body politics [that my organization] had to deal with. [I 
worked with] everybody. I would deploy myself on a discrete basis 
when [there was a need for] direct communication with the head of 
the FSSA, the head of any state department, the head of OMB, the 
Governor himself. I think I met with governor Pence onetime alone 
in his office at my request to make sure that we are all on the same 
page. 
 
 
Participant E  
 
Participant E indicated that the board formulates policy based on religious 
principles. Self-preservation is important to the board given the diversity of the 
faith-based community that they represent, advocacy and policy stances are 
evaluated based on political calculus, religious values, and internal consensus.  
 
The fundamental sort of question that we ask ourselves is this a 
religious issue? And that really determines what our public policy is 
going to be. The reason that we're involved in public policy is little 
bit self-serving. Is that our primary mission is to make sure that the 
religious community is safe and secure and that we have a place 
where we can live, practice freely, engage freely, communicate 
freely, and ensure [these freedoms] for [our] community. We also 
need to have a hand in ensuring [those freedoms] for the entire 
community. [But I recognize that our positions] are a little bit self-
serving. 
 
We have an internal system here, our Board of Directors is made 
up of representatives from almost all the houses of worship in 
town… as well as other membership organizations. We have a 
couple of at-large members that represent [specific communities]. 
What we say is that we work on a process of consensus. To 
determine what a policy issue before us, it is a process. My 
government affairs committee hears the issue, talks about the 
issue, addresses a policy position and then the board will ultimately 
decide, but the biggest piece is consensus. We do not act unless 
there is clear consensus in the community and we do not have a 
definition of consensus. [Consensus] is somewhat something less 
than unanimity but more than a simple majority. Kind of you know it 
when you see it. But if we don't feel like we have the clear 
consensus of the community we don't act on the issue. 
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Participant F  
 
Participant F indicated that advocacy and policy positions are determined 
through a highly structured process that uses a set of principles that aim to 
protect the organization’s reputation and relationship with communities and 
donors. The organization avoids taking positions on controversial issues and 
plays the role of a convener to help opposing parties reach a compromise.   
 
I will start with the broadest level and that is we have a lot of e-mail 
communications throughout our policy update newsletter, which 
goes out to about 1500 staff. I also communicate by actually visiting 
a lot of communities where we hold a lot of community 
conversations or we have feedback sessions throughout the year. 
So I'm always collecting information in that way. Our local chapters 
have their funded partner organizations meeting. I go to those 
meetings and listen for what are the policies [of interest], what's 
working, and what's not working. Then at the membership level we 
have meetings with all of our executives … this is an executive 
roundtable that meets four times a year. We [also] have a board of 
directors that is elected from the membership and they are the ones 
who decide on the decisions or policy priorities as recommended by 
the policy committee that meets every month. So we have [many] 
different ways to listen. 
 
Our policy committee tends to be more politically savvy, so they will 
weigh the politics, interests of donors, volunteers, nonprofit 
organizations, the larger community, and [they consider the] 
diversity of our membership. 
 
[The] board adopted a set of principles, one of the first principles 
[is] do no harm to any of our members of the movement … we have 
principles around advancing the common good, sound policy, and 
[achieving] long term solutions, not [just] short term gains. [We are] 
always looking at [developing] long-term relationships. 
 
We have been criticized for being too middle of the road, too milk 
toast [laughter]. I think we were called that once. But we feel that it 
is [important to help organizations find] compromise solutions. We 
help negotiate compromises among the different parties, parties 
who do not ordinarily talk together. 
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Well, initially [we were] cautious [to] not lose donors. Over the last 5 
to 7 years, in this age of highly partisan political partisanship, [our 
philosophy has been] more about [being] the big person, [taking] 
the high road, and [sitting] down across the table from people that 
we disagree with. Someone has to [illustrate] that compromise [is 
sometimes necessary and acceptable], and we don't see that 
happening. So I think it started out as a do no harm principle and 
now it's more of we need to elevate ourselves for them. 
 
Participant G  
 
Participant G indicated that policy and advocacy decisions and priorities are 
informed by the association’s strategic plan and are made by the association’s 
public policy committee that is appointed by the board chairperson. The CEO of 
the association develops an initial public policy concept paper and then works 
with the public policy committee to review concepts for the coming year. A formal 
vote is taken to approve the policy document, then the paper gets presented to 
the board of directors for further review and a final vote, then the paper is 
presented to the entire membership at any of the quarterly membership business 
meeting.  
 
We supported the Healthy Indiana Plan. Obviously, as with most 
things, it will never be designed perfectly, but we did remain 
supportive of the idea of the Healthy Indiana Plan because we 
knew that our system was now [going to] be prepared to provide 
services to incredibly important part of our society that historically 
did not have access to Medicaid, especially people with criminal 
justice background, people coming out of the criminal justice 
system. Some people need access to substance abuse treatment. 
In the old days, prior to HIP 2.0, it was very difficult to be eligible for 
Medicaid [if you had a mental health issue] or if you had a disability. 
We could not provide substance abuse treatment under Medicaid 
unless it was a co-occurring disorder. [HIP] opened the door now 
for anyone under 138% or below of the federal poverty level who 
qualifies to receive services to address [mental health issues]. [The 
implementation of HIP 2.0 came during the] opioid crisis, which is 
unfortunately [late]. I believe we have [an opioid crisis] because we 
did not invest [previously] as a society in mental health. So given 
those factors we were supportive [of HIP 2.0]. 
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Participant H  
 
Participant H indicated that policy and advocacy decisions are made based on 
data, research by the policy and advocacy staff, organization’s strategic priorities, 
and discussions and final votes on the executive and board level.  
One of the main principles in deciding policy is the impact of the policy on the 
business model and long term stability of the organization. Patient feedback was 
not formally solicited.  
 
Public Policy, or Health Care policy, is what I believe to be the 
foundation of what a health care leader [should focus on] as an 
advocate for their community regardless of their size. I would say 
that [looking after my community] was a trade instilled in me early 
not only in the University of Kentucky but early on in my career and 
it has been a corner stone of every role I’ve had throughout my 
career. 
 
Reading it from a Federal aspect of how do we have expansion? 
What does each of our market position looks like based on what 
that state is considering doing? How do we support that individual 
market with resources? [What] other intelligence [do we have]? 
[What] conversations and connections [we need to pursue] at the 
Federal level to make sure everyone of our markets has some form 
of expansion that goes along with getting more people served? 
[These are the policy questions we must consider].  
 
Theme 5: Different Levels of Influence 
 
Question 5: Influence over the implementation of the policy process: How 
did you influence the policy implementation? 
 
With the exception of the two health care providers, the remaining six 
organizations engaged in formal and informal lobbying activities. The two 
Hospital systems were focused on long term strategic goals, business model 
stability, and securing favorable regulations. The two trade associations have 
similar process to formulate policies that serve the best interest of their 
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membership organizations and by extension they believe their policies will benefit 
the population they serve. The mutual benefits association, the faith-based 
nonprofit, and the two health care providers formulated advocacy and policy 
decisions based on the political environment, a calculus of cost-benefits as it 
relates to their organizations and constituents, religious values and guiding 
missions and principles, and aimed to mitigate internal conflicts through a 
consensus building process.  
 
The data illustrates that a complicated web of relationships exists within the 
nonprofit sector by which leaders of the largest health care organizations serve 
on boards of other health care nonprofits and help shape their agendas. One 
health care executive had a direct access to the governor and government staff. 
Nonprofit leaders and organizations are divided into two camps with differing 
worldviews. One camp views themselves as humanitarians while the other camp 
views themselves as pragmatic. Humanitarians tend to criticize dominant groups 
like hospitals. Leaders of large hospital systems believe that smaller 
organizations do not fully understand the complexities of running large 
enterprises. 
 
Participant A  
 
Participant A indicated that the organization did not engage in formal lobbying. 
Policy and advocacy were not part of the organization’s mission until the last few 
years mainly due to hiring progressive leadership with policy background.  
The organization engaged in educating the general public, provided testimony on 
advocacy days, and educated public officials. Communications with state 
agencies and elected officials were sporadic and infrequent. The organization 
joined a partner organization groups or a coalition that was focused on health 
and human services policies and programs. The coalition was loose, not formally 
registered, consisted of many groups with different focus areas, did not always 
represent the underserved, and many organizations represented clients with 
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multiple needs. The coalition was led by leaders of prominent health care 
organizations. National organizations with local chapters were engaged in the 
coalition and frequently dictated to the local level certain positions that 
complicated the work and decision making process at the local level.   
 
A few really active engaged individuals or organizations [led of the 
coalition]. Individual organizations were always given the 
opportunity to [either support] or not participate in a call to 
action…A lot of politics were involved. It was a Medicaid expansion 
but done in a certain way… [And many] organizations tried to take 
credit for the [coalition’s] work. 
 
Participant B  
 
Participant B indicated that the organization did not engage in formal or direct 
lobbying. Volunteers who were also parents advocated for their own cause. The 
organization engaged in educating the general public by disseminating research 
and fact papers, provided testimony as needed, and educated public officials on 
issues confronting families with disabled members. The organization 
communicated very frequent with state agencies, at least daily, on specific health 
care issues. The organization was viewed as a trusted partner particularly as it 
relates to maternal and child health in the department of health and FSSA and 
department of disability services and Medicaid. The organization participate in a 
coalition that was loose, not formally registered, consisted of many groups with 
different focus areas, did not always represent the needs of the underserved, and 
many organizations represented clients with multiple needs. The coalition was 
led by leaders of prominent health care organizations. The coalition’s internal 
decision making process allowed member organizations to opt-in or opt-out of 
calls to action, voted on certain issues, or co-signed letters supporting or 
opposing certain positions. National organizations with local chapters were 
engaged in the coalition and frequently dictated to the local level certain positions 
that complicated the work and decision making process at the local level.  Many 
organizations tried to take credit for their work. Private for-profit entities did not 
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participate in the coalition directly, but many member organizations had that 
representation on their boards. 
 
We have developed relationships where our volunteer policy voices 
are seen as key and trusted resources from many members of our 
congressional delegation. We have some emerging, but not as 
effective as we would like, relationships with state legislators. 
 
Member organizations provided resources. Few organizations had 
paid lobbyists or full time lobbyist staff. Organizations came to the 
table with their resources depending on what the need was (a 
letter, a lobbying meeting, a newspaper ad, it this a rally, who is 
going to be the primary host, how are we [going to] collaborate 
resources and maintain the letter of the law related to advocacy 
and then also be most effective in messaging…. A lot of politics 
were involved. 
 
Faith-based nonprofits favored rallies and public demonstrations. 
Insurance companies and trade associations opted out. 
 
[We] supported HIP 2.0 even though the program does not cover 
our primary constituency. We felt like we could be the voice for 
parents who did not have coverage and whose abilities to [give 
care] was impacted by their lack of access to health care. 
 
Participant C  
 
Participant C indicated that the association engaged in direct negotiations with 
top state executive, conducted formal lobbying activities, educated the general 
public, testified on health care related policies, and shared policy proposals with 
elected officials. The organization communicated very frequently with state 
agencies and enjoyed a very strong working relationship with elected officials.  In 
addition, the association participated in a coalition with other organizations to 
advance the goal of expanding coverage through HIP 2.0. The coalition was 
organic, informal, not registered as a legal entity, and engaged in a constant 
iterative process of responding to changes in the political environment. The CEO 
serves on the boards of multiple organizations that were members of the 
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coalition. The HIP Finance Overview document (see appendix D) clearly states 
that the state and the trade association engaged in direct negotiations.  
 
[The organization] was pulled into some direct negotiations with the 
state around funding. Most of that was informal but regular. 
 
Participant D  
 
Participant D indicated that he was very connected to many former governors, 
elected officials, and policy decision makers. He was personally engaged in 
direct negotiations with former governors, his organization engaged in formal 
lobbying activities, and participated with a trade association to represent the 
interest of all hospitals. The CEO served on critical government commissions that 
influenced health care policy in Indiana.  
 
We have a large lobbying operations and [a] state-wide footprint. 
So we were able to communicate as the largest employer in 
[legislators] local [communities]. I personally spent a lot of time 
[lobbying and educating] because [rural legislators] got the same 
number of votes [similar to those] who serve in downtown 
Indianapolis. In some cases, because of seniority, [rural legislators 
had a] lot more influence [than urban legislators] especially [when 
rural legislators] are in the majority, which in Indiana is more likely 
to be Republican than Democrats [especially over] the last 10-15 
years. So I spent a lot of time with [legislators] and deployed my 
own personal time [to shape] public policy. 
 
In 2009 the Affordable Care Act passed. Governor Pence was 
[then] the whip in the minority [party of the United States Congress] 
so he was whipping votes against [the ACA]. [He] personally voted 
against [the ACA]. [Few years later, he] becomes governor [after 
Governor] Mitch [Daniels left]. [As a result], we started focusing on 
Governor Pence. [Governor Pence] is younger than I, I [have] 
known him his entire professional life pretty well. I knew that he was 
a reasonable person, but very conservative. [So when he became 
governor], we had to help him get from [HIP] 1.0 to [HIP] 2.0. 
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Participant E  
 
Participant E indicated that the organization did not formally lobby elected 
officials to expand Medicaid, participated in a broader coalition, and engaged 
with executives of state agencies under the umbrella of a broader coalition.  
The board of the organization did not reach consensus regarding whether or not 
to support Medicaid expansion, so Participant E participated individually through 
the coalition to express his personal views and beliefs. The relationship between 
Participant E and the executive of the state agency that was responsible for 
implementing HIP 2.0 was turbulent for the first six to eight months due to 
conflicting views on how to expand Medicaid. After it became clear that the 
political environment in Indiana will not advance a full Medicaid expansion, 
Participant E worked with the coalition to advance HIP 2.0 as a local model of the 
ACA expansion.  
 
Going back to that particular meeting with the Medicaid director, 
definitely it was more adversarial at the beginning… and even 
though we were not successful in pushing a traditional Medicaid 
expansion, I think what we did there that was successful was 
keeping the issue [of Medicaid expansion] at the forefront, and I 
really feel good about us having a hand in doing that. It could’ve 
been easy for Governor Pence particularly with his politics and 
particularly with future aspirations to just say we’re not expanding, 
no way, no how, and I do not want to talk about it anymore. But by 
strongly advocating for Medicaid expansion we kept the issue alive 
and we kept it there so he [Governor Pence] had [to] engage. [He 
had to either] not expand Medicaid [or] find a different way to do it, 
and so that was the benefit [of our advocacy].  
 
Later as our position evolved we were able to deliver over 10,000 
signatures to the governor's office on Medicaid expansion and we 
heard directly from the executive of the state agency especially in 
the last couple of months. [We were aware that] not only did the 
governor receive some pushback from conservative circles on the 
HIP 2.0 program, but obviously he's also received a lot of pushback 
from sort of classically progressive policy think tanks [such as] the 
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, Families USA, the 
Georgetown Center on Families.  
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[These organizations were] basically saying you can't do this, you 
can't have copayments, you can't have sliding scales, you can’t 
have lock out periods, and things like that. [Therefore], the way that 
we have engaged over the last 6-8 months is to strategically push 
on these issues but be supportive of HIP 2.0 because at that point 
with politics that was the best thing to do. 
 
Participant F  
 
Participant F indicated that the organization engages in formal lobbying, 
conducts formal advocacy, and engages with elected officials throughout the 
year. The organization supported HIP 2.0 but did not aggressively lobby for 
traditional Medicaid expansion under the ACA to avoid internal conflicts between 
liberal and conservative donors and communities that the organization serves. 
Participant F engaged on a personal level in a broader coalition to express her 
views and carry on the mission of her organization.  
 
I think our role as an organization was not as strong on the 
legislative side so I would argue that our engagement has been 
more with state officials because again we didn't initially take a 
position. So we did not, we were not as engaged in the policy as 
the implementation side. 
 
When the state filed its application and submitted its proposal for 
HIP and its proposal to extend HIP 1.0, I wrote all the comments. 
Very overly lengthy set of comments around our concerns. It was 
about our support for HIP. So they read the details, and they were 
very detailed, [explaining] why we supported [HIP]. We [also] 
conveyed our concerns about [coverage for] pregnant women, how 
[unbanked] people can make payments, [and suggested allowing 
HIP 2.0 members to pay their] power account payments online or 
by mail.  
 
In addition, we had a lengthy list of concerns about the lockout 
[provision], [the ambiguity of rules regarding] people who are right 
at [the eligibility level], who go [above the eligibility level], who have 
changes in income over the course of a year, the concept of 
personal responsibility, and the cost curve for so many of the 
uninsured who never have access except to the emergency room.  
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It will take a lot of education, and [we questioned] what kind of 
support will FSSA provide? Or what does the faith-based 
community needs to provide to help with the educational piece?  
 
We will sometimes engage in a coalition so that we can be more 
active than what our membership allows us, so sometimes we hide 
in a coalition and honestly there are times that we do a lot of that 
work.  
 
So for example, I write a lot of policy positions for the Indiana 
Coalition for Human Services that maybe [my] organization cannot 
take but under the coalition umbrella we can engage and influence 
[policy]. 
 
We knew politically that it would not be accepted by all advocates 
to say all child care [advocates] needed to focus on [the HIP 
legislation], or on tax funded childcare [centers]. That’s how we 
negotiated [by allowing different advocates focus on their area of 
expertise]. Our policy committee tends to be more politically savvy, 
so they will weigh the politics [while considering] interests of 
donors, volunteers, nonprofit organizations, the larger community, 
and also weighing the diversity of our membership. So for example 
on the immigration issue some of our rural communities did not 
want us to touch that [issue]. Some of our urban communities felt it 
is a moral obligation and we have to engage. So [we] wrestled 
[with] how do you balance the needs of all of your members? [This] 
is a challenge so we try to craft a middle ground. 
 
Participant G  
 
Participant G is a registered lobbyists. He indicated that the association 
supported HIP 2.0 because it expanded coverage for uninsured individuals, 
which was a good public policy that had a positive impact on the general 
population even-though HIP 2.0 benefits and funding for the segment of the 
population that was served by Participant G’s membership was not increased. 
The association engaged in formal lobbying activities while also utilizing a 
contracted lobbyist to perform additional lobbying services. Participant G 
informally participated in certain events as part of a larger coalition.  
Participant G believes that his organization was isolated throughout the process. 
The hospitals contributed financially to fund a portion of HIP 2.0, therefore, 
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Participant G believes that his association was not influential in impacting the 
crafting of HIP 2.0 because his membership did not contribute to funding HIP 2.0.  
 
The public good is at the heart of everything that we are trying to 
do. And at the end of the day, it is the highest level. But in terms of 
day to day we are not just talking about [the public good] to the 
public, we are doing it, working in the weeds. [The Health care field] 
is a very complicated system.        
 
Unfortunately [my] organization is not a major player. Our ability to 
influence the spectrum is not that great but we [issued] a press 
release and certainly when [HIP 2.0] was working its way through 
the legislature we were supportive in areas related to [health care 
coverage]. But mostly since [HIP 2.0] was done on the 
administrative level as an amendment to the previous waiver, [the 
expansion] was mostly administrative in terms of how it unraveled. 
 
Participant H  
 
Participant H indicated that the organization engaged in both formal and informal 
lobbying. The organization’s chief advocacy officer and contracted lobbyists 
communicated frequently with state legislators, helped build strong relationships 
between hospital executives in different counties with their state representative or 
senator, and worked very closely with the trade association to formulate policy 
positions and lobbying strategies. The organization sees its advocacy efforts as 
part of the day to day operations through the engagement with patients and 
communities.  
 
For [my] organization advocacy starts with the relationships we 
develop with our elected officials and patients and consumers. We 
look at our elected officials no different than a patient or a 
consumer in that we want them to understand what the 
organization is all about and to look to us when they have a 
question, [they can call us and say] help me understand this, what 
should this be for a system that covers individuals from pre-natal to 
end of life? We feel being the advocate for that in several different 
fields.  
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For [my] organization, our philosophy [is] not only for the leadership 
[to promote] but for every associate and medical staff member [to 
know] how we advocate for public policy. [Public Policy] is a formal 
and informal process, it is a formal and informal job duty, and it is 
something that must be done on a continual basis. There are 
aspects of [policy advocacy] that are [embedded in] how we 
operate on a daily basis in terms of how we believe health care 
[services] should be conducted [and] how [service costs] should be 
reimbursed. There are also the formal pieces of policy advocacy 
[that are handled by professional staff and formal lobbyists]. 
 
Theme 6: Hospitals Were the Most Influential 
 
Q6: Impact of influence over Medicaid Expansion in Indiana: Please explain 
the impact of your efforts to influence the implementation of Medicaid 
expansion in Indiana? 
 
The eight organizations fully supported HIP 2.0 because the policy expanded 
coverage to the uninsured population and allowed organizations to improve their 
finances, which in return allowed them to serve more people. HIP 2.0 was viewed 
favorably by most organizations thus minimizing internal conflicts within and 
between organizations. Hospitals were the most invested stakeholders given the 
financial commitment they made in financing HIP 2.0, so the state negotiated 
directly with hospitals because they were the most important stakeholders, they 
have statewide impact on improving access to health care, and they are the 
largest employers in many counties of the state. Given the political environment 
and the general consensus between organizations that implementing HIP 2.0 
was better than maintaining the status quo, most organizations supported the 
policy but focused on the transactional aspect of the implementation. 
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Participant A  
 
Participant A indicated that the organization advocated for positions that 
supported the expansion of Medicaid, and ultimately the state implemented HIP 
2.0 and expanded coverage. This allowed the organization to get services paid 
for by Medicaid and re-allocate existing funds to other areas of the organization 
where they were most needed, such as wrap around services. Clients benefited 
by getting more coverage and became more educated about the new policy. The 
organization was very pragmatic about what to advocate for given the political 
parameters that were set by the state. Success was evident through the 
reduction of number of screenings that became a covered benefit under HIP 2.0. 
 
[The organization] always [focused on setting] policy that covers as 
many people as possible. Our focus was [to] make sure we set our 
policy for the 80% [of the population] that [the policy] works for; the 
20% that it does not work for we will figure out [a different solution], 
but we can’t set the policy around the 20%. 
 
Certain organizations like the hospital system had more influence, 
power, and financial stake than others. Their staff were fulltime and 
focused on policy. 
 
Participant B  
 
Participant B indicated that the organization advocated for expanded coverage 
without the cost participation requirement, also known as the Power Accounts. 
Uninsured families with children or disabled family members benefited by having 
access to health care coverage. The organization was very pragmatic about what 
to advocate for given the political parameters that were set by the state. 
Participant B believed that certain organizations like the hospital system had 
more influence, power, and financial stake than others. Participant B believed 
patients were happier with HIP 2.0. 
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I will give [HIP 2.0] a 7 out of a 10 point scale. I would have 
preferred that Indiana take straight Medicaid expansion, I think that 
would be a better policy that would’ve created less barriers to 
coverage for the HIP population. It would [have] been a better way 
to ensure a healthy state but [HIP 2.0] was significantly better than 
not taking anything. A lot better than nothing. 
 
Participant C  
 
Participant C indicated that initially member organizations had different views 
about the ACA. However, once it became the law of the land, the focus shifted to 
implementation. The association advocated for expanded coverage because they 
believed it was the right policy for Indiana’s population and focused on mitigating 
the risk of financial loss due to cuts in DISH payments, Market Basket, and 
Medicare reimbursements. Due to the political environment, the organization 
supported HIP 2.0 without calling it Medicaid expansion.  
The association was given direct access to negotiating with the state because of 
two reasons: (1) viewed as trusted partners and the most important stakeholder 
in the policy arena since the inception of HIP 1.0. Hospitals were the most 
impacted by uncompensated care. Market Basket cuts exceeded $1 billion in 
2015, and will exceed $8 billion by 2020. (2) There was no other mechanism to 
fund the program without the Hospital Assessment Fee (HAF). So the state had 
to negotiate directly with hospitals to ensure that the new policy did not 
negatively impact hospital operations because financial stability) could lead to 
closure of hospitals or reduced access to health care providers.  
 
In addition, the association participated in a broader coalition. Calls to action 
within the coalition were driven by representatives of particular disease or 
syndromes groups or local chapters of a national organization. Some 
organizations within the coalition were affiliated with national organizations that 
imposed their national agenda to expand Medicaid on their local affiliates despite 
the governor’s opposition to the ACA and the pragmatic understanding of 
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Indiana’s organizations that HIP 2.0 was a better policy than having no 
expansion. This dynamic created tension within the coalition.  
 
Outcomes 
 
In terms of outcomes, Participant C indicated that there are 250 thousand 
individuals that have coverage today that would not have had coverage had his 
association not been engaged and ultimately worked to find a solution.  
 
Indiana, from the policy side, was one of the most restrictive states 
in Medicaid eligibility. HIP 1.0 covered individuals who were 23-
24% of the Federal Poverty Level for care takers, no coverage, no 
really program for adults outside of the HIP 1.0, which was limited, I 
really think [HIP 2.0 is] a huge step forward for us in many respects. 
So I feel very good about the bi-partisan support [for HIP 2.0]. I 
think the primary beneficiary are the people that have coverage 
now that would otherwise would have not if the politics were 
different. 
 
All of our members would say that coverage is the right way to get 
people the right care, at the right time, not through the ED, but have 
coverage through primary care physicians to try [taking] care of 
chronic conditions before they become worse and much more 
expensive.  
 
We had the most to lose, so we were the loudest voice … our 
members exist in every large community. We encouraged our 
members to write op-eds, visit with their lawmakers, talk with the 
administration, talk about coverage on social media, and [we] 
undertake a lot of activities to push [information] out there. [Our 
efforts] helped promote the sense that hospitals are behind this 
policy and [hospitals] want to see it enacted. Hospitals are large 
employers, almost 200 thousand Hoosiers are employed across the 
state. In many communities, they are the largest employers in the 
county if not in the multi-county region. 
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Participant D  
 
Participant D indicated that his organization engaged in direct but informal 
negotiations with the governor and state officials to expand coverage.  In 
addition, he worked closely with the trade association to finalize the details of the 
program. Participant D leveraged his personal relationship with the governor and 
other state officials to remind them of the importance of expanding coverage to 
the uninsured.  
 
We were very successful in dealing with [state officials], very 
successful, never really had a bad year. The recession was bad but 
[government] had nothing to do with that, Mr. Market did that. 
 
In 2009 the Affordable Care Act passed. Governor Pence was 
[then] the whip in the minority [party of the United States Congress] 
so he was whipping votes against [the ACA]. [He] personally voted 
against [the ACA]. [Few years later, he] becomes governor [after 
Governor] Mitch [Daniels left]. [As a result], we started focusing on 
Governor Pence. [Governor Pence] is younger than I, I [have] 
known him his entire professional life pretty well. I knew that he was 
a reasonable person, but very conservative. [So when he became 
governor], we had to help him get from [HIP] 1.0 to [HIP] 2.0. 
 
I was directly involved in dealing with governmental representatives 
on the [Hospital Assessment Fee] committee, [which played a 
critical role] in [designing the financing model for] the 
implementation of HIP 2.0. We also received DISH payments. As a 
result of these algorithms [and the complexity of the funding 
streams], I was very much involved in [these decisions]. 
 
I had to remind state staff [working for FSSA and the Governor’s 
Office] why are we doing HIP 2.0? [I explained] that [HIP 2.0] was 
not a bureaucratic exercise, it was to get people enrolled to fill the 
hole for folks who otherwise [were] uninsured. 
 
There was body politics [that my organization] had to deal with. [I 
worked with] everybody. I would deploy myself on a discrete basis 
when [there was a need for] direct communication with the head of 
the FSSA, the head of any state department, the head of OMB, the 
Governor himself. I think I met with governor Pence onetime alone 
in his office at my request to make sure that we are all on the same 
page.  
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The trade association was going back and forth with him on the 
funding as you can imagine. I [met with the Governor to] reinforce 
the idea that we did share a common value which is to serve as 
many people as possible and improve the health of particularly the 
underserved. His political argument may have been about self-
determination and federal budget deficit mandates, but at the end 
of the day his goal was the same as mine. [The Governor’s 
challenge was] how you translate that into marching orders to other 
folks? [This is] the art of administration and politics. That was up to 
him, so I remained focused on [the idea of] expansion. 
 
The profit margin did increase after HIP 2.0 after we started getting 
paid for our compensated care at Medicare rates for Medicaid 
expansion. 
 
Participant E  
 
Participant E indicated that he represented the coalition in 2012-2013 and 
advocated for a traditional Medicaid expansion. In meetings with state officials, 
the conversations were adversarial at the beginning; however, even though the 
coalition was not successful in pushing a traditional Medicaid expansion, 
Participant E indicates that the coalition was successful in keeping the issue at 
the forefront.  
 
The coalition delivered over 10,000 petitions to the Medicaid Director from 
supporters of Medicaid expansion. Participant E feels that his personal 
involvement in the coalition with other organizations and like-minded individuals 
pushed Medicaid expansion over the finish line.   
 
I really feel good about us having a hand in doing that. It could’ve 
been easy for Governor Pence particularly with his politics and 
particularly with future aspirations to just say we’re not expanding, 
no way, no how, and I do not want to talk about it anymore. But by 
strongly advocating for Medicaid expansion we kept the issue alive 
and we kept it there so he [Governor Pence] had [to] engage. [He 
had to either] not expand Medicaid [or] find a different way to do it, 
and so that was the benefit [of our advocacy].  
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Later as our position evolved we were able to deliver over 10,000 
signatures to the governor's office on Medicaid expansion and we 
heard directly from the executive of the state agency especially in 
the last couple of months. [We were aware that] not only did the 
governor receive some pushback from conservative circles on the 
HIP 2.0 program, but obviously he's also received a lot of pushback 
from sort of classically progressive policy think tanks [such as] the 
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, Families USA, the 
Georgetown Center on Families. [These organizations were] 
basically saying you can't do this, you can't have copayments, you 
can't have sliding scales, you can’t have lock out periods, and 
things like that. [Therefore], the way that we have engaged over the 
last 6-8 months is to strategically push on these issues but be 
supportive of HIP 2.0 because at that point with politics that was the 
best thing to do. 
 
Participant F  
 
Participant F indicated that it was a pragmatic decision to support HIP 2.0 instead 
of a traditional Medicaid expansion under the ACA. Once the state frames the 
parameters for expanding Medicaid using a locally invented model and not the 
traditional Medicaid expansion model, Participant F and other members of the 
coalition focused on improving the design and implementation of certain 
transactional aspects of the program.  
 
I think I'm satisfied because we did not cross the line with our 
members. Am I happy with the policy? Probably not. We did not get 
everything we wanted. I don't think people fully understand the 
demand or the challenges for low wage workers. We won't be 
satisfied [until more people understand]. So I'm satisfied that it is 
what it is given the circumstances but I'm not satisfied with the 
outcome yet. 
 
I think [the policy discussion with the state] is more of a dialogue 
and this is where the rubber meets the road in terms of the 
intervention of politics. [We recognized] that there are certain public 
positions that the governor advertised in the media. [However] 
there are certain activities that the managers and staff of FSSA or 
Medicaid are able to carry out and do good work.  
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[The administrative level is] where I want to have influence even if 
the top level [i.e. the governor] was ranting about Obamacare as 
evil or whatever [he] wanted to say. If the [Medicaid] program can 
be improved by my friends, the bureaucrats that I love [laughter], 
state employees, then that's where I want to have the influence. A 
very specific example, one of the ongoing questions is with an 
issue of prepayment versus monthly payment. I, as a consumer, 
can go and get a discount if I prepay my insurance, I get a nice 
discount. Why won't we allow low-wage workers to prepay when 
they get their tax refund? It just makes sense, they have the 
money, they are making a good decision, it is good planning, and 
that’s good responsible activity. So that's a conversation that the 
Medicaid Director and I had and we have weighed in a public way 
through the coalition. Why [did we advocate for this change]? [We 
asked FSSA to consider how would] 80,000 Hoosiers who are still 
unbanked and do not have a checking account [pay their power 
account fees]? [We offered a solution to] create a mechanism for 
the [unbanked] to pay through no additional fee through a 
partnership with a vendor like a Kroger or CVS or Wal-Mart.  
 
[We raised many questions such as] where can [the unbanked] go 
and make their safe and secure payment? How do we make sure 
that that population gets the best service? Because the lockout is 
scary and even non-payment is scary for someone who has no 
track record in making monthly payments. And how can we make 
sure that there is an appeal process and coverage [continues] if an 
error on the state side [occurs as a result of a losing, not filing, or 
not processing the right document? How we can make sure that [a] 
person doesn't get a bill [while they still] have credit. So those are 
the kinds of [policy implementation] conversations [that we had], 
[these were] client or consumer focused issues.  
 
The other concern we brought to the Medicaid Director and had 
conversations about it is the cost of implementation. There is an 
administrative burden to providers to collect the copayment, the 
administrative payment, and what we've heard from health 
physicians is that it is cheaper for them to write it off than try to 
collect a five dollars co-pay or three dollars. So I don't think there is 
a fair recognition of how the [power accounts or co-pays] work 
because healthcare providers are [focused on health care delivery] 
and [should not] be distracted with a lot of things that may not be 
recognized. We don't have data to actually evaluate how well 
[power accounts and co-pays] works and I would love to have more 
data that shows [how] it works out. 
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Participant G  
 
Participant G indicated that the organization supported the implementation of HIP 
2.0 because it was a good public policy that will reduce the number of uninsured 
individuals in Indiana. The association supported the policy despite the fact that 
they felt they were excluded from negotiations about the design and 
implementation of HIP 2.0, which did not increase reimbursement rates for 
member organizations of Participant G’s association.  Participant G thinks his 
association was able to influence one transactional aspect of HIP 2.0 that 
impacts the designation of elders who are considered medically frail.  
 
HIP 2.0 has done a lot of amazing things for a lot of people. One of 
the requirements of HIP 2.0 is also that health centers could use 
presumptive eligibility determination with respect to Medicaid 
eligibility. That helped. That really assisted us getting people into 
care, I will tell you the problem we will have with HIP 2.0 and for the 
way it was envisioned to the way it was implemented. We simply 
have not been able to adequately respond to the demand of 
services because there are so many new people who are eligible 
and in need of services as we sit in the opioid crises. There are a 
lot of addiction out there we haven’t been able to respond to in a 
way that provides them with easier access to care and almost 
exclusively because we do not have enough licensed professional 
staff to carry the service requirement in order to bill Medicaid or 
commercial insurance.  
 
Certain standards have to be met [to get reimbursed]. This is very 
challenging especially in rural areas. Even in urban areas, [it is 
difficult] to find enough licensed staff to carry on the responsibilities 
associated with [mental health treatment]. While there was some 
increase in MRO rates associated with the expansion of the HIP 2.0 
program, those rates have not been raised for many years. 
 
Participant H  
 
Participant H indicated that his organization fully supported HIP 2.0 because it 
expanded coverage for the whole population that was not currently served, which 
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then would lead them to the right care at the right place at the right time. That’s 
the end goal, to have a healthy community.  
 
Hope, justice, dignity, truth [are values we believe in]. [It is part of 
our value system to] look at ourselves and say how we practice 
virtues as servant leaders and extend our mission to everybody? 
 
When you speak with an individual who does not seek health care 
proactively [you discover that] their biggest barrier [is that they] do 
not have coverage, [the uninsured would say] I can’t afford this. HIP 
2.0 immediately [took] down almost every bit of that barrier and 
then that allowed [the hospital system to develop] a closer 
connection with an [uninsured] individual to figure out how [the 
hospital system] can serve [this person]? How [can the hospital 
system stay in touch with this person]? How [can the hospital 
system] restore another level of dignity with this person?  
The Governor used to say HIP 2.0’s biggest success is [that the 
program is] a hand up and not a hand out. Now with the successes 
of [HIP 2.0] we [thought of] how [can we] utilize [this program] to 
generate more and more momentum that come with it.  
 
In general our biggest belief is we have to have [a] safety net. We 
want more coverage for more individuals and those to me are 
fundamental aspects of how we improve health outcomes.  
 
Theme 7: They Switch Roles Based on the Issue 
 
Q7: Whose interest does your organization represent: Does your 
organization represent dominant, challenging, or repressed groups? 
 
The two 501-C-6 Trade Associations, the 501-C-3 faith-based organization, and 
the statewide mutual benefits organization represented the interests of their 
board members and CEOs of member organizations. One of the trade 
associations represented dominant interest, the other association represented 
challenging and repressed interest. Both the faith-based nonprofit and the state-
wide mutual benefits association represented their membership’s interest and 
they valued internal consensus over taking public positions on controversial 
policies. Therefore, leaders from both organizations engaged under the umbrella 
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of broader coalitions to challenge certain policies. Thus, they represented 
challenging interest to improve the transactional aspects of certain policies. The 
other four organizations viewed the patient and the larger community as their 
primary constituency [two 501-C-3 health care providers and the two 501-C-3 
hospital systems]. Large health care providers were very dominant and influential 
over health care policy in Indiana. However, participants from these 
organizations firmly believed that they use their dominance to represent 
challenging and repressed interest. They did not see a contradiction between 
their business model and values to serve the repressed. They disagreed with 
those who criticized their business model by explaining the connection between 
profits and an improved health care delivery system to the repressed population 
and the larger community. Participants representing advocacy groups believed in 
representing the interests of the repressed and voiceless. They viewed their roles 
as humanitarians and they criticized dominant trade associations, large health 
systems, and other health care providers for being profit driven. However, under 
HIP 2.0, they decided to support the policy because it was a win-win-win for the 
state, the health care industry, and the larger population. 
 
Participant A 
 
Participant A indicated that her organization advances the interest of the 
repressed.  
 
We advance the interest of the underserved, the uninsured, and the 
low income chronic disease population… We represent the 
repressed. We engage in challenging certain aspects of the policy, 
but we mainly represent the repressed. 
 
We were pushing for healthcare or Medicaid expansion because 
that was to us what was on the table that was right for our clients. 
As that evolved and became HIP 2.0, we didn’t dig in our heels and 
say no we just want Medicaid expansion. We really looked at [HIP 
2.0] and said okay this has a better chance. [HIP 2.0] got the 
political will and it's really good for our clients so we became very 
supportive of the program. 
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Participant B  
 
Participant B indicated that they represent the repressed. She views herself as a 
humanitarian who represents the voices of an underserved population. Her 
organization is willing to lose funding if funding will limit their ability to remain a 
voice for the voiceless.  
 
We try to stay in our lane so we focus on policy where we have 
expertise and connection to our mission and vision. So HIP 2.0 is a 
policy that touches the lives of families who are raising disabled 
family members with complex health care needs…we really try to 
make sure the things we focus on connect with our mission and 
vision. 
 
We are always interested in grants and support from our state 
partners and our federal partners and are aware that public 
positions that are against an administration can make that 
challenging. So we try to be mindful of that and have a clear 
conversation with the board around the pros and cons and are able 
to move forward. A recent example, the last legislative session we 
were asked to give comments on a bill around abortion based on 
prenatal diagnosis and so there was a board discussion whether 
this is an issue we should give a comment on and we declined to 
give comment on it as it did not really fit within our vision and 
mission. 
 
We always start with our vision and mission and we always start 
with the needs of our children and families in Indiana who have a 
lived experience of medical complexity and disability and if that 
means we will miss a funding opportunity or other things then that 
is what it means. 
 
I think the people involved were savvy enough to understand the 
competing priorities and that for some people in the room this was 
about reimbursement and profit margins and for other people in the 
room this was about a more humanitarian mission and the impact 
on end users. The fact that people understood that allowed it not to 
be a significant issue. Generally the humanitarians among us which 
I probably would put myself into that category were not opposed to 
the hospital system making more money because more people 
have insurance. 
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Participant C 
 
Participant C indicated that his organization represents dominant interest but 
does not see a contradiction between their business model that serves the 
membership and the advancing the interests of population they serve. Participant 
C thinks they are mutually inclusive.  
 
Ideally what I would like to say, the political answer I would give 
you, I have to acknowledge [that we are] a dominant interest, but I 
think there are elements of the others. I will give you two answers, 
which is very political. I would say dominant because if I have to 
pick one that would make sense because I think that is what we 
are, we are the trade association and that’s how we are identified.  
 
[It is worth noting that] even within our for-profit systems we have 
physicians [who took an oath] with their leadership positions to 
[serve their patients and be] passionate about things like infant 
mortality.  
 
[Our organization could also be viewed as representing challenging 
and repressed interest]. Some of our faith-based religious affiliated 
institutions were founded by the mission taking care of the poor and 
I think our members do live up to those commitments today 
[especially] when you look at their hospitals they still continue to 
operate in our state [and advocate to enroll] individuals in those 
programs and directly help them. 
 
Back to the dominant interest [question]. Yes, the fact that we were 
able to reduce the uncompensated care helps [hospitals] run their 
business and their operations and continue [their] missions. 
Otherwise they would wither. It is mostly dominant but with input 
from the others. 
 
Participant D  
 
Participant D views his organization as a representative of dominant interest but 
does not see a contradiction between the business model and serving their 
patients and communities. Participant D also believes that conflict of interest may 
appear in all sectors and fields including the public sector or government. The 
perception that hospitals are profit-driven is misleading because it implicitly 
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suggests that hospitals with fixed assets that are worth billions of dollars and 
employs tens of thousands of employees should not care about profits. He 
argues that hospitals that lose profits tend to close and subsequently stop 
serving the needs of the most vulnerable in our society. Most hospitals tend to 
run a distribution of profits model by which hospitals in suburban areas subsidize 
losses of hospitals in urban areas where they serve the most vulnerable in our 
society.   
 
I view my role as continuity to the original purposes of the 
organization, and the only reason I mention that this informs our 
position on Medicaid expansion. I view it as a values based 
decision and not an economic decision or a political decision.  
My true north so to speak was the values proposition that our 
purpose was to provide health care and innovation to everybody 
[and] not a [specific] segment. 
 
You can make both arguments, it is easier to argue [nonprofits 
advocated] for their own interest. Our customer is the patient. The 
patient, not Anthem, not the State of Indiana, it’s the patient.  
So my job as a CEO is [to serve] all the patients. Your job as a 
practitioner is [to serve individual patients]. The two of those 
coming together means I look like I am arguing for more money, 
and [others] look like [they were] arguing for more money for [their] 
area. So if you are a policy maker, it is essentially hard to disagree 
with [groups such as the] neurosurgeons [who argued that if] you 
give me [these resources], we will do that.  
 
[Policymakers had to think about] where can I do the most good 
that I can? I think most of [nonprofits] would come off as if we were 
arguing for ourselves, and I believe in most cases [that was true]. 
Confirmation bias convinces us that we are arguing on behalf of the 
greater good but in fact we are arguing on behalf of ourselves.  
So you [have to] do a gut check and I cannot say with any 
reasonable assurance that what I was doing and what I actually did 
was the same thing. It could be what I thought was doing and what 
I was actually doing was more than just accidentally benefiting my 
organization. So I’d admit to a conflict of interest, but I also say that 
[government] as the policy maker is to figure that out. 
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The core function of hospital systems is acute care. The 
organization is one of three acute cases in the State of Indiana, so 
we would be the dominant by far on the core business. 
 
And [as for] repressed [interest], [this relates] to the values. [Ethical 
dilemmas at the hospital system] would include end of life 
decisions. I must tell you that if I agonized over anything, and the 
chairman of my organization’s values committee knows this, I 
agonized over [what we were doing with acute care]. We were so 
focused on acute care [and] providing unnecessary care to 96 
years old with dementia patients who are voiceless, or the pregnant 
mom how comes in labor and never brings the baby back for a well-
baby visit and we know where she lives. In fact, we got the data 
from the state board of health that tells the infant mortality rate is 
high [in Indiana]. 
 
You can ration care in a number of ways. One [example] is in the 
form of access. [The organization could choose to] close the clinic 
at 4 o’clock. Anthem used to shut down their customer service line 
in the afternoon, so that’s an access issue. [If] you do not build a 
clinic on a bus line what do you think is [going to] happen? [What 
happens if you’re not open on Saturdays or weekends? So you can 
do it that way [by shrinking service hours or limiting service 
locations], or you can say we can’t afford to do it [unless we] charge 
this co-pay. So there would be well intentions, sometimes high 
minded sometimes not so high minded, debates at the governance 
levels between what you and I call the finance people and the 
values people and then the patients’ folks group. 
 
Participant E  
 
Participant E indicated that they represent the voices of their own membership. 
Even though this organization is driven by religious values, they place a higher 
value on internal harmony within their membership over taking public positions 
on controversial policies. This approach positions them to challenge certain 
policies indirectly without sacrificing their self-interest. 
 
I think if you asked a number of us individually we would say that 
we are still more supportive of a traditional expansion but if this is 
the program that's going to allow those individuals get covered we 
can support it… 
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[We had] a lot of discussions about whether the HIP program had 
the ability to take on these new clients? Should it be the vehicle? 
Could we be supportive of this knowing that there were some real 
deficiencies within the program that we thought would make it 
difficult to expand into that much larger population? Are we hurting 
the possibility of traditional expansion if we too quickly support a 
HIP model? So there was a lot of disagreement over time and there 
was a period of over multiple months that eventually the position 
evolved. 
 
The fundamental sort of question that we ask ourselves is this a 
religious issue? And that really determines what our public policy is 
going to be. The reason that we're involved in public policy is little 
bit self-serving. Is that our primary mission is to make sure that the 
religious community is safe and secure and that we have a place 
where we can live, practice freely, engage freely, communicate 
freely, and ensure [these freedoms] for [our] community.  
We also need to have a hand in ensuring [those freedoms] for the 
entire community. [But I recognize that our positions] are a little bit 
self-serving. 
 
We have an internal system here, our Board of Directors is made 
up of representatives from almost all the houses of worship in 
town… as well as other membership organizations. We have a 
couple of at-large members that represent [specific communities]. 
What we say is that we work on a process of consensus. To 
determine what a policy issue before us, it is a process. My 
government affairs committee hears the issue, talks about the 
issue, addresses a policy position and then the board will ultimately 
decide, but the biggest piece is consensus.  
 
We do not act unless there is clear consensus in the community 
and we do not have a definition of consensus. [Consensus] is 
somewhat something less than unanimity but more than a simple 
majority. Kind of you know it when you see it. But if we don't feel 
like we have the clear consensus of the community we don't act on 
the issue. 
 
Yeah, I think that the term interest group has been hijacked a little 
bit, it’s viewed negatively now. Just like I don't call myself a lobbyist 
because the term has been hijacked a little. But we are an interest 
group and our interest is our community. Just from a very basic 
definitions perspective we are an interest group. 
 
 
86 
Participant F 
 
Participant F indicated that her organization primarily advocates for the 
repressed. However, when it comes to controversial policy issues, individuals 
tend to engage under the umbrella of other coalitions to challenge certain 
aspects of the policy. Organizational self-preservation and protecting the 
cohesiveness of the membership is a top priority for the organization; therefore, 
the organization makes decisions based on consensus, compromises, and long 
term strategic goals. Under such circumstances, the organization represents 
challenging interests. 
 
We tend to focus on four primary areas: education, income [or] 
financial stability [to] help people become financially stable, health, 
and strong communities, which we define as having a thriving 
charitable sector. 
 
We took no position on the Affordable Care Act after it passed and 
it was a law. We were hopeful [that Indiana will] implement the law 
and educate communities about the ACA and [its] impact on 
communities, clients, nonprofit organizations, business partners, 
faith partners, and then how to implement it. 
 
We try to position ourselves as the trusted research, not the hair on 
fire kind of advocate... We try to present ourselves as the trusted 
resource where we will do the research, will document it, and 
[maintain] a very good relationship around the state. 
 
Our primary first constituency are our members … comprised of all 
of their donors, all of their volunteers, and all of their funded 
partners, plus all of their community because they have a mission 
to make their community better. 
 
We have been criticized for being too middle of the road, too milk 
toast [laughter]. I think we were called that once. But we feel that it 
is [important to help organizations find] compromise solutions. We 
help negotiate compromises among the different parties, parties 
who do not ordinarily talk together. 
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Well, initially [we were] cautious [to] not lose donors. Over the last 5 
to 7 years, in this age of highly partisan political partisanship, [our 
philosophy has been] more about [being] the big person, [taking] 
the high road, and [sitting] down across the table from people that 
we disagree with. Someone has to [illustrate] that compromise [is 
sometimes necessary and acceptable], and we don't see that 
happening. So I think it started out as a do no harm principle and 
now it's more of we need to elevate ourselves for them. 
 
Yes, absolutely. We are members of a number of coalitions....We 
will sometimes engage in a coalition so that we can be more active 
than what our membership allows us, so sometimes we hide in a 
coalition and honestly there are times that we do a lot of that work. 
So for example, I write a lot of policy positions for a coalition that 
maybe my organization cannot take but under the coalition 
umbrella we can engage and influence [policy]. 
 
I don't get any financial benefits by advocating for health insurance, 
for low income people. There is nothing that we do other than the 
goodwill and accomplishing our mission. 
 
In a very crass way, we do not have or can spend the money that 
they have. Our currency is our information and our relationships. So 
we do not have as big of a voice as the Hospital Association or the 
name of any of the big healthcare organizations. But I feel we are 
often a trusted resource because we don't have that kind of leg in 
the game. 
 
I think in a room full of nonprofits advocates all of us [I would] 
separate the big players because they are different. There are 
times where we have a meeting and we won't invite the big players 
because we know that they have lots of money, partisan activity, 
and political activities. They have things that none of the rest of the 
nonprofits in the room have. 
 
Participant G  
 
Participant G indicated that his organization represents the interests of the 
membership, and the membership represents the interests of the repressed. 
Therefore, the organization represents either challenging or repressed depending 
on the issue. The organization represents challenging interest when opposing 
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policies that may harm the public and represents repressed interest when 
promoting polices to expand access to health care services.  
 
[We represent] challenging [interest]. We did have some discussion 
about the medically frail designation the feds had just amended the 
definitions for medically frail under the HIP 2.0 program, or the HIP 
state plan. There is a distinction here, was afforded the opportunity 
for additional treatment services and so the way it was crafted they 
did engage us in conversations to talk about how we can ensure a 
seamless designation process so that the people can get access to 
treatment quickly [based on a] national model. In fact, the team and 
I did a national webinar on this process [and] it was so well 
received. 
 
[We also represent the] repressed. [Those are the] voices who did 
not have access to health care services, we indirectly [became] 
their voice. I stay up at night and I think about how the Association 
serves these repressed voices and their interest in a complicated 
way, it’s not [a simple] one size fits all scenario. [We have to make 
the challenging business model work…  
 
I think we are doing some pretty cool stuff. In fact I was pretty 
instrumental in working on getting the language changed around 
[providing health care services] for folks coming out of the criminal 
justice [system] from both the DOC and the County jails and into 
treatment. By that standard alone I think we’ve really done a good 
job getting people better access to care. Again, the presumptive 
eligibility [provision] made a big difference. 
 
Participant H 
 
Participant H indicated that his organization switches roles in representing 
challenging and repressed interest. Even though some may view the 
organization as dominant, Participant H indicated that they will use their 
dominance as a large employer to serve the needs of the repressed. In addition, 
Participant H does not see a contradiction between his organization’s values and 
business model. He indicated that profits are necessary for business continuity to 
serve more communities and patients. A reduction in uncompensated care and 
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an increase in profit margins allows the organization to increase their missionary 
work and investment in communities that they serve.    
 
I would say we are challenging and repressed for those who are 
voiceless, and it is a combination of the two because as large as 
we are we have the ability to influence [policy]. We should always 
be looking out for those who are on the margins and take care of 
them the way that Jesus found those who were naked and clothed 
them, found those who were hungry and gave them food. We 
should find those who are struggling and help them. But that does 
not mean we can’t be dominant in how we do it because our 
mission is always grounded in serving those who are struggling. 
 
It is disappointing [that other nonprofits criticize us] because [they] 
have the traditional [view] of [how] a nonprofit [should operate] that 
I do not believe in. I believe that we should be great at what we do 
and do more with the fruits of our labor. So with it how do we show 
that [we do more with the fruits of our labor]?  
 
It is not something that we have to prove but if we are caring for 
one poor and vulnerable individual and now we have the ability to 
care for two, [then] by God we are [going to] go out and find that 
second one and when we are done with that we are [going to] 
evolve and find a way to care for three because we can show that 
evolution over time. [This approach will improve] health outcomes. 
 
Visual Trend Analysis  
 
Indiana’s nonprofit leaders argued that they supported HIP 2.0 expansion under 
the ACA because the program benefited the most vulnerable in our society by 
expanding coverage  to the uninsured, increasing access to care, and improving 
services offered to patients. Indiana’s nonprofit health care leaders claimed that 
customers are more satisfied with services offered under HIP 2.0. To validate the 
accuracy of their arguments, this study examined the HCAHPS data on a 
national level before and after the implementation of the ACA to verify whether or 
not customer satisfaction increased. The HCAPHS survey measures patient’s 
satisfaction with services they received at hospitals.  While we cannot fully 
attribute any increase in customer’ satisfaction rates to the ACA, the results of 
the trend analysis will confirm whether or not services at hospitals improved 
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during the expansion period. To test for a correlation between the ACA 
expansion and customer satisfaction or any other variables, an advanced 
statistical analysis is needed, which is outside the scope of this study. If rates of 
customer satisfaction in Indiana and nationwide increased, then the findings only 
validate statements made by nonprofit health care leaders and should not be 
viewed as conclusive evidence.      
 
The HCAHPS survey contains 21 patient perspectives on care and patient rating 
items that encompass nine key topics: communication with doctors, 
communication with nurses, responsiveness of hospital staff, pain management, 
communication about medicines, discharge information, cleanliness of the 
hospital environment, quietness of the hospital environment, and transition of 
care. The survey also includes four screener questions and seven demographic 
items, which are used for adjusting the mix of patients across hospitals and for 
analytical purposes. The survey is 32 questions in length. For purposes of this 
study, the visual trending analysis relied on data collected for questions 10 and 
11 of the survey: questions 10 (H_HSP_RATING_9_10) and 11 
(H_RECMND_DY) of the survey (The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
2017). 
 
The visual trend analysis clearly illustrates that in Indiana and on a national level 
the ACA expansion did improve patient satisfaction measured by patients’ 
perception of the quality of care they received.  The following trend line charts 
illustrate that both Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states experienced an 
increase in patient satisfaction after the implementation of the ACA. In response 
to the question “How do you rate this hospital?” respondents from expansion and 
non-expansion states rated their hospitals as either a 9 or 10 on a scale of 0 to 
10. The two charts below clearly show that in 2015, a year after the expansion of 
Medicaid under the ACA, patients were more satisfied with services they 
received at hospitals after the implementation of the ACA. Even though Indiana 
expanded Medicaid via HIP 2.0, which was approved as a waiver program under 
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the ACA, the state is included on the non-expansion chart because Indiana’s 
expansion occurred in February of 2015.  
 
Figure 3: Chart 1A compares patient responses to the question “How do you rate 
this hospital?” for patients residing in Medicaid expansion states before and after 
the expansion of Medicaid. Figure 4: Chart 1B represents patient responses to 
the question “How do you rate this hospital?” for patients residing in non-
expansion states before and after the ACA took effect on January 2014. The 
results in Figure 3: Chart 1A clearly illustrate that hospitals in twenty two out of 
the twenty five expansion states reported an increase in patient satisfaction when 
comparing 2013 to 2015.  
Figure 3: Chart 1A- Comparison of Hospital Ratings in Medicaid Expansion 
States before and After the Implementation of the ACA. 
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Figure 4: Chart 1B compares responses for patients residing in non-Medicaid 
expansion states before and after the expansion of Medicaid or when the ACA 
took effect on January 2014. The results in Figure 4: Chart 1B clearly illustrate 
that hospitals in twenty four out of all twenty five non-expansion states reported 
an increase in patient satisfaction when comparing 2013 to 2015. Indiana’s 
customer satisfaction rates increased by 1 percentage point.  
Figure 4: Chart 1B-: Comparison of Hospital Ratings in Non-Medicaid Expansion 
States before and After the Implementation of the ACA 
 
           
Figure 5: Chart 1C compares patients’ responses to the question “How do you 
rate this hospital?” over a period of nine years between Medicaid expansion and 
non-expansion states. On an aggregate level, all states reported a rising trend 
over the period of 9 years. It is worth noting two findings: (1) the trend has been 
rising since before the implementation of the ACA; and (2) Patients in non-
expansion states tend to have a better rating of their hospital experience 
compared to patients living in expansion states (a difference of approximately 2 
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percentage points). Both findings confirm that the visual trend on its own is not 
enough to validate arguments made by hospital leaders in Indiana claiming that 
HIP 2.0 made patients more satisfied. In addition, the results confirm the need for 
an advanced statistical analysis to test the correlation between a set of different 
variables and customer satisfaction before attributing the improved rates to the 
implementation of HIP 2.0.  
Figure 5: Chart 1C -Comparison of Averages of “Rate of Hospital” between 
Expansion and Non Expansion States between 2007 and 2015 
  
Figure 6: Chart 1D compares patient responses to the question “Do you 
recommend this hospital to others” for patients residing in Medicaid expansion 
states before and after the expansion of Medicaid. Figure 7: Chart 1E represents 
patient responses to the question “Do you recommend this hospital to others” for 
patients residing in non-expansion states before and after the ACA took effect on 
January 2014. Figure 8: Chart 1F compares the averages for responses to the 
question “Do you recommend this hospital to others” over a period of nine years 
(2007-2015) between Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states.  
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It is worth noting the following findings: (1) the trend has been rising (between 
2007 and 2015) since before the implementation of the ACA; (2) Patients in non-
expansion states tend to recommend their hospital to others more than patients 
living in expansion states but the margin of difference is very minimal; (3) On an 
aggregate level, there in anomaly in reporting in the year 2009.  
The significant drop in 2009 is attributed to non-reporting, or reporting 0, for 
couple of states due to changes in reporting guidelines at the state level. These 
findings confirm that the visual trend on its own is not enough to validate 
arguments made by hospital leaders in Indiana claiming that HIP 2.0 made 
patients more satisfied. In addition, the results confirm the need for an advanced 
statistical analysis to test the correlation between a set of different variables and 
customer satisfaction before attributing the improved rates to the implementation 
of HIP 2.0.  
Figure 6: Chart 1D - Comparison of “Recommend Hospital to Others” in non-
Medicaid expansion states before and after the expansion of the ACA 
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Figure 7: Chart 1E - Comparison of “Recommend Hospital to Others” in Medicaid 
expansion states before and after the expansion of the ACA. 
 
Figure 8: Chart 1F - Comparison of Averages of “Recommend Hospital to 
Others” between Expansion and Non Expansion States between 2007 and 2015 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, AND THEORATICAL 
APPLICATION 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
The main research question of this study is whose interest do nonprofit 
organizations advance when they attempt to influence the implementation of 
public policy? To answer this question, it is critical to understand why nonprofits 
engage in the public policy process (motivation and values), the policy actions 
that nonprofits make during the implementation of the policy (how?), and the 
method by which nonprofits address or mitigate conflicts and contradictions 
between organizational interest and constituents’ interest (whose interest do they 
advance?). Analysis of interview data produced consistent themes that were 
further analyzed to answer the above questions. The results of the analysis can 
be summarized in six major findings that inform the hypotheses of this study: (1) 
a complex web of relationships exist among nonprofits and with elected officials 
and state executives resulting in different levels of influence; (2) nonprofit’s 
pursuit of private and public interest can be explained and justified; (3) the 
political environment impacts the implementation of public policy and there is a 
political cost that nonprofits consider when participating in the public policy 
implementation; (4) for some organizations, conflict between values and the 
business model can be explained and justified;(5) nonprofit leaders are 
pragmatic and know when to compromise; (6) nonprofits are divided into two 
camps that view each other differently: humanitarians vs. a profit driven. Below is 
an expanded explanation of each of these findings by participant. This section 
concludes with a summary of findings and explains the outcomes of applying 
Robert Alford’s theory to those findings to verify whether or not public interest 
theory helps us explain Indiana’s nonprofits political behavior during the 
implementation of HIP 2.0. 
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Why they advocate? 
 
1- Indiana’s nonprofit health care advocacy and health provider groups 
advocate to achieve their missions and values, driven by the commitment 
to the public good, represent different interests and constituencies, act 
with self interest in mind, are pragmatic and willing to compromise if the 
proposed policy benefits the most vulnerable in our society, and they 
believe that advancing their self- interest benefits the populations they 
serve.  
 
2- Hospitals advocated because they had the highest financial risk, they 
serve millions of people, employ hundreds of thousands of employees, 
operate in almost every county of the state, and are considered the most 
critical stakeholders with the capability to operationalize HIP 2.0. 
 
3- The health care industry is one of the most regulated industries. The legal 
and financial complexities of operating large hospital systems require 
hospital leaders and trade associations to protect the business model of 
these institutions. 
 
4- For-profit hospitals who contributed towards the HAF did not benefit from 
HIP 2.0 as much as nonprofit hospitals because uncompensated care at 
for-profit hospitals is insignificant. As a result, nonprofit hospitals engaged 
to protect their financial interest.  
 
How they advocate? 
 
5- Internal and external competing interests, the impact of the political and 
policy environment, and funding implications are factors that nonprofits 
consider when making advocacy decisions.  
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6- Organizational variables such as structure, membership diversity, funding 
sources, and community interests and demographics could either restrain 
or empower the advocacy of health care nonprofits.  
 
7- Larger organizations tend to engage in formal lobbying, direct advocacy, 
and direct negotiations with elected officials and state agencies. Mutual 
benefit associations, faith-based advocacy groups, and smaller advocacy 
organizations tend to informally advocate through 501-C-4 or non-
registered coalitions. 
 
8- Not all 501-C-6s have the same level of influence. Mental health and 
addiction nonprofits do not have the same level of influence as primary 
health care providers and institutions.  
 
9- Nonprofit leaders with experience in policy and advocacy tend to give a 
higher priority to advocacy than leaders with little or no advocacy 
experience. Not all health care leaders who were interviewed had a 
background in health care policy. They were hired for different reasons 
given their expertise in law, public policy, and health care administration.  
 
Whose interest do they advance? 
 
10- They advance the interests of their constituents, whether they are 
patients or member organizations. 
 
11- Nonprofits advocate because of their missions and values, driven by the 
commitment to the public good, represent different interests and 
constituencies, act with self interest in mind, pragmatic and willing to 
compromise if the proposed policy benefits the larger population. 
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12- Nonprofits believe that advancing their self- interest results in benefits to 
the populations they serve. 
 
13- Smaller advocacy nonprofits acknowledge that there is an internal tension 
between nonprofits and believe that the health care nonprofits are divided 
into two camps or types of nonprofits: a camp that considers themselves 
as humanitarians who advance the interests of the repressed, and a camp 
that is driven by profits. Almost all participants confirmed that this 
worldview does exist; however, dominant organizations argued that they 
are not different from smaller organizations in terms of securing funds to 
serve their mission. 
 
What level of influence do they have? 
 
14- A complicated web of political, social, and professional relationships exist 
within the nonprofit health care sector. 
 
15- Leaders of dominant organizations serve on boards of other 501-C-3 
advocacy nonprofits, which allows them to influence advocacy methods 
and policy positions of other nonprofits. This seems to be a revolving door 
for few professionals to influence the direction of multiple organizations at 
the same time. 
 
16- Dominant interest groups are well connected to policy makers, powerful 
and elite leaders in the community, and have more resources to influence 
the implementation of public policy. However, the analysis revealed more 
details about the connection between dominance and serving the most 
vulnerable in our society. In the case of HIP 2.0, dominant interest groups 
supported HIP 2.0 because it was the right policy for Indiana’s uninsured 
population. Hospitals and other health care providers assert that an 
improved financial position as a result in increase of state reimbursements 
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will allow their organizations to provide more services to a segment of the 
population that was historically uninsured. 
 
17- There is a political cost to advocating for certain policy positons that could 
impact future funding for certain organizations. 
  
18- Internal political dynamics within health care coalitions allowed powerful 
organizations to not participate in certain calls to action. Faith-based 
nonprofits preferred rallies or public demonstrations as methods to 
express their views. Dominant organizations engaged in direct 
negotiations with the state and conducted formal lobbying activities. 
Dominant organizations benefited from actions performed by other 
organizations and leveraged their outcomes during negotiations with state 
officials.  
 
19- Challenging and repressed interest groups tend to support positions that 
are promoted by dominant interest groups if the policy benefits the public.  
 
Is there a conflict between values and organizational interest? 
 
20- Ethical dilemmas exist in every sector and every organization including 
government. Example: allocating resources based on values. Participants 
argued that every organization, including governmental organizations, are 
confronted with ethical dilemmas around allocating resources based on 
values on policy priorities.  
  
21- Even though one of the 501-C-6’s advocacy focused on achieving better 
reimbursement rates, they did not see a contradiction between their 
mission and values on one hand and an improved finances on the other. 
To serve the repressed or the uninsured, health care providers argue that 
they need financial resources to cover the cost of services offered. They 
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argue that protecting the financial model for large health institutions 
protects access to health care services and coverage for the uninsured. 
Therefore, their dominance may appear as driven by profits; however, 
dominant groups think they use their dominance to fulfill their mission to 
serve the most vulnerable in our society. 
 
22- Even though uncompensated charity care declined as a result of HIP 2.0, 
hospitals dedicated a portion of their HAF to fund HIP 2.0. The financial 
impact of HIP was a net positive for large health institutions. Hospital 
systems believe that this positive outcome allows them to serve more 
uninsured clients by enrolling them into HIP 2.0 and by reaching more 
communities through their missionary and community based charitable 
initiatives. 
 
23- Leaders of hospital systems and their trade associations view an 
enhanced financial position as a benefit to the communities and patients 
being served by these institutions. 
 
Are these organizations profit-driven? 
 
24- Small advocacy nonprofits acknowledge that there is an internal tension 
between nonprofits and believe that health care nonprofits are divided into 
two camps or types of nonprofits: a camp that considers themselves as 
humanitarians who advance the interests of the repressed, and a camp 
that is driven by profits who advance the institutions private interest. 
Almost all participants confirmed that this worldview does exist; however, 
dominant organizations argued that they are not different from smaller 
organizations in terms of securing funds to serve their mission.  
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Does the political environment have an impact? 
 
25- Healthcare Nonprofits have different levels of understanding of the impact 
of the political environment in shaping the implementation of public policy. 
However, most organizations exercise a pragmatic decision making 
process and utilize political cost-benefit analysis to evaluate short term 
versus long term benefits.  
 
26- Nonprofit leaders maintain professional networks composed of like-
minded individuals who are focused on health care policy. These networks 
get activated as needed especially during the time of policy changes. 
These networks allow individual leaders to express their views especially 
when their individual organizations avoid taking public stances on policy 
proposals. 
 
27- Each organization has a political capital and they pragmatically decide 
how to leverage their political capital.   
 
28- Some organizations waited, hesitated, and did not engage in the policy 
implementation discussions. They remained idle waiting to react to the 
final outcome of the policy implementation due to the politically charged 
environment as it related to the ACA. 
 
29- The state participated in few meetings with the coalition, called upon 
organizations to testify and engage in the process. In a way, the state 
sought the engagement of nonprofits to legitimize its policies. 
 
30- The state strategically chooses who to communicate with and when to 
participate in and engage with certain coalitions or organizations to 
advance the state’s interests.  
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Table 1- Summary of Key Responses Based on Nonprofit Type 
 501-C-6 501-C-3 
Hospitals 
501-C-3 
Health Care 
Providers & 
Advocacy 
groups 
501-C-3 
Faith- Based 
Who do  
they 
advocate 
for? 
Membership 
organizations  
The institution. 
Focused on the 
business 
model. 
The client or 
the patient 
Their own 
Community  
How do  
they 
advocate?  
 
Formal 
lobbying, direct 
negotiations 
Formal 
lobbying, 
through trade 
associations  
Via coalitions 
and through 
mobilizing the 
public 
Via coalitions 
and through 
mobilizing the 
public. 
What role  
do they 
play?  
 
Advocates and 
representatives 
of the industry 
Advocates and 
representative 
of the institution 
that serves 
communities 
and patients  
Advocates for 
patients or 
clients  
Represent the 
voices of their 
board 
Policy 
decision 
making 
process? 
Formal, 
structured, 
driven by policy 
data, skilled 
professionals, 
and the board.  
Formal, 
structured, both 
direct and 
indirect, works 
through the 
trade 
association. 
Formal, 
driven by the 
board. 
Focused on 
long term 
goals  
Formal, driven 
by the board 
Whose 
interest  
do they 
advance? 
Dominant only 
if representing 
primary health 
care providers.   
Mainly 
Dominant, but 
plays a 
challenging role 
on certain 
issues 
Challenging 
and 
repressed  
Challenging 
and repressed 
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Discussion 
 
First: Driven by their mission and values 
 
Why do they advocate? They are driven by their missions and values. They do 
not see a conflict between values and their business model.  
 
Summary: All participants indicated that they were motivated by their missions 
and values. They do not see a conflict between their organizational values and 
their policy positions even at times when they advocate for better reimbursement 
rates. They argue that HIP 2.0 was a good policy that expanded coverage, which 
is aligned with their organizational missions and values. They argue that 
expanding coverage required a sound business model to fund providers and the 
cost of additional services provided. Therefore, some organizations were more 
engaged than others because they contributed funds towards the program, they 
increased their risk by serving more patients, and they were the largest 
stakeholders in the state of Indiana.   
   
Participant D 
 
Participant D indicated that his organizations decision to expand coverage was 
based on values and the mission of the organization and not driven by 
economics. 
 
I view my role as continuity to the original purposes of the 
organization, and the only reason I mention that this informs our 
position on Medicaid expansion. I view it as a values based 
decision and not an economic decision or a political decision. My 
true north so to speak was the values proposition that our purpose 
was to provide health care and innovation to everybody [and] not a 
[specific] segment. 
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You can ration care in a number of ways. One [example] is in the 
form of access. [The organization could choose to] close the clinic 
at 4 o’clock. Anthem used to shut down their customer service line 
in the afternoon, so that’s an access issue. [If] you do not build a 
clinic on a bus line what do you think is [going to] happen? [What 
happens if you’re not open on Saturdays or weekends? So you can 
do it that way [by shrinking service hours or limiting service 
locations], or you can say we can’t afford to do it [unless we] charge 
this co-pay. So there would be well intentions, sometimes high 
minded sometimes not so high minded, debates at the governance 
levels between what you and I call the finance people and the 
values people and then the patients’ folks group. 
 
You can make both arguments, it is easier to argue [nonprofits 
advocated] for their own interest. Our customer is the patient. The 
patient, not Anthem, not the State of Indiana, it’s the patient. So my 
job as a CEO is [to serve] all the patients. Your job as a practitioner 
is [to serve individual patients]. The two of those coming together 
means I look like I am arguing for more money, and [others] look 
like [they were] arguing for more money for [their] area. So if you 
are a policy maker, it is essentially hard to disagree with [groups 
such as the] neurosurgeons [who argued that if] you give me [these 
resources], we will do that. [Policymakers had to think about] where 
can I do the most good that I can? I think most of [nonprofits] would 
come off as if we were arguing for ourselves, and I believe in most 
cases [that was true]. Confirmation bias convinces us that we are 
arguing on behalf of the greater good but in fact we are arguing on 
behalf of ourselves. So you [have to] do a gut check and I cannot 
say with any reasonable assurance that what I was doing and what 
I actually did was the same thing. It could be what I thought was 
doing and what I was actually doing was more than just accidentally 
benefiting my organization. So I’d admit to a conflict of interest, but 
I also say that [government] as the policy maker is to figure that out. 
 
We have a duty of responsible grace. We have to discharge that 
duty and the only way to discharge that duty is to hold it at the 
center of our work, [which is to serve] the patient and their families 
and try to throttle back the inclination to treat the bond market as if 
it is the customer, which is very easy to do. They give me a bond 
rating report as a CEO, so during the recession we were 
downgraded. I think it wasn’t too bad but we got upgraded couple of 
times since then. So the new questions is the new tax bill, who 
deserves the tax exemption. Center Township has 44% of tax 
exempt properties, one of the hospital systems has many toilets to 
flush. Other business and homeowners are paying for that. So have 
we earned the exemption?  
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The law says we earn it through charity care, but there all of these 
counter measures for charity care, so is there a public good that is 
charity? So should the law said have you improved the health of the 
community you serve? And how would you know? So it’s like value 
based purchasing. If the health of Center Township became less 
obese, less diabetic, less drug abuse, should we have paid more 
for having done that? What would the incentive be? That’s the 
[question for] policy makers. I always argues strongly give us the 
incentive that actually makes the population healthier. 
 
I saw some of the 501-c-3s that would measure the success of their 
mission by how much money they made, and that was true for the 
majority of them including county hospitals. So how sincere does 
my organization looks because we were the biggest and profitable 
as we argued to expand coverage? It’s a hard a sell! So it was very 
difficult for me to call somebody out and say [you’re not sincere 
about serving patients]. So yes, there was tension because most of 
the folks were focused, as they always are, on the money. And 
because the values connection here, and I am 100% sure that our 
major partners would totally disagree with what I am about to say, 
they say their values are the same. I do not measure values by 
television ads, and by check registers. The check register would 
disclose your true values pretty fast. At the end of the day they 
were arguing for no margin no missions, give us more money! My 
view is that the county boundaries were drawn between 1816 and 
1832 and they have very little relevance to the portability to disease 
and sickness and so forth. Just look at the drug crises now, it’s the 
same sort of thing, that’s my view. 
 
The profit margin did increase after HIP 2.0 after we started getting 
paid for our compensated care at Medicare rates for Medicaid 
expansion. 
 
Participant G 
 
[I do not see a conflict of interest between the business model and 
our values]. [It is not a conflict of values. It is a core. Our ability to 
ensure that the system functions, we know what the business 
model is. It comes down to the business model. And at the end of 
the day it is not necessarily about protecting the entities 
themselves, it is about creating a business model that functions and 
carry out the functions of the delivery of health so that the public 
then benefits from the service. 
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Participant B 
 
We always start with our vision and mission and we always start 
with the needs of our children and families in Indiana who have a 
lived experience of medical complexity and disability and if that 
means we will miss a funding opportunity or other things then that 
is what it means. 
 
Participant C 
 
There are certainly reimbursement battles that ensue whether 
you’re religious affiliated or nonprofit or private nonprofit or for-
profit. You have to engage [in the policy process]. It is a competitive 
environment because of the nature of [business]. [Consumers have 
options such as] the private insurance market, the role that choice 
plays, and the ever increasing consumer driven economy where 
people seek care. 
 
Profit generating functions within the hospital systems subsidize 
other areas of the system were losses occur. For example: building 
new hospitals in Hamilton counties could subsidize services offered 
in the inner city. 
 
When you look at the number of rural hospitals that are a part of 
their system some of them would have gone out of business. One 
hospital filed for bankruptcy [but a larger organization took over and 
the] hospital became part of their system so they were able to 
sustain their business model and [preserve] the jobs in the 
community that were associated with the hospital. [Keeping the 
hospital open and preserving jobs in the community] were part of 
the [parent hospital’s] broader mission. I do not think that this is part 
of their profitable venture. Building a facility in an area where 
population growth is going to continue allows the system to be 
healthy enough in this competitive free market environment to be 
able to sustain those other initiatives. 
 
Participant H 
 
Did not see a conflict of values as it relates to HIP 2.0. Outside of 
HIP 2.0, abortion and birth control continue to be ethical dilemmas 
for this organization.  
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The other aspect to it is we use our medical missions at home 
when we go out to a neighborhood that is disadvantaged. In every 
aspect of it we provide soup to nuts health care services for them. 
Part of this is our rural and urban access to healthcare workers that 
were able to use [HIP 2.0] and [ask members of the community] do 
you have coverage? HIP 2.0 was a phenomenal [program to 
expand coverage]. So we look at those coverage vehicles as 
helping us go find individuals [who need] coverage. Everyone we 
serve with coverage allows us to go out and find more that do not 
have [coverage] and offer them coverage. 
 
Second: A Complex Web of Relations and Advocacy Methods 
 
How do they advocate? Using a complex web of relationships and formal and 
informal methods to influence policy implementation at different leadership levels.   
 
Summary: Leaders of dominant organizations are well connected with smaller 
health care advocacy groups, they serve on their boards, and influence their 
decision making process. Leaders of small 501-C-3 organizations tend to join 
coalitions to advocate for certain policy positions, especially when those policy 
positions are controversial and not publically endorsed by their boards.  
Dominant organizations deploy formal and informal methods to influence public 
policy positions of elected officials and state agencies.   
   
Participant F 
 
This 501-C-3 organization participates in a coalition to carry on policy positions 
that their organization cannot publically support for political and financial 
considerations. Through her service on multiple coalitions, Participant F built an 
extensive network with other nonprofit leaders who coordinate policy and 
lobbying activities to influence health care policy implementation. 
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We will sometimes engage in a coalition so that we can be more 
active than what our membership allows us, so sometimes we hide 
in a coalition and honestly there are times that we do a lot of that 
work. So for example, I write a lot of policy positions for the Indiana 
Coalition for Human Services that maybe [my] organization cannot 
take but under the coalition umbrella we can engage and influence 
[policy]. I wrote the comments around the Healthy Indiana Plan, 
around ACA, around funding for Medicaid, and those might have 
not been filed with my organization but they were filed under the 
coalition for human services. 
 
Participant E 
 
Similar to Participant F, Participant E’s 501-C-3 organization participates in 
coalition to carry on policy positions that their organization cannot publically 
support for political and financial considerations. 
 
There are few [coalitions] that maintain themselves from year to 
year that we are actively involved in. Probably the biggest is the 
Indiana Coalition for Human Services. This [coalition is composed 
of] about 25 or 30 nonprofits [who are] both direct providers and 
advocacy organizations like us. [These organizations] come 
together around issues affecting low-income Hoosiers and work 
pretty heavily on [state] appropriations and funding [for] various 
agencies and programs. We [are] also interested in education and 
access [to quality education] and even immigration. 
 
Over the years we have been involved in a number of sort of ad- 
hoc coalitions [that revolve] around specific issues. The role of my 
organization is just to be an active member in this coalition. The 
purpose of these coalitions is to come together, to band together, 
and to raise our voice as member organizations. [Many smaller 
nonprofits are] fairly small, have limited constituency, and a limited 
voice. [Therefore] coming together raises the collective voice of 
small organizations. [Most member organizations] within the 
coalition are sort of volunteer-based, it’s up to individual member 
organizations [to decide their level of engagement]. 
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We [created] the Indiana Coalition for Health Services, [which] is a 
501(c)-4. [The coalition] has a Board of Directors [who are] 
volunteers from the member agencies. [The coalition] has a 
[decision making] process and a public policy committee [that 
decides] our public policy priorities. Sometimes we speak on behalf 
of the coalition. If there is an instance where the coalition needs to 
testify on a particular [legislation] that is not [a priority for] my 
organization I can still testify and say I’m here representing my 
organization but today I'm speaking on behalf of the coalition. One 
of the other coalitions actually employs a lobbyist. [If the lobbyist is] 
not available then [a volunteer member of the coalition] will say hey 
this is who I am but today I'm speaking on behalf of the coalition. 
 
Participant H 
 
Participant H indicated that she serves on the boards of several health care 
nonprofit advocacy organizations. When engaging in public policy, she tends to 
promote the policies of her employer, which is a large health care provider in the 
state of Indiana.  This arrangement complicates the decision making process for 
smaller nonprofits due to the influence of board members who are employed by 
large dominant health care systems. In other words, health care systems can 
influence the decisions of local nonprofits at the board level. Participant H does 
not participate in loose coalition to advocate because they have more effective 
means to influence policy through lobbying, direct negotiations, and through 
influencing the policy positions of other nonprofits.   
  
We are all very connected with these organizations so I am on the 
board of many organizations. We [learn about other organizations’ 
policy priorities by serving] as board members [of other 
organizations].  
 
I do not remember being part of a broader coalition, but certainly 
you had organizations that were representing the positions of the 
hospitals. 
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We do things at various different levels by doing it formally and 
informally, [and through] educating and participating in groups 
[such as] the Chamber, the United Way, Covering Kids and 
Families, and Gleaners. We [serve] on the boards of those 
[organizations]. So we participate in a variety of different [ways]. 
 
Participant C 
 
Participant C works for a large trade association. Similar to Participant H, he 
serves on the board of other health care advocacy nonprofits and uses formal 
and informal methods to influence nonprofits, coalitions, and state officials.    
 
We collaborate [with other organizations] a lot. For example, on HIP 
2.0 we collaborated with the Primary Health Care Association, 
Mental Health America, and Covering Kids and Families of Indiana, 
State Medical Association, and AARP. I serve on the boards of 
many of these nonprofits. [We decide how to collaborate] 
depending on the issue. We do work with other trade associations. 
 
[We informally participate] in loose coalitions. I don’t know that we 
ever created a formal coalition. We certainly talked about it whether 
or not we need to do that but we had regular discussions through 
the various trade associations and with others who shared a similar 
interest in seeing Indiana expand Medicaid eligibility to include a 
program like HIP 2.0. To expand Medicaid through a waiver we met 
regularly, we had calls, and [participated] with other groups who 
have a public policy aspect to their operation. So we participated in 
these [activities] and [served with] the provider policy committee 
that I used to chair at the time. That was in some ways a formal 
aspect of coordination advocacy. [We were] one of the 
stakeholders and [we were] pulled into some direct negotiations 
with the state around funding; [however], most of our work was 
informal but regular. 
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Third: Private and Public Interests Converge 
 
Whose interest do they advance? They advance their own institutional interest to 
serve their constituents. 
 
Summary: All participants justified their policy positions by connecting their 
private interest to the public’s interest. They do not see a contradiction between 
their values and policy positions. Influential health care organizations argue that 
they are not unique in that sense, all nonprofits advocate for their private interest 
to advance the public good.  
 
Participant C 
 
Participant C leads a trade association that represents both for-profit and 
nonprofit health care institutions. From Participant C’s point of view, member 
institutions are perceived by other nonprofits as if they advocate for their private 
interest and disregard the public interest; however, Participant C firmly believes 
that both for-profit and nonprofit institutions share the common mission of 
improving health outcomes for the populations they serve. Keeping patients well 
and healthy is in the best financial interest of the hospital system, it lowers costs 
of services that are subsidized in the long term. If institutions do not protect their 
business model, which largely revolves around reimbursements, then they risk 
reducing services or closing facilities. Subsequently, this will lead to limited 
access to care. Therefore, the institutions private interest is directly connected to 
the public’s interest.  
 
[There is] no difference between policy agendas of for-profit and 
non-profit hospitals. Everyone supported expanded coverage while 
also mitigating financial cuts in Medicare payments and Market 
Basket. The financial impact of the policy was similar on both types 
of hospitals. 
 
There are several for-profit hospitals that are safety net hospitals 
for the underserved and qualify for DISH payments. 
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The financial impact on rural and smaller for-profit hospitals could 
be significant.  If they close, then access and coverage is reduced. 
 
The main difference could be seen in the level of reinvesting back 
in the community. For example: expanded focus on population 
health. 
 
Whether you are a for-profit or nonprofit, you must have a margin of 
profit to be able to operate, that’s why reimbursement is a priority 
for both. 
 
For-profit and non-profit hospitals share the same compassion to 
provide safe care for patients. In addition, keeping patients well and 
healthy is in the best financial interest of the hospital system, it 
lowers costs of services that are subsidized in the long term. 
 
I can’t get into the minds of all the leaders to speculate [whether 
they were] focused on a cost benefit analysis associated with the 
Medicare cuts, reimbursement, and expanding coverage to stabilize 
the impact [of federal funding cuts]. Maybe organizationally or 
institutionally, but a lot of that sort of strategy happens beyond what 
I can see at the association. I work more with the individual CEOs. 
 
Participant B 
 
Participant B believes that private and public interest tend to mix at the board 
level. For-profit entities influence policy by participating on boards of key health 
care organizations and through formal lobbying. For-profits tend to not participate 
in coalition based advocacy, but many member organizations had representation 
on boards of nonprofits. On the nonprofit side, Participant B’s organization 
engaged in educating clients about the impact of the policy on their clients’ 
interest and relied on data to make decisions. Clients did not always understand 
their interest. Tensions between local affiliates of national organizations and 
Indiana based nonprofits were evident. The source of tension revolved around 
maximizing the public’s interest based on the policy positions of Indiana’s 
nonprofits.   
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A lot of politics were involved [in the implementation of HIP 2.0]. 
Organizations tried to take credit for the [coalitions] work. National 
organizations with local chapters were engaged in the coalition. 
Faith-based nonprofits favored rallies and public demonstrations. 
Insurance companies and the IHA opted out. 
 
The coalition’s internal decision making process allowed member 
organizations to opt-in or opt-out of calls to action, voted on certain 
issues, or co-signed letters supporting or opposing certain 
positions. 
 
The [political] environment in Indiana has made significant 
commitment to being business friendly and we have large corporate 
voices that represent both the insurance industry and the 
pharmaceutical industry. And organizations who have advocated 
around treatment may leverage legislative bills or any efforts of 
policy to frame it around those interests and this may be different 
than what evidence based or best practice would say about the 
most cost effective or appropriate treatment. 
 
We represented the repressed. We engage in challenging certain 
aspects of the policy, but we mainly represent the repressed. 
 
Participant F 
 
Participants F’s organization places a higher value on internal harmony within the 
membership, donors, volunteers and communities over taking a stance on 
controversial policy positions to protect the organization’s long term goals. 
Participant F justifies this by asserting that internal harmony within the 
membership and protecting long terms goals aims to serve the public and 
advance the public good. Therefore, the organization’s private interest is directly 
linked to the public interest. In a way, this is not different from the justification 
provided by large health care institutions. 
   
Our policy committee tends to be more politically savvy, so they will 
weigh the politics [while considering] interests of donors, 
volunteers, nonprofit organizations, the larger community, and also 
weighing the diversity of our membership. So for example on the 
immigration issue some of our rural communities did not want us to 
touch that [issue].  
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Some of our urban communities felt it is a moral obligation and we 
have to engage. So [we] wrestled [with] how do you balance the 
needs of all of your members? [This] is a challenge so we try to 
craft a middle ground. 
 
Participant D  
 
Participant D makes similar arguments as Participants C and F asserting that on 
a surface level the political posturing of influential health care organizations 
creates the perception that they only care about advancing their own private 
interest. However, a deeper analysis shows that there is a link between an 
organization’s private interest and the public’s interest.      
 
I think most of [nonprofits] would come off as if we were arguing for 
ourselves, and I believe in most cases [that was true]. Confirmation 
bias convinces us that we are arguing on behalf of the greater good 
but in fact we are arguing on behalf of ourselves. So you [have to] 
do a gut check and I cannot say with any reasonable assurance 
that what I was doing and what I actually did was the same thing. It 
could be what I thought was doing and what I was actually doing 
was more than just accidentally benefiting my organization. So I’d 
admit to a conflict of interest, but I also say that [government] as the 
policy maker is to figure that out. 
 
Fourth: A Strategic and Pragmatic Decision Making Process 
 
Whose interest do they advance? They balance short term versus long term 
goals and interests. This results in a pragmatic decision making process and 
leads to short term compromises to achieve long term goals.  
 
Summary: Everyone agreed to the policy because it expanded coverage to over 
300 thousand people in Indiana, which was better than maintaining the status 
quo. Most organizations understood that a gradual change is better than no 
change. The political environment and political costs associated with opposing 
certain policies could hurt the long term goals of some organizations who deeply 
care about their clients and patients. Therefore, these organizations 
116 
compromised by accepting and endorsing HIP 2.0 despite the fact that a 
traditional expansion would have been a better solution for Indiana.   
 
Participant B 
 
I think the people involved were savvy enough to understand the 
competing priorities and that for some people in the room this was 
about reimbursement and profit margins and for other people in the 
room this was about a more humanitarian mission and the impact 
on end users.  
 
The fact that people understood that allowed it not to be a 
significant issue. Generally the humanitarians among us which I 
probably would put myself into that category were not opposed to 
the hospital system making more money because more people 
have insurance. 
 
I just think it is part of the pragmatic reality and it is critical when 
thinking about healthcare in America to find ways to partner 
effectively. 
 
Right, exactly. I mean this is Indiana and we have a Republican 
governor and super majorities in both houses, if you are going to 
have Medicaid expansion here, you had to work with everybody. 
 
In terms of the traditional idea of a Republican versus a Democratic 
model of social services there is a difference and so you have to 
understand the climate that you are in and look for avenues and 
levers to move things forward that would meet the needs. It’s often 
surprising to families the role that politics play and what resources 
are available because in general you have not considered it until it 
is something you need. The rhetoric around values is different than 
the ways that political parties have supported systems and 
services. 
 
I think that this particular issue [HIP 2.0], the overall winner is the 
State of Indiana and that’s the individuals who received coverage, 
that’s employers who’s workforce is healthier, that’s our kids and 
families, that’s the providers who have increased reimbursements, 
we all won. 
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Supported HIP 2.0 even though the program does not cover our 
primary constituency. We felt like we could be the voice for parents 
who did not have coverage and whose abilities to care for their 
children was impacted by their lack of access to health care. 
 
Participant F 
 
Our policy committee tends to be more politically savvy, so they will 
weigh the politics [while considering] interests of donors, 
volunteers, nonprofit organizations, the larger community, and also 
weighing the diversity of our membership. So for example on the 
immigration issue some of our rural communities did not want us to 
touch that [issue]. Some of our urban communities felt it is a moral 
obligation and we have to engage. So [we] wrestled [with] how do 
you balance the needs of all of your members? [This] is a challenge 
so we try to craft a middle ground. 
 
[The] board adopted a set of principles, one of the first principles 
[is] do no harm to any of our members of the movement … we have 
principles around advancing the common good, sound policy, and 
[achieving] long term solutions, not [just] short term gains. [We are] 
always looking at [developing] long-term relationships. 
We have been criticized for being too middle of the road, too milk 
toast [laughter]. I think we were called that once. But we feel that it 
is [important to help organizations find] compromise solutions. We 
help negotiate compromises among the different parties, parties 
who do not ordinarily talk together. 
 
Well, initially [we were] cautious [to] not lose donors. Over the last 5 
to 7 years, in this age of highly partisan political partisanship, [our 
philosophy has been] more about [being] the big person, [taking] 
the high road, and [sitting] down across the table from people that 
we disagree with. Someone has to [illustrate] that compromise [is 
sometimes necessary and acceptable], and we don't see that 
happening. So I think it started out as a do no harm principle and 
now it's more of we need to elevate ourselves for them. 
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Fifth: Two Camps: Humanitarians vs. Profit Driven 
 
Whose interest do they advance? Nonprofit professionals see each other 
differently: humanitarians vs profit driven.    
 
Summary: Despite the fact that HIP 2.0 was a good policy, there is a deeply held 
view by smaller nonprofits that large health care institutions and their trade 
association are dominant, very influential, and motivated by profits.  
Contrary to that view, leaders of large health care institutions and their trade 
association provided logical arguments about the financial complexities 
associated with operating a multi-billion dollar industry that employs hundreds of 
thousands of employees, and serves millions of people in Indiana. Driven by 
values, hospital leaders and their association argued that it is their legal and 
fiduciary duty to protect the financial stability of their institutions to ensure 
business continuity to serve every citizen in the state of Indiana. 
 
 Participant D 
 
[Driving] down the cost demand side to improve the health of the 
constituency you serve is not a conflict. For examples, [schools 
have to pay] to clean facilities, [provide] safe bus routes so that kids 
who go to school through these hot spots with highest crime rate 
[can make it safely], [feed] hungry kids, etc. [Shouldn’t we consider 
a] pantry in the building that sells food that makes [children] fat [due 
to] high calorie foods [a conflict of values]? Off course not. It’s the 
same sort of thing how you triage it. [Another example], I made 
more than one millions dollars a year, [and many people including 
my kids] would say you ought to do it for free. I never did that. So I 
can’t elevate myself among my peer group. I am 100% sure that 
some of my peers who view me with disdain because [my 
organization was] very successful in dealing with [state officials]. 
We never really had a bad year. The recession was bad but 
[government] had nothing to do with that, Mr. Market did that. In 
addition, we have to fund depreciation, most nonprofits do not have 
to fund depreciation. So we [must] have money in the bank. This is 
nothing different than a university.  
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Folks look at my organization or [other hospitals in the state or the 
country] and [question why] we got $4 billion in cash investments. 
[They ask] will you need more money? A 4.57% return [on 
investment is not enough to offset] a negative margin in downtown 
[hospitals], that’s why we built suburban hospitals [to offset losses] 
from the downtown [hospital]. We were running a re-distribution 
system within the organization and that was intentional. One 
hospital [earned] double digit [profit] margin but the downtown 
hospital [earned] a single digit margin and sometimes a no digit 
margin. 
 
The for-profit hospitals had a very low comparative charity care. So 
they took a very aggressive position in the subsequent [legislative] 
sessions at the General Assembly on the nonprofit tax status. They 
thought that was unfair… the psych hospitals, some of these pure 
for-profit nursing homes they were [making profits] by [billing] days 
[of service]. They had a patient for 100 days [of rehab]! … Their 
business model is [billing for] days [of service. Our business model 
is [achieving] health outcomes, so that’s the value based [difference 
between for-profit and nonprofit]. [In the past], I played a big role as 
I could with Office of the National Coordinator that was writing the 
policies for value based purchasing, disease state, obesity, etc. 
 
Other hospitals moved out of the inner cities. [Many] feared that the 
academic side of the downtown medicine wouldn’t be able to meet 
its goals because it did not have enough patients to provide 
teaching opportunities. The community health provision side was 
also a concern because patients were getting poorer, payer-mix 
was getting more and more [dependent on] Medicare and Medicaid. 
 
Participant B 
 
The [political] environment in Indiana has made significant 
commitment to being business friendly and we have large corporate 
voices that represent both the insurance industry and the 
pharmaceutical industry. And organizations who have advocated 
around treatment may leverage legislative bills or any efforts of 
policy to frame it around those interests and this may be different 
than what evidence based or best practice would say about the 
most cost effective or appropriate treatment. 
 
If Eli Lilly has X psychotropic drug and people work hard to get 
Medicaid to pay for that even though another company could 
provide a cheaper drug or a backed cognitive behavior therapy 
would be a more effective treatment.  
120 
This realty exists in navigating our current healthcare system in 
Indiana and if anything it has been ratcheted up by the number of 
voices in Indiana who are now part of the administration guiding our 
healthcare system in America.  
 
Sixth: The Calculus of Politics 
 
Policy actions are impacted by the political environment and are assessed based 
on a political cost-benefit analysis.   
 
Participant G 
 
Participant G leads a trade association that represents member organizations 
that serve a stigmatized population.  
 
I think we have a good relationship [with state legislators] and it 
was not always the case. What I’ve seen through the years is that it 
is a sign of leadership at the state level if leadership at the state 
level is open to meeting with [advocates], coming up with innovative 
ideas, getting input, receiving input, then those things are really 
powerful and helpful in terms of crafting policy. But if the ivory tower 
wants to operate in a vacuum and does not want to receive input 
from all parties, [then this is not helpful]. [State legislators] need 
public input, need input from the providers who are providing the 
services, need to understand who [needs] help, and who’s hurt by 
public policy. It is a balance.  
 
I mean I do not like the world politics. Politics should not enter the 
decision making when it comes to health care policy. That does not 
mean that politicians who are elected shouldn’t [engage in politics]. 
They need to invest themselves in health care policy, they often do 
not have detailed knowledge on these matters because these 
matters are so complex. I get upset when politics get involved in 
health care decision making. 
 
Participant C 
 
Each organization has a political capital…There was a fear that 
Governor Pence’s Administration was just pulling a political stunt 
and not serious about [Medicaid] expansion. 
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Participant H 
 
I think good policy is bi-partisan. In fact I think good policy has zero 
partisan favor, belief, and face to it. 
 
[We invest in developing relationships with] City Council, County 
Commissioners, state senators, and representatives. Every year, 
sometime between January and February or March, we have a 
session downtown where we have a lunch with all of the elected 
officials and those who are on the health committees of the state 
legislature. We [educate legislators] about the organization. I 
couldn’t tell you who is a Republican and who is a Democrat. [I 
recognize] couple [of legislators] because they are known, [for 
example] Brian Bosma. But the vast majority, if not almost all of 
them, I couldn’t tell you what their affiliation is and I’d say it makes 
a better policy for us and for our connections with them. [We 
educate them about our] positions. 
 
Theoretical Application of Alford’s Public Interest Theory 
 
Hypothesis #1: Financial Interest vs Patients’ Interest 
 
Due to the high cost of providing quality health care, there is an inherent conflict 
between financial interest of health care nonprofits and the interest of their 
Medicaid patients. Patients desire to receive the highest quality of care at the 
lowest cost possible while hospitals desire to maximize revenues by providing 
services at the lowest cost. Therefore, dominant health care organizations 
prioritize their interest as a top priority and engage in the policy process to 
protect their interest.  
 
Finding: This hypothesis specifically applies to hospital systems. According to 
the participants who were interviewed, this hypothesis is partially true. Based on 
the data analysis, hospital leaders asserted that their financial interest is critical 
to their values and mission to serve the most vulnerable in our society. 
Therefore, they see their financial interest and dominance as a requirement to 
protect their patients and communities that they serve in. In addition, they assert 
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that hospitals must protect their business model to mitigate risks associated with 
constant changes in federal and state regulations, a volatile health care market, 
the responsibility to maintain billions of dollars in fixed assets, and the moral 
commitment to hundreds of thousands of employees and their families.  
 
Participant A 
 
This organization prioritized their clients need first. Their policy positions 
supported expanded coverage because it meant more services to a larger group 
of clients. The organization did not financially benefit from the expansion.  
 
Participant B  
 
This organization prioritized their clients need first. Their policy positions 
supported expanded coverage because it meant coverage to parents with 
children. The organization did not financially benefit from the expansion.  
 
Participant C  
 
[There were] places where you have people coming to the 
emergency room with no coverage [but] now [these institutions] 
have the opportunity to sign these people up [for HIP 2.0] and get 
reimbursed for some of those services. But in another areas it is 
more about the entire health system, [which] is now pushing people 
towards population health [and] taking care of people so they do 
not end up in the emergency room.  
 
I think what our [physicians] hear about [are success] stories of 
someone who was able to get something taken care of before they 
come to the hospital [because they now have coverage]. [Our 
physicians] do not think oh shoot that would have been [an] 
expensive transplant, they do not think that way. They think that’s 
what we are supposed to be doing, [which is] keeping people well 
so that they don’t end up costing the entire system more. [Currently 
the] health care system is all about treating people who are sick or 
injured.  
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A lot of work is being done now on how you completely flip the 
reimbursement model so that everyone is incentivized to keep 
people well outside of the hospital. 
 
Participant D  
 
I was directly involved in dealing with governmental representatives 
on the [Hospital Assessment Fee] committee, [which played a 
critical role] in [designing the financing model for] the 
implementation of HIP 2.0. We also received DISH payments. As a 
result of these algorithms [and the complexity of the funding 
streams], I was very much involved in [these decisions].  
 
How can the relationship be equal enough that you can have a 
judgment about what you’re receiving, whether you need to receive 
it or not, so that’s what the argument is about. In American 
healthcare, 80% of those prescribed drugs in the world are 
prescribed here so how can that be? Do we just simply provide too 
much and it’s too expensive?  
 
Around here we have [an] ethics committees. So any patient, any 
provider, or any employee can ask for an ethics consultation and 
actually talk a problem through. Those usually include end of life 
[decisions], sometimes they involve kids in the NQU but mainly end 
of life. But talk about waste, and I can’t tell you how many times in 
my years as a CEO I was dragged into those unwillingly because I 
am not part of the protocol but I knew the people. 
 
Participant E 
 
Organization does not provide health care services. 
 
Participant F  
 
Organization does not provide health care services. 
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Participant G  
 
The business model should not be viewed as a conflict between patients and 
providers. The business model has to function for the centers to afford providing 
services.  
 
Participant H  
 
[The argument about whether or not a conflict exists between our 
values and business model is] an interesting one, it’s going to be an 
argument that will never be resolved. My belief, is that the 
consumer in general has one shade of this, but really this goes 
back to their belief of what a nonprofit organization is. The historical 
or the traditional aspect of nonprofits, regardless of whatever it is, 
[believes that nonprofits] are not supposed to make money, they  
are supposed to squeak by, they are supposed to have raiser thin 
margins if they have one at all, they are supposed to solicit. And 
where I disagree with that is my status of whether I pay property 
taxes or I am tax exempt should not flow into how it is we operate 
as an organization because our belief is if today we are covering 
five individuals, hypothetically, who are poor struggling and 
vulnerable, and we have the ability to evolve what we are doing 
today to cover six, then we should be doing that. So from our 
leadership perspective even though we have a tax exempt status, 
that does not give us a free pass for being able to go and find more 
[patients to serve]. Our charity care continues to rise every year 
because you still have people that are struggling and until no one is 
struggling we have a mission to serve. It just so happens that we 
are very efficient and effective at [achieving our goals]. 
 
Hypothesis #2: Challenging and Suppressed Interest 
 
Challenging and suppressed interest groups engage to protect the interest of the 
most vulnerable in their communities.  
 
Finding: This hypothesis holds true for the most part as confirmed by the 
responses of participants and the data analysis. However, the faith-based 
nonprofit and the mutual benefit association placed a higher value on internal 
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harmony within their membership, engaged in consensus building, and focused 
on long term goals. They continued to advance the goals of repressed through 
different advocacy vehicles outside of their formal roles with their organizations.  
 
Participant A 
 
We advance the interest of the underserved, the uninsured, and the 
low income chronic disease population… We represent the 
repressed. We engage in challenging certain aspects of the policy, 
but we mainly represent the repressed. 
 
We were pushing for healthcare or Medicaid expansion because 
that was to us what was on the table that was right for our clients. 
As that evolved and became HIP 2.0, we didn’t dig in our heels and 
say no we just want Medicaid expansion. We really looked at [HIP 
2.0] and said okay this has a better chance. [HIP 2.0] got the 
political will and it's really good for our clients so we became very 
supportive of the program. 
 
Participant B  
 
We advance the interest of children with disabilities and health care 
challenges. 
 
We represent the repressed. We engage in challenging certain 
aspects of the policy, but we mainly represent the repressed. 
 
Participant C  
 
Not applicable.  
 
Participant D and Participant H 
 
Not applicable  
 
Participant E  
 
The fundamental sort of question that we ask ourselves is this a 
religious issue? And that really determines what our public policy is 
going to be.  
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The reason that we're involved in public policy is little bit self-
serving. Is that our primary mission is to make sure that the 
religious community is safe and secure and that we have a place 
where we can live, practice freely, engage freely, communicate 
freely, and ensure [these freedoms] for [our] community. We also 
need to have a hand in ensuring [those freedoms] for the entire 
community. [But I recognize that our positions] are a little bit self-
serving. 
 
Participant F  
 
From a public policy, that's a very interesting question because we 
have struggled with that. Our primary first constituency are our 61 
members throughout the state comprised of all of their donors, all of 
their volunteers, and all of their funded partners, plus all of their 
community because they have a mission to make their community 
better. By extension, our constituency, we see much broader than 
our 61 members. 
 
Participant G  
 
I think it gets back to influence. Let’s be honest, hospitals are major 
employers in local communities, I think they are 20% of the GDP 
total, and we are a tiny sliver of the 20%, but it’s very important part 
of our economics. Our society valued health care services in a way 
that has driven up health care cost for specific services over and 
above those that were not deemed to be reimbursable at the same 
level or at least on par with certain treatment aspects.  
 
But do not get me wrong other aspects of primary health care have 
been underfunded too [such as] pediatrics, primary family care 
practice, all of those things. But that does impact the influence an 
organization has because again there is a huge economic driver 
here to the system. It is just the reality of how we valued health 
care here in the United States and I think it has been a poor public 
policy decision on our part to go down that path.  
 
We should’ve been invested in health all along avoiding this drive 
up of costs. Doctors [are serving] elderly people [and] advancing 
treatments that they do not need. It’s not good for the health care 
system at all. 
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Hypothesis #3: Governmental funding is critical 
 
The more benefits nonprofit health care organizations receive from government, 
the more these nonprofits will attempt to dominate the policy field.  
 
Finding: Based on the data analysis of key responses from participants, this 
hypothesis holds true.  
 
Participant A  
 
This organization does not receive funding from government and they did not aim 
to dominate the health care field. 
 
Participant B  
 
This organization does not receive funding from government and they did not aim 
to dominate the health care field. 
 
Participant C  
 
The organization was given direct access to negotiating with the state because of 
two reasons: (1) viewed as trusted partners and the most important stakeholder 
in the policy arena since the inception of HIP 1.0. Hospitals were the most 
impacted by uncompensated care. Market Basket cuts exceeded $1 billion in 
2015, and will exceed $8 billion by 2020. (2) There was no other mechanism to 
fund the program without the HAF. So the state had to negotiate directly with 
hospitals and ensure that the new policy would not lead to a shock to the hospital 
system (financial instability) that may lead to closure of hospitals or shrinking of 
coverage.  
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We had the means to create a fiscal solution to the issue. We had 
the most to lose, so we were the loudest voice … our members 
exist in every large community.  
 
We encouraged our members to write op-eds, visit with their law 
makers, talk with the administration, talk about coverage on social 
media, undertake a lot of activities to push that out there, so that 
also helped promote the sense that hospitals are behind this policy 
and want to see it enacted. Hospitals are large employers with 
almost 200 thousand Hoosiers in total employment across the 
state. In many communities, they are the largest employers in the 
county if not in the multi-county region. 
 
Participant D 
 
Well, clearly [HIP 2.0 provided] money to hospitals based on a 
public policy, but the devil was in the details of the calculation. 
Here’s a fact. I never had a direct conversation with Governor 
Daniels or Governor Pence about the actual calculation, never. I 
never went above a staff member’s head to their boss about an 
arithmetic calculation. I did encourage both Governor Daniels and 
Governor Pence that I thought that they needed to refresh the 
staff’s memory to why we were doing these sort of things. Like why 
are we doing HIP 2.0? So it’s not a bureaucratic exercise, it is to 
get people enrolled. [Why did we implement] HIP 1.0? To fill the 
hole for folks who otherwise uninsured. 
 
Participant E  
 
Does not receive government funding – does not aim to be dominant  
 
Participant F  
 
Does not receive state or local funding.  
 
Yes, we are currently a CMS navigator grantee through the 
organization. It was a multi-state grant application. We were the 
Indiana grantee and ironically only Indiana was funded out of all of 
the states that applied through the multistate application. We have 
applied for other grants on behalf of our members or on behalf of 
Indiana 211 partnership but we were not successful. 
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The organization does not [receive state funding] directly. We do 
have a contract with the state to manage the state employee 
combined campaign. 
 
I feel like we are a trusted resource because we are not political. 
We do not operate in a political capacity like other organizations. 
We do not engage in anything partisan. So if we are viewed as a 
resource [then this is] a success. My board view it [a success] when 
we are recognized [in the media] and they often see that as are we 
quoted in an article? Do they see changes happening at the local 
level? That's how they view success. 
 
But I feel we are often a trusted resource because we don't have 
that kind of leg in the game. I don't get any financial benefits by 
advocating for health insurance, for low income people, there is 
nothing that we do other than the goodwill and accomplishing our 
mission. The Hospital Association sees very clearly that when there 
is a Medicare rate versus a Medicaid rate pay loss they have a 
clear bottom line reason and one could argue that philanthropy is 
better, is improved, when businesses do better so let's support 
businesses; but that's not our motivation and that's not part of our 
thinking. 
 
Participant G  
 
Of course we can’t be dominate because we do not have the 
influence to be dominant, so I would say a balance between the 
three. 
 
So I want to be dominant but again I do not want to be dominant at 
the cost of my ability to be transactional or my ability to represent 
the repressed. 
 
Participant H  
 
This organization is dominant; however, they view their dominance as an 
instrument to protect the most vulnerable. Therefore, the Participant thinks that 
the organization may switch roles between challenging and dominant dependent 
on the issue.  
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I would not say repressed, we are either a challenging or a 
dominant depending on what the issue is…Dominant to serve the 
repressed. 
 
I would say we are challenging and repressed for those who are 
voiceless, and it is a combination of the two because as large as 
we are we have the ability to influence [policy]. We should always 
be looking out for those who are on the margins and take care of 
them the way that Jesus found those who were naked and clothed 
them, found those who were hungry and gave them food. We 
should find those who are struggling and help them. But that does 
not mean we can’t be dominant in how we do it because our 
mission is always grounded in serving those who are struggling. 
 
It is disappointing [that other nonprofits criticize us] because [they] 
have the traditional [view] of [how] a nonprofit [should operate] that 
I do not believe in. I believe that we should be great at what we do 
and do more with the fruits of our labor. So with it how do we show 
that [we do more with the fruits of our labor]? it is not something 
that we have to prove but if we are caring for one poor and 
vulnerable individual and now we have the ability to care for two, 
[then] by God we are [going to] go out and find that second one and 
when we are done with that we are [going to] evolve and find a way 
to care for three because we can show that evolution over time. 
[This approach will improve] health outcomes. 
 
Hypothesis #4: Dominant interest organizations are influential 
 
Unlike challenging and suppressed interest groups, dominant health care 
nonprofits tend to be very influential, connected to the political elite, have 
abundance of resources, and are focused on protecting long term goals. 
Challenging and suppressed interest groups tend to collaborate with each other 
to counter public power and private interest via networks of coalitions. 
 
Finding: Based on the data analysis of key responses from participants, this 
hypothesis holds true. 
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Participant A  
 
This organization represented the repressed. They are not very influential, not 
connected to the political elite, have limited resources. Their focus is to advance 
the interest of their clients. Advocacy is mainly conducted via joining coalitions. 
 
Participant B  
 
This organization represented the repressed. They are not very influential, not 
connected to the political elite, have limited resources. Their focus is to advance 
the interest of their clients. Advocacy is mainly conducted via joining coalitions. 
 
Participant C  
 
This organization represented dominant interest. They are very influential, 
connected to the political elite, have abundant resources. Their focus is to 
advance the interest of the hospitals in Indiana. Advocacy is the core function of 
the organization and conducted formally via lobbying, direct communication with 
the state, and through coalitions with other nonprofits. 
  
[Our organization could also be viewed as representing challenging 
and repressed interest]. Some of our faith-based religious affiliated 
institutions were founded by the mission taking care of the poor and 
I think our members do live up to those commitments today 
[especially] when you look at their hospitals they still continue to 
operate in our state [and advocate to enroll] individuals in those 
programs and directly help them. Back to the dominant interest 
[question]. Yes, the fact that we were able to reduce the 
uncompensated care helps [hospitals] run their business and their 
operations and continue [their] missions. Otherwise they would 
wither. It is mostly dominant but with input from the others. 
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Participant D  
 
It does not matter if you work for a nonprofit or a for-profit [hospital]. 
If the policy maker that you’re lobbying, for a lack of better word, is 
someone you know, you are not going to exaggerate [the 
importance of your policy proposal], it’s not going to happen. And 
you are not going to ask them to do something that’s unreasonable 
or selfish, it’s just not going to happen. Others [they] will say this is 
not true. Most of our competition would say that I had undue 
influence, [but] it never happened. I just did not talk to them, so you 
slice this spectrum of influence and [discover that different 
hospitals] are going to be with more or less influence but the 
reasons for that may not be obvious.  
 
You may or may not know, you may think it is the size of the check 
[donated to political campaigns], but I do not think so. At least in my 
case, I personally wrote big checks to both Mitch and Mike. Mitch is 
a really good friend of mine and it had nothing to do with that. Mike 
called me and asked me for a 5 figure gift if I could afford it, I would 
do it, and did do it, and contributed to his PAC which gave to them. 
But the truth is I was working with him and contributing to him. 
Governor O’Bannon was a family friend. Governor Kernan 
appointed me, a Republican to the state economic development 
commission, IEDC when it was first formed. 
 
So I talked to a lot to governors about this issue. In fact recently the 
issue of what data you look at, what data do you actually trust, and 
what change or outcome do you want to see, so that’s the public 
policy question. If the goal was to expand payment for the 
underserved, then what would that do? Would that improve the 
health of the underserved and drive down the demand side?  
 
My operating theory was that the only way you can deal with [cost 
and quality of health care services] is if you treat this issue as a 
population health matter and convince policy makers that 
emergency departments were being abused because they were 
being used for primary care visits, which was really a big leap for 
what people thought of the medical model for the emergency 
departments. 
 
Connecting public policy need with governmental action I thought 
was within my wheel house, part of that was because I worked for 
big law firms. 
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The trade association was going back and forth with him on the 
funding as you can imagine. I [met with the Governor to] reinforce 
the idea that we did share a common value which is to serve as 
many people as possible and improve the health of particularly the 
underserved. His political argument may have been about self-
determination and federal budget deficit mandates, but at the end 
of the day his goal was the same as mine. [The Governor’s 
challenge was] how you translate that into marching orders to other 
folks? [This is] the art of administration and politics. That was up to 
him, so I remained focused on [the idea of] expansion. 
 
The core function of hospital systems is acute care. The 
organization is one of three acute cases in the state of Indiana, so 
we would be the dominant by far on the core business. 
 
And [as for] repressed [interest], [this relates] to the values. [Ethical 
dilemmas at the hospital system] would include end of life 
decisions. I must tell you that if I agonized over anything, and the 
chairman of my organization’s values committee knows this, I 
agonized over [what we were doing with acute care]. We were so 
focused on acute care [and] providing unnecessary care to 96 
years old with dementia patients who are voiceless, or the pregnant 
mom how comes in labor and never brings the baby back for a well-
baby visit and we know where she lives. In fact, we got the data 
from the state board of health that tells the infant mortality rate is 
high [in Indiana]. I was among those personally who lobbied 
Governor Pence to make this the number one priority of the State 
Department of Health. It seems they did a good job on [the issue of 
infant mortality] and I think this is a work in progress. You got to 
have forcing functions, and around here the forcing function is the 
values committee. I think everybody talks the talk [but must 
advocate for policy changes] to walk the talk. So what would be the 
forcing function? That’s the leadership question. So Congress 
would say the law.  
 
Measuring community benefit [is critical] and we got to do a 
community benefit report [to report our progress]. The [current] 
community benefit reports are not aligned. For example, [as it 
relates to the] drug epidemic, I suggested that all 120-130 hospitals 
in the state that own 40% of physician [networks] in the state, which 
produce two thirds of the state’s business, to have a common 
prescription guidelines for opioid and other pain killers. What a 
great idea? But that was trying to move an industry on a common 
problem that does not pay anybody money at the end of the day. 
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Participant E  
 
I think we have very positive relationships with just about 
everybody. One thing that we really pride ourselves on at the 
organization is maintaining good relationships with [state 
legislators] and on both sides of the aisle. We may as a community 
[agree to disagree with] a legislator or an elected officials on a 
policy, but at the end of the day that legislator or elected official 
knows that the organization will [engage in a] civil and fact-based 
discussion about that particular issue. 
 
Participant F  
 
Because we tend to do the middle of the road compromise, I think 
every communication has strengthened our relationship [with state 
legislators] because even if we agree to disagree about a policy we 
are still providing good data and not beating them over the head to 
do something. Though one area that I think we are hampered 
because we hold the navigator grant, which is a federal grant and 
some of our sub grantees are also Indiana navigators, we have 
gone by two sets of rules related to that. So we are extra cautious. 
For example, because of the navigator grant, we were restricted in 
how much we could do with the health plans. So sometimes the 
rules get in the way of wearing multiple hats. 
 
Participant G  
 
This 501-C-6 trade association represented challenging and repressed interest.  
 
We did have some discussion about the medically frail designation 
the feds had just amended the definitions for medically frail under 
the HIP 2.0 program, or the HIP state plan. There is a distinction 
here, was afforded the opportunity for additional treatment services 
and so the way it was crafted they did engage us in conversations 
to talk about how we can ensure a seamless designation process 
so that the people can get access to treatment quickly [based on a] 
national model. In fact, the team and I did a national webinar on this 
process [and] it was so well received. 
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I think we are doing some pretty cool stuff. In fact I was pretty 
instrumental in working on getting the language changed around 
[providing health care services] for folks coming out of the criminal 
justice [system] from both the DOC and the County jails and into 
treatment. By that standard alone I think we’ve really done a good 
job getting people better access to care. Again, the presumptive 
eligibility [provision] made a big difference. 
 
[We also represent the] repressed. [Those are the] voices who did 
not have access to health care services, we indirectly [became] 
their voice. I stay up at night and I think about how the Association 
serves these repressed voices and their interest in a complicated 
way, it’s not [a simple] one size fits all scenario. [We have to make 
the challenging business model work. 
 
Participant H  
 
Policy is the only way strategy to me can be successful. If you do 
not have sound policy that can be evolved, massaged, and 
changed over time you can never have a grounded success and 
evolution with a strong health care policy. The Chief Advocacy 
Officer have shown the board how this works. If we do not have a 
strong voice in what policy is, [then] we can never advance 
ourselves to find those who are struggling. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Summary 
 
This study examined the question of whose interest do nonprofit organizations 
advance when they attempt to influence the implementation of public policy. To 
answer this question, a qualitative methods approach was used to analyze why 
nonprofits engage in the public policy process (motivation and values), the policy 
actions that nonprofits make during the implementation of the policy (how?), and 
the method by which nonprofits address or mitigate conflicts and contradictions 
between organizational interest and constituents’ interest (whose interest do they 
advance?). 
 
The coding of interview data uncovered seven initial themes:  
 
(1) Leaders of Indiana’s health and human service nonprofits are experienced in 
the fields of politics and public policy. All interviewees are highly educated 
nonprofit leaders who hold prominent leadership roles within their organizations. 
They all have extensive experience in the fields of law, politics, lobbying, and 
health care policy and administration. Five of the eight interviewees are 
registered lobbyists.  
 
(2) Indiana’s health and human service nonprofits advocate to advance the 
interests of their member organizations, patients, and communities that they 
serve.  
 
(3) Indiana’s health and human service nonprofits have different levels of 
organizational maturity. Hospital systems are among the largest employers in the 
state with tens of thousands of employees statewide, highly structured, operate 
almost in every county of the state, maintain budgets with billions of dollars, 
serve millions of people, very well connected to policy makers and the corporate 
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community, engage in direct and indirect lobbying and advocacy activities, highly 
regulated and operate in a very volatile market place, and very focused on long 
term strategies and goals. Smaller trade associations, mutual benefits 
organizations, health care advocacy groups, and faith-based nonprofits share 
similar characteristics: they operate with small budgets, small teams, boards are 
composed of executives of locally affiliated chapters or branches, self- 
preservation is important given the diversity of their membership, and advocacy 
and policy stances are evaluated based on political calculus, religious values, 
and internal consensus.  
 
(4) Indiana’s health and human service nonprofits utilize direct, indirect, formal 
and informal methods to influence policy. The eight organizations fully supported 
HIP 2.0 because the policy expands coverage to the uninsured population and 
allows organizations to improve their finances, which in return allows them to 
serve more people. HIP 2.0 was viewed favorably by most organizations thus 
minimizing internal conflicts. All organizations have a formal process to finalize 
policy and advocacy positions, some are more complicated than others. With the 
exception of the two health care advocacy groups, the remaining six 
organizations engaged in formal and informal lobbying activities. The two 
Hospital systems were focused on long term strategic goals, business model 
stability, and securing favorable regulations.  
 
(5) Indiana’s health and human service nonprofits have different levels of 
influence. Data illustrates that a complicated web of relationships exists within 
the nonprofit sector by which leaders of the largest health care organizations 
serve on boards of other health care advocacy groups and help shape their 
agendas. One health care executive had a direct access to the governor and 
government staff.  
 
(6) Indiana’s hospitals were the most influential in influencing the implementation 
of HIP 2.0. Hospitals were the most invested stakeholders given the financial 
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commitment they made in financing HIP 2.0, so the state negotiated directly with 
hospitals because they were the most important stakeholders, they have 
statewide impact on improving access to health care, and they are the largest 
employers in many counties of the state. Given the political environment and the 
general consensus between organizations that implementing HIP 2.0 was better 
than maintaining the status quo, most organizations supported the policy but 
focused on the transactional aspect of the implementation. 
 
(7) Indiana’s health and human service nonprofits switch roles in representing 
different types of interest depending on the policy issue. The two 501-C-6 Trade 
Associations, the 501-C-3 faith-based organization, and the statewide mutual 
benefits organization represented the interests of their board members and 
CEOs of member organizations. One of the trade associations represented 
dominant interest, the other association represented challenging and repressed 
interest. Both the faith-based nonprofit and the state-wide mutual benefits 
association represented their membership’s interest and they valued internal 
consensus over taking public positions on controversial policies. Therefore, 
leaders from both organizations engaged under the umbrella of broader 
coalitions to challenge certain policies. Thus, they represented challenging 
interest to improve the transactional aspects of certain policies. The other four 
organizations viewed the patient and the larger community as their primary.  
 
Further analysis of the categories and concepts that emerged from the coding 
phase confirmed that nonprofits advocate to achieve their missions and values, 
are driven by the commitment to the public good, represent different interests 
and constituencies, act with self interest in mind, are pragmatic and willing to 
compromise if the proposed policy benefits the larger population, and they 
believe that advancing their organizational self-interest benefits the populations 
they serve. It is also worth noting that small advocacy nonprofits acknowledge 
that there is an internal tension between nonprofits and believe that the health 
care nonprofits are divided into two camps or types of nonprofits: a camp that 
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considers themselves as humanitarians who advance the interests of the 
repressed, and a camp that is driven by profits. Almost all participants confirmed 
that this worldview does exist; however, dominant organizations argued that they 
are not different from smaller organizations in terms of securing funds to serve 
their missions. 
 
The micro-level analysis of internal decision making processes within a given 
organization and the meso-level analysis of the relationship between interest, 
power, and health care policy confirmed that hospitals tend to dominate Indiana’s 
health care policy field and influence decisions made by other actors to impact 
policy outcomes.  
 
The application of Robert R. Alford’s theory of structural interests to the 
implementation of HIP 2.0 and findings from the qualitative analysis produced a 
more comprehensive understanding of Indiana’s health care policy field, 
organizational actors, organizational conflicts based on values and interests, and 
the distribution of power between nonprofit interest groups. Indiana’s dominant 
institutions were the most powerful, connected and influential; challenging 
interest groups participated in the implementation process and advocated for 
certain transactional changes; and repressed interest groups were not as 
influential as the other groups.  
 
Internal and external competing interests, the impact of the political and policy 
environment, and funding implications are factors that nonprofits consider when 
making policy decisions. It is very clear from the interviews that organizational 
variables such as structure, membership diversity, funding sources, and 
community interests could either restrain or empower the advocacy efforts of 
nonprofits that operate either as advocates or as service providers.  
The findings clearly illustrate that dominant interest groups have more power, 
influence, connections to the powerful elite, and have more resources to 
influence the implementation of public policy. However, the analysis revealed 
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more details about the connection between the idea of dominance and serving 
the most vulnerable in our society. In the case of HIP 2.0, dominant interest 
groups supported HIP 2.0 because it was the right policy for Indiana’s uninsured 
population. Hospitals and other health care providers argued that an improved 
financial position as a result of an increase in state reimbursements allowed their 
organizations to provide more services to a segment of the population that was 
historically uninsured.  
 
The visual trend analysis clearly illustrates that on a national level the ACA 
expansion did improve patient satisfaction measured by patients’ perception of 
the quality of care they received.  The trend line illustrates that both Medicaid 
expansion and non-expansion states experienced an increase in patient 
satisfaction after the implementation of the ACA. The results also show that 
hospitals in twenty two out of the twenty five expansion states reported an 
increase in patient satisfaction when comparing 2013 to 2015. It is worth noting 
two findings: (1) the trend has been rising since before the implementation of the 
ACA; and (2) Patients in non-expansion states tend to have a better rating of 
their hospital experience compared to patients living in expansion states (a 
difference of approximately 2 percentage points).  
 
As it relates to hypotheses that were tested, the following conclusions were 
reached based on the data analysis:  
 
Financial Interest vs Patients’ Interest 
 
Hypothesis #1: Due to the high cost of providing quality health care, there is an 
inherent conflict between financial interest of health care nonprofits and the 
interest of their Medicaid patients. Patients desire to receive the highest quality of 
care at the lowest cost possible while hospitals desire to maximize revenues by 
providing services at the lowest cost. Therefore, dominant health care 
141 
organizations prioritize their interest as a top priority and engage in the policy 
process to protect their interest.  
 
Finding: This hypothesis specifically applies to hospital systems. According to 
the participants who were interviewed, this hypothesis is partially true. Based on 
the data analysis, hospital leaders asserted that their financial interest is critical 
to their values and mission to serve the most vulnerable in our society. 
Therefore, they see their financial interest and dominance as a requirement to 
protect their patients and communities that they serve in. In addition, they assert 
that hospitals must protect their business model to mitigate risks associated with 
constant changes in federal and state regulations, a volatile health care market, 
the responsibility to maintain billions of dollars in fixed assets, and the moral 
commitment to hundreds of thousands of employees and their families.  
 
Challenging and Suppressed Interest 
 
Hypothesis #2: Challenging and suppressed interest groups engage to protect 
the interest of the most vulnerable in their communities.  
 
Finding: This hypothesis holds true for the most part as confirmed by the 
responses of participants and the data analysis. However, the faith-based 
nonprofit and the mutual benefit association placed a higher value on internal 
harmony within their membership, engaged in consensus building, and focused 
on long term goals. They continued to advance the goals of repressed through 
different advocacy vehicles outside of their formal roles with their organizations.  
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Governmental funding is critical 
 
Hypothesis #3: The more benefits nonprofit health care organizations receive 
from government, the more these nonprofits will attempt to dominate the policy 
field.  
 
Finding: Based on the data analysis of key responses from participants, this 
hypothesis holds true.  
 
Dominant interest organizations are influential 
 
Hypothesis #4: Unlike challenging and suppressed interest groups, dominant 
health care nonprofits tend to be very influential, connected to the political elite, 
have abundance of resources, and are focused on protecting long term goals. 
Challenging and suppressed interest groups tend to collaborate with each other 
to counter public power and private interest via networks of coalitions. 
 
Finding: Based on the data analysis of key responses from participants, this 
hypothesis holds true. 
 
The convergence of all findings from this research study support assertions 
made by existing research that found measures of institutionalization and 
resource dependence to be inconsistent predictors of political activity and 
nonprofits’ motive to engage in advocacy (Herrnson, 2000; Nicholson-Crotty, 
2007). 
 
Implications to Future Research 
 
As in the case of every research project, all research is never perfect and 
assertions made by any researcher are always subject to further investigation, 
examination, and critique. The findings from this study raise additional questions 
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to be explored in the future, such as: did large health care institutions increase 
their charitable investments in communities as a result of the reduction in 
uncompensated care?  Is there a correlation between improved financial 
reimbursement rates and customer satisfaction? Would findings be different had I 
interviewed patients rather than executives of health and human service 
nonprofits? Would a difference-in-difference statistical analysis confirm that the 
ACA or the implementation of HIP 2.0 had a direct impact on the improvement of 
customers’ perception of services they received at their local hospital? Under 
which conditions and circumstances do organizations switch roles between 
representing dominant, challenging, and repressed interest? These are important 
questions that are worth pursuing in future research studies. 
 
On the theoretical side, Alford’s framework assumes that there is an inherent 
conflict between the three different types of public interests for two main reasons: 
(1) organizations represent different constituents with different interests, and (2) 
dominant interest groups desire to maintain the status quo to maximize their 
benefits. In the case of Indiana’s implementation of HIP 2.0, leaders representing 
the three different interest categories set aside their differences and agreed to 
collaborate in supporting the implementation of HIP 2.0 because HIP 2.0 was a 
policy that advanced the public good. In light of this finding, it is important that 
additional research be conducted to examine under which conditions do 
repressed and challenging public interest groups support policies that benefit a 
dominant group? In Indiana, the three types of public interest groups supported 
the implementation of HIP 2.0 because they collectively believed that the policy 
to expand coverage benefited the most vulnerable despite the fact the hospitals 
also benefited financially from the reduction in their uncompensated care.  
 
Finally, this research could be expanded and extended to other policy areas for 
practitioners in different policy fields either in Indiana or on a national level. The 
policy process is very complicated due to the engagement of many actors, 
interest groups, the impact of the political environment, abundance or lack of 
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organizational resources, and many other factors. Philanthropists and nonprofit 
leaders must be equipped with the knowledge about power structures in a given 
policy field to be able to influence the outcomes of public policy.   
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APPENDIX A – Qualitative Interview Guide Template 
 
Qualitative Interview Guide Template  
 
Philanthropy, Policy, and Politics: Power and Influence of Health Care Nonprofit Interest 
Groups on the Implementation of Health Care Policy (IRB Study # 1411878474) 
 
Introduction: Thank you for taking the time to talk to me today.  I really 
appreciate your willingness to help me out with this interview.  Have you ever 
been interviewed before?  Well, the main reason why I would like to interview you 
is to learn about your experiences with advocacy in healthcare. 
 
Findings from this study will add value to existing academic scholarly research on 
the impact of hospital advocacy on social welfare policies.  
 
Interviewee Role: I want you to feel that this is your interview.  I am here to 
listen to what you have to say. I am very interested in your experiences, so 
please feel free to share anything that comes to mind. My job is to listen to you 
so that I can better understand these experiences.   
 
Explain Audio Recording Procedures: As I explained when we talked [on the 
phone], I will record our conversation so that I do not have to take notes and so I 
can get your complete answer.  This also helps me guarantee that my report will 
accurately reflect your experiences.  After the interview, I will listen to the 
recording and type up the interview.  I will not include any information that 
identifies you. When I have finished my project, the recorded copy of the 
interview will be erased. Is this okay with you?  
 
Assure Interviewee of Confidentiality: Please feel free to speak openly with 
me.  Maintaining your privacy is the most important thing to me and anything you 
say during this interview will be kept private and confidential.  I will not include 
your name or any other unique information that could identify you in my report.  
Also, if I ask you any questions that you do not want to answer, you can just say, 
“pass” and we will skip those questions. 
 
Time Frame of Interview: The interview will last about 1-2 hours.  If you need a 
break at any time, just let me know. 
 
Obtain Informed Consent: Before we begin the interview, I would like to go over 
the study’s information sheet, which describes the nature of the study, your role 
in the study, the steps taken to maintain your confidentiality, and the voluntary 
nature of the study.  You can take this form with you (Wait for the participant to 
read the information). Do you have any questions about the study or the 
information you read? If not, do you give your permission to participate in the 
study by being interviewed? (If the participant agrees, then start the interview). 
146 
Ok thank you for your help with the study.  Do you have any more questions 
before we start?  
 
Gain Verbal Consent and Start Interview: Ok, then I will begin recording the 
interview now.   
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APPENDIX B – Interview Questionnaire 
 
Topic Domain Main Question Sample Follow up – Probes 
 
 
Personal 
Background 
 
Please describe 
your background 
(professional 
experience, 
areas of policy 
interest, etc.).  
 
 
1. How long have you been with 
this nonprofit?  
2. What roles did you occupy? 
3. Please tell me about your 
experiences in the field of 
healthcare? 
4. In your previous/current role, 
did/do you engage in 
educating the public or 
government 
staff/representatives on issues 
that your organizations cares 
about? 
Organization’s 
Constituents 
 
Who is your main 
constituency?  
1. Who do you serve 
(clients/demographics)? I.e., 
who are the primary 
constituents of your 
organization?   
2. Does your organization have 
other important constituents 
whose needs/interests you 
must consider? 
3. Are there conflicts among the 
needs/interests of your 
constituents? 
4. What role do your constituents 
play in your organizational 
decision making?  
5. What role did your constituents 
play in your work around ACA? 
 
Organization’s 
Background 
 
 
Can you tell me 
how your 
organization 
works with 
government?  
1. What government programs 
does your organization 
participate in?  
2. Does your organization 
engage in educational 
initiatives that target the 
public? Government staff & 
representatives?  
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3. Does your organization 
perform any lobbying 
activities? 
4. Does your organization receive 
any government funding? If so, 
for what programs? 
5. Does your organization meet 
with elected representatives or 
government staff/managers? If 
so, who participates from your 
organization and how often? 
6. Does your organization 
engage in educating the public 
about issues related to your 
mission? If so, what are these 
issues (can you give me 
examples from the last year or 
two)? 
7. Can you describe your 
organization’s current 
relationship with government 
agencies/staff/representatives? 
Organization’s 
Advocacy 
decision making 
process, type 
and purpose   
 
During ACA 
expansion in 
Indiana, what 
was the decision 
making process 
to formulate a 
policy position?    
1. What was the motivation for 
the meeting?   
2. What were the goals that your 
organization wanted to 
achieve? Who participated? 
Describe the meeting.   
3. What was the outcome? 
4. Who participated in making 
decisions regarding how to 
engage, educate, or work with 
government officials? 
5. In that instance, did your 
clients/constituents participate 
in the decision making 
process? If so, how? 
6. Do you remember any 
instances during this process 
where your clients and the 
organization had different 
ideas of how to educate and 
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engage government staff or 
representatives? How did you 
deal with this situation? 
7. Does your organization 
coordinate and plan with other 
nonprofits to educate or 
engage government programs 
or policies?  
8. Which organizations and what 
was the purpose?  
9. If so, can you walk me through 
the process of how these 
efforts are coordinated (who 
participated, how did you 
prepare for the meeting, what 
were the goals of the meeting, 
etc.)? 
10. What was the program or 
policy area you were trying to 
influence? And Why? 
 
Influence over 
the 
implementation 
of the policy 
process 
Did you influence 
the policy 
implementation? 
1. Did you participate in any 
events or meetings with 
government 
staff/representatives to discuss 
Indiana’s Medicaid expansion? 
2. If so, who did you meet with?  
3. What was the purpose?  
4. Was the process easy 
/difficult? 
5. Did your organization have an 
official stance on Medicaid 
expansion in Indiana? If so, 
what was it? 
6. Can you describe to me the 
type of educational efforts your 
organization engaged in to 
educate the public or 
government 
staff/representatives regarding 
Medicaid expansion in 
Indiana? Can you explain the 
process? 
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7. Why did you choose this 
method/type of 
engagement/education? 
8. What was the purpose you 
were trying to achieve?  
9. Who will benefit from your 
efforts?  
10. What does your organization 
like about Medicaid expansion 
and why? 
11. What do you dislike about 
Medicaid expansion and why?  
 
Outcomes/Impact 
of influence over 
Medicaid 
Expansion in 
Indiana 
 
 
Explain the 
impact of your 
efforts to 
influence the 
implementation of 
Medicaid 
expansion in 
Indiana? 
 
1. Were you able to influence the 
public or government 
staff/representatives regarding 
the design or implementation 
of Indiana’s Medicaid 
expansion?  
2. If so, who did you influence 
and how?  
3. What was the outcome of your 
efforts?  
4. Where you pleased with the 
outcomes? Please explain?  
5. How did the implementation of 
Medicaid expansion impact 
your organization?  (ex: 
services) 
6. How did the Medicaid 
expansion impact those who 
you serve?  
7. Did the implementation of 
Medicaid expansion impact 
your organization’s relationship 
with other nonprofits that you 
work with? If so, can you share 
a few examples? 
8. How do you measure the 
success of your efforts in 
regards to Medicaid 
expansion? 
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9. Did your relationship with 
those who you tried to 
influence (public, clients, 
governor, legislature, state 
agency executives) change as 
a result of your engagement to 
influence Medicaid expansion? 
If so, how? 
10. Was your organizational 
budget affected as a result of 
your engagement with 
government 
representatives/staff or 
Medicaid expansion?  
11. Do you coordinate with other 
nonprofit healthcare 
organizations to influence 
health care policy in Indiana? If 
so, who and why?  
12. If appropriate, do you think 
your patients/clients are more 
satisfied today as a result of 
Medicaid expansion? 
 
Whose interest 
does your 
organization 
represent?  
 
 
Does your 
organization 
represent 
dominant 
challenging, or 
repressed 
groups? 
 
1. If you are to use one of these 
labels, which one best 
represents your organization?  
2. Why? 
3. If more than one label applies, 
then please explain?  
4. Any final thoughts? 
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APPENDIX C – Study Information Sheet 
 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY STUDY INFORMATION SHEET FOR 
 
Philanthropy, Policy, and Politics: Power and Influence of Health Care Nonprofit 
Interest Groups on the Implementation of Health Care Policy (IRB Study # 
1411878474) 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study that examines the role of nonprofit 
health human service nonprofits as interest groups on the implementation of public 
policy/healthcare policy. You were selected as a possible subject because of your 
familiarity with nonprofit healthcare advocacy. We ask that you read this form and 
ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
The study is being conducted by Fady Qaddoura in the Indian University Lilly 
School of Philanthropy at Indiana University - Indianapolis.  Dr. Lehn Benjamin, a 
faculty member in the Lilly School of Philanthropy, is supervising the project.  This 
project is not funded. 
 
STUDY PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of nonprofit health human service 
nonprofits on the implementation of public policy/healthcare policy. 
 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY: 
 
If you agree to be in the study, you will do the following things: Participate in an 
interview designed to last no more than two hours. The interview will be recorded 
on a digital recorder and then transcribed.  The interviews will occur at a location 
of your choice or in a private room at your organization’s location. 
 
RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
This study involves no risk. However, if you feel discomfort in discussing 
confidential or personal experiences that may have been difficult then please know 
that you can stop the interview at any time and we can skip any questions. 
 
BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
There is no direct benefit to the subject. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential.  We cannot 
guarantee absolute confidentiality.  Your personal information may be disclosed if 
required by law.  Your identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study 
may be published. Fady Qaddoura and Dr. Lehn Benjamin will have access to the 
audio recordings of the interview, and they will be deleted at the end of this research 
project.    
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Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality 
assurance and data analysis include groups such as the study investigator and 
his/her research associates, the Indiana University Institutional Review Board or its 
designees, and (as allowed by law) state or federal agencies, specifically the Office 
for Human Research Protections (OHRP).  
 
PAYMENT 
 
There are no payments for participation. 
 
 
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
For questions about the study or a research-related injury, contact the researcher 
Fady Qaddoura by e-mail at fqaddour@iupui.edu.  
 
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, 
complaints or concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, or offer 
input, contact the IU Human Subjects Office at (317) 278-3458 or for Indianapolis 
or (812) 856-4242 for Bloomington or (800) 696-2949 or by e-mail at irb@iu.edu. 
 
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY 
 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or may 
leave the study at any time.  Leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss 
of benefits to which you are entitled.  Your decision whether or not to participate in 
this study will not affect your current or future relations with IUPUI 
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APPENDIX D – Recruitment Email 
 
Dear_________________________ 
 
My name is Fady Qaddoura, I'm a PhD candidate at the IU School of Philanthropy 
- Indianapolis. I have an IRB approval (1411878474) to conduct a research project 
to fulfill my PhD dissertation requirements under the supervision of Dr. Dwight 
Burlingame (dburling@iupui.edu office phone: 317-278-8926). My study 
aims to examine how nonprofits influence the implementation of new health care 
policies in Indiana using the implementation of the Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 as a 
case study. HIP 2.0 is Indiana’s Medicaid expansion program under the Affordable 
Care Act.  
 
I'm interested in interviewing you because you/your organization/or an association 
or coalition that represents your organization either: 
 
(1) Participated in the HIP 2.0 public comment hearings back in 2015 or  
(2) Participated (directly or indirectly) with government officials from the 
Indiana Family and Social Services Administration or other state agencies to 
influence the implementation of HIP 2.0 in Indiana during the implementation 
phase (2015).  
 
Your participation would involve meeting with me for a one-on-one private 
interview designed to last one to two hours. I will ask you questions about your 
organization, constituency, public policy positions, and advocacy 
activities. Everything you share with me will be kept very strictly private and 
confidential. Your identity and your organization's identity will be protected and will 
not be included in the final publication. The outcome of this research will be used 
for my dissertation only. If you are interested in participating and your organization 
is a registered nonprofit then please reply to this email with your formal acceptance 
to participate in the interview. I can meet with you either at your office/organization 
or at IUPUI/School of Philanthropy (University Hall, Suite 3000 - 301 University 
Boulevard - Indianapolis, IN 46202), whichever is more convenient for you. Please 
feel free to contact me by email at (fqaddour@iupui.edu). 
 
I appreciate your consideration of my request. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Fady Qaddoura 
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APPENDIX E – Document Summary 
 
I reviewed the public hearing documents on “Medicaid Expansion in the State of 
Indiana” and “Public Conversations on the Future of Healthcare in Indiana” events, 
or what is known as expanding the “Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 (HIP 2.0).” Governor 
Mike Pence, Secretary of the Family and Social Services Administration, and the 
Indiana Medicaid director led a series of public events and conversation forums to 
educate the public about the state’s plans to expand healthcare options to the 
uninsured and the underinsured Hoosier population. The videos of the public 
hearing events are posted on the state of Indiana’s website. The pdf documents 
explaining the history of the program, the proposed new program, public comments 
by nonprofits, for-profits, and citizens’ groups were also posted to the website. 
Documents I reviewed could be found on this website 
http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/2442.htm  
 
The list of documents I reviewed are listed below: 
 Press release  
 Governor Pence HIP 2.0 Rollout recording (5.15.14)  
 HIP 2.0 waiver application  
 HIP 2.0 letters of endorsement  
 HIP 2.0: Myths vs. Facts  
 Frequently asked questions  
 HIP 2.0 plans at a glance  
 Infographic: The history of consumer-driven health care in Indiana  
 Public comment period information  
 HIP 2.0 public presentation  
 Presentation to State Budget Committee (6/20/14)  
 About the waiver process 
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